Sentences with phrase «knower in»

An object is that which has the relationship of being known by a subject - which Knower in the final analysis is the Mind of God, in whose image our own minds are made.

As Thomas Aquinas repeatedly mentions, «to know» means, as a first approximation, that a being is not just itself as this determinate actuality, but also is another, that is, by holding in itself other «forms,» purely as forms, without at the same time itself having the real being that normally attaches to those forms.7 In this perspective, «knowing» expresses the possession of a multiplicity of forms that extends beyond the formal existence of the knower and includes forms that the knower in reality is not.

At the same time, I do not think that the notion of the active participation of the knower in the process of knowing needs to lead to such sinister consequences as is sometimes suggested.

Not exact matches

As I have argued in my book Moral, Believing Animals, all human beings are believers, not knowers who know with certitude.

Later the idea gained ground that we can not «speak of nature apart from human perception in the historical development of knowledge», that all knowledge is «a creative interaction between the known and the knower» and that therefore there is no System of scientific knowledge or of technology which does not have the subjective purposes and faith - presuppositions of humans built into it.

The knower, the percipient event, provides the clue to nature in general.

In thomistic terms, form - as - intellectual - species is a «likeness» of the knowable thing, ordered towards the same, and adequate to the knower's task of knowing.

The other solution was to say clearly that, Yes, the knower is also a being, and then to think of that being in analogy with tables and stones.

If one still wanted to know about the knower and the knower's experience, this could be treated in a secondary way as a particular form of the body or a relation of the body to external objects.

In the Thomistic doctrine, this applied to all knowers except the Supreme Knower: «It was indeed the Thomistic doctrine that in knowledge, apart from God, it is the knower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knower..In the Thomistic doctrine, this applied to all knowers except the Supreme Knower: «It was indeed the Thomistic doctrine that in knowledge, apart from God, it is the knower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knowKnower: «It was indeed the Thomistic doctrine that in knowledge, apart from God, it is the knower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knower..in knowledge, apart from God, it is the knower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knowknower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knowerknower....

And there can be no efficacy in a systematic philosophy that loses sight of the vocation of the human knower to the whole of reality.

Just as Hartshorne claimed that God is not only the knower of all, but known by all, he now claims that God not only causes all (in a supreme but non-determinative sense), but is the supreme effect of all.

Just as we would say that the person in the Chinese Box has no real knowledge of Chinese, Hartshorne would say that God does not have real knowledge of the world unless God is a sympathetic knower.

Indeed, it is You who is Knower of the unseen» (109)[The Day] when Allah will say, «O Jesus, Son of Mary, remember My favor upon you and upon your mother when I supported you with the Pure Spirit and you spoke to the people in the cradle and in maturity; and [remember] when I taught you writing and wisdom and the Torah and the Gospel; and when you designed from clay [what was] like the form of a bird with My permission, then you breathed into it, and it became a bird with My permission; and you healed the blind and the leper with My permission; and when you brought forth the dead with My permission; and when I restrained the Children of Israel from [killing] you when you came to them with clear proofs and those who disbelieved among them said, «This is not but obvious magic.»

Part of the impetus for the idea of divine relativity comes from Hartshorne's interpretation of the Thomistic theory of knowledge in which the knower is in an internal cognitive relation to the known.

God knows all things, but in such fashion (it was held) that there is zero relativity or dependence in God as knower, and maximal dependence in the creatures as known.

A driving force in this tradition has been the philosophical «turn to the subject,» a shift of focus from the thing known to the knower who knows it.

Among the most important dimensions of this critique is its insistence that knower and «knowee» are, in relation to one another and before God, both subjects and objects.

These knowers occupy epistemological standpoints that are salutary precisely because of, and almost in direct relation to.

In the former the knower can not be merely a detached scientific observer but must also himself participate, for it is through his participation that he discovers both the typical and the unique in the aspects of human life that he is studyinIn the former the knower can not be merely a detached scientific observer but must also himself participate, for it is through his participation that he discovers both the typical and the unique in the aspects of human life that he is studyinin the aspects of human life that he is studying.

Then we turn to the All - knower, who knows our bad, but knows this good in us also, and who is just.

Only I - Thou sees this wholeness as the whole person in unreasoned relation with what is over against him rather than as a sum of parts, some of which are labeled objective and hence oriented around the thing known and some subjective and hence oriented around the knower.

I Let us follow John Wilcox in defining temporalistic or process theism as any theism which portrays God as an experiencing subject, the knower of temporal processes, whose knowledge is itself subject to growth, expanding along with the growth in temporal reality which is the object of that knowledge (2:295 a).

