i.e.,
knowledge by acquaintance.
For example, Proudfoot argues that James's descriptive «
knowledge by acquaintance,» even though it claims to be acquired by an unprejudiced and radically empirical «sense,» is in fact heavily theory - laden, an intellectual hypothesis.
Whether it be Wieman's general appropriation of James's «
knowledge by acquaintance» in Religious Experience and Scientific Method, Meland's «appreciative awareness,» or Loomer's more narrative forms of gathering evidence, each purports merely to describe, but then evinces that the description is driven by rather specific personal and / or contextual definitions of what counts as religious experience.
And the role of intuitions in Russell's view seems, on the face of it, similar to Bergson's in being foundational — they consist of
knowledge by acquaintance, thus serving an indispensable role in epistemology.
Not exact matches
Moreover, this
knowledge is empathetic, intimate, sympathetic
knowledge, closer to feeling than to rationality.27 It is
knowledge «
by acquaintance»; it is not «information about.»
Cf. also Brightman, «Do We Have
Knowledge -
by -
Acquaintance of the Self?»