Economic growth can be boiled down to two factors: growth in working - age population and growth in
labor force productivity.
The consequences are a reduction in America's
labor force productivity, future increases in spending on the social safety net, and a loss of tax revenue.
Since the 1940's, the 8 - year growth rate of U.S.
labor force productivity has rarely exceeded 3 %, and the recent trend has been progressively lower.
Not exact matches
Under these circumstances
productivity is increased only by working the existing
labor force more intensively and cutting back medical insurance, old - age pensions and other social welfare expenditures.
Based on estimates of
labor force and
productivity growth at the time, if you asked a standard - issue macroeconomist back then where real GDP would be today, this is the line she would have showed you.
By 2015, analysts had significantly marked down GDP growth, based on the fact that the
labor force had contracted more than they thought back in 2007 and
productivity growth was slower.
Potential economic growth is going to slow dramatically over the coming years because of slowing growth in the
labor force, due to growing demographic trends, and continued poor
productivity performance.
And the Council of Economic Advisers announced that policies such as work flexibility «lead to higher
labor force participation, greater
labor productivity and work engagement, and better allocation of talent across the economy.»
Improved management and automation enables production with fewer people Falling need for
labor inputs means that
labor force and
labor productivity growth are not the constraints on production growth they once were.
While the assumptions about the future unemployment rate may be affected by policy, the fact is that slower U.S. population growth, coupled with an aging population, place substantial limits on
labor force growth, which will leave U.S. GDP growth almost entirely dependent on changes in
productivity.
It would mean that German industrialists and their government allies, who have attempted to grow not by investing in
productivity but by
forcing German workers and their European partners to subsidize their unit
labor costs, after having caused huge damage to peripheral Europe's balance sheets and European workers everywhere, including in Germany, will now pass the cost onto the rest of the world.
At a 4.1 % unemployment rate and
labor force growth now down to about 0.5 %, the baseline expectation for real GDP growth in the coming years is approaching just 1 % (0.5 %
labor force growth plus
productivity growth of about 0.5 % annually).
[158] Other causes include the rise in non-cash benefits as a share of worker compensation (which aren't counted in CPS income data), immigrants entering the
labor force, statistical distortions including the use of different inflation adjusters by the BLS and CPS,
productivity gains being skewed toward less
labor - intensive sectors, income shifting from
labor to capital, a skill gap - driven wage disparity,
productivity being falsely inflated by hidden technology - driven depreciation increases and import price measurement problems, and / or a natural period of adjustment following an income surge during aberrational postwar circumstances.
«The only way to get to 3 percent growth on a sustained basis is faster growth of the
labor force or faster growth of
productivity.
Businesses are allocating capital more efficiently; the
labor force is retooling its skills for the new economy; and technological innovation continues to push the limits of human
productivity.
Its deceleration between 1972 and 1999 was offset by a broad acceleration in potential
productivity of the
labor force during these years.
Spader's presentation addressed past and projected movements in the homeownership rate, and Calabria dove into why reversing weak
productivity and the low
labor force participation rate are necessary to boost the economy.
The subpar growth reflects weak
productivity growth, which has averaged less than 1 % over the past five years, and a low rate of
labor force participation that remains at levels last seen in the 1970s.
In a report issued from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in January, average GDP growth was projected to be less than 2 % per year between 2017 and 2020 due to sluggish growth in the
labor force of 0.5 % and
productivity growth of less than 1.5 % per year.
Demographics patterns in the U.S. today do not support strong gains in the working age population and
labor force without changes in immigration rates, while
productivity growth has been stubbornly weak.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that during the 1950 — 1973 period, the
labor force grew 1.6 % per year, while
labor productivity grew at a strong 2.4 % rate, resulting in overall potential growth of 4 % annually.
These conditions are associated with a wide range of health issues, including unintentional injuries, respiratory illnesses like asthma and radon - induced lung cancer, lead poisoning, result in lost school days for children, as well as lost
productivity in the
labor force.
In a report issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in January, average GDP growth was projected to be less than 2.0 percent per year between 2017 and 2020 due to sluggish growth in the
labor force of 0.5 percent and
productivity growth of less than 1.5 percent per year.
By definition, output growth is the sum of
productivity growth and
labor force growth.
So either
productivity growth has to accelerate from today's low levels or the
labor force has to expand at a more rapid rate.