I would accept this stress on the importance of the categories of understanding imposed by the knower, but I would want to attribute them less to the given structures of the mind (as in Bohr's neo-Kantian view) than to the limitations of our experience and imagination.

He provides the balanced picture again between knower and known, without an a priori, in going on to say: «The key to development is a mind capable of thinking in technological terms and grasping the fully human meaning of human activities, within the context of the holistic meaning of the individual's being.»

In this way the self - knowledge of man, the knower, is accepted as an essential part of the process of inquiry.

Pope Benedict goes on in CiV to affirm the necessary contextualization of the most objective and fruitful use of knowledge, the production of technology, by the complimentarity of knower and known:

Therefore, logical interdependence entails ontological interdependence — God as knower and the world as known depend, in some respects, on each other.87

I believe that similar insights are conveyed by Whitehead when he argues against understanding the relationship between subject and object as only that between knower and known in a Cartesian conceptualism (Al 117ff.).

Rather, genuine knowledge is a performative questioning of the multiple environments and ecologies of data, empowering the knower to participate creatively and responsibly in life.

Thus, it is the cognitive context that shapes Hartshorne's conception of actuality; hence, in the final analysis what anything (including the concrete) is, is what it is as an item of knowledge in the perfect knower.

For the possible, however articulated or specific, is in principle accessible to the knower; the actual, as an instantiation of possible structure and quality, is knowable, but, as concrete, it exceeds any knowledge of its structures and qualities.

In other words, on the part of the knower (reason), to attain the future, the region of metaphysical knowledge, it must be fully evolved.

Not only because they can only be known if they are brought together by this one cognition under definite common formal principles, but also9 because cognition rightly understood is not simply the conscious taking cognizance by a knower of an object which confronts the process of cognition in a completely external and uninvolved way.

Mutual interaction between subject and object, knower and known, is the context for the rise of knowledge rather than that context being in the object or subject alone.

And as the use of what is lower - than - man can only be for what is lower and not for what is higher in the user himself, the knower and user becomes in such use, if made all - inclusive, himself lower than man.

Thus man - the - knower apprehends man - qua - lower - than - himself and in doing so achieves knowledge of man - qua - lower - than - man, since all scientific theory is of things lower than man - the - knower.

In the recognition, that contemplation and reflection are the distance of eternity away from time and actuality, there is indeed a truth: the knower can understand that truth, but he can not understand himself.

The issue of the structure of experience is often discussed as a choice between two epistemological theories: «realism» (in which «the known creates the knower» or the noetic pole depends on the ontic) and «idealism» (in which «the knower creates the known» or the ontic pole depends on the noetic).

The universal structure of the universe is not given, as in most other forms of theology; it is in part constructed and deconstructed by the knower's particular interests and actions.

Palmer always uses the term «objective» to describe the antagonistic posture of the isolated, active knower who seeks, for purposes of manipulation and control, to grasp, through the scientific method, the passive objects of the world in such a way that the knowledge that results «will reflect the nature of the objects in question rather than the knower's whims.»

We close ourselves down, because we KNOW deep down in our knower that we have the truth.

Rorty's description of the hermeneutical or edifying philosopher resembles Palmer's description of the knower - in - community.

Necessary existential truth (metaphysical truth) means to be capable, in principle, of being apprehended by any knower.

H. Richard Niebuhr in his classic study The Meaning of Revelation, put this idea in the context of religious revelation:»... no universal knowledge of things as they are in themselves is possible,... all knowledge is conditioned by the standpoint of the knower.

Expulsion of the human subject from nature is implied in the scientific method of knowing which puritanically (one is tempted to say Gnostically) segregates the human knower from nature, and in the materialism, mechanism, or «hard naturalism,» which follows from a severe logical divorce of physical reality from mental reality.

The claim of Dewey and others that all knowing involves aesthetic valuation is intimately associated with the idea that knowing is purposive, that it is guided and given form by some end in view, some active concern of the knower.

Niebuhr recognized this complexity when he wrote in his essay The Purpose of the church and its Ministry: Reflections on the Aims of Theological Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), 26, «The world is sometimes enemy, sometimes partner of the Church, often antagonist, always one to be befriended; now the one that does not know what Church knows, now the knower of what the Church does not know,» 13.

And if discourse about a context devoid of objects is absurd, so must be discourse in a context devoid of subjects; the expression «There might have been nothing» could hardly be meaningful when no conceivable knower, not even God, could exist to confirm its truth (CSPM 57f; NTT 79, 83f; LP 87f).

These questions present no special difficulty if one's philosophical stance is external to the human knowers one is considering as subjects; if, in other words, one speaks of knowers only in the third person.