Still, consider s. 64 (1) of that statute: «An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and
liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.»
So forget about sections like An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and
liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.
Not exact matches
Whether one views constitutional
interpretation as grounded in a theory of original meaning or the traditional
liberal theory of judicial restraint and neutral principles, the distinctive nature of this approach is that it is legal in nature.
As a result the Wesleyan tradition, like most other classical traditions, has had both its fundamentalist and its more
liberal wings of
interpretation.
Others among the Sufis held fast to shari`a, but understood it in ways which were much wider and more
liberal than the
interpretation of the orthodox, looking upon the law
as either a system of self - discipline or
as a set of symbols representing hidden religious meanings.
Every ideological passion,
liberal or conservative, may be encased in scripture itself or enshrined in longstanding
interpretation until it is regarded
as absolute and trusted
as decisive authority.
Nevertheless, in spite of the
interpretations offered by
liberal thought, ancient or modern, the doctrine of divine choice did in actuality work out
as a prolific source of national arrogance.
For my part I have been very much taken with — I should say, won over by — the eschatological
interpretation that Jurgen Moltmann gives to the Christian kerygma in his work The Theology of Hope.1
As we know, Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer are at the origin of the reinterpretation of the whole of the New Testament, starting with the preaching of the Kingdom of God and of the last things and breaking with the moralizing Christ of the
liberal exegetes.
Here we can not go into the analyses of each of these trends or the adequacy of Ferré's
interpretation of the recent trends in American theology, except to say that theologians of different persuasions, with the possible exception of the so - called
liberals, while recognizing the usefulness of the history of religions, nevertheless agree with Professor Hendrik Kraemer in stating that only theology «is able to produce that attitude of freedom of the spirit and of impartial understanding, combined with a criticism and evaluation transcending all imprisonment in preconceived ideas and principles
as ultimate standards of reference.»
Critical scholars can not ignore such voices for they underline the necessity of moving beyond
interpretations that view the politics of building peace
as driven by a Manichean split between
liberal and illiberal political epistemologies.
These include the need for a purposively broad,
liberal and benevolent
interpretation of the Constitution
as a whole, so far
as the language of the constitution would admit, having due regard to the underlying values and principles that need to be promoted to safeguarded our system of participatory democracy, the principle that the constitution is a document sui generis, and allied to this, the principle that the constitution must be interpreted in the light of its own words, and not words found in some other written constitution» (Writ No: JI / 15/2015 [unreported] pages 23 & 24).
(And,
as with Body Snatchers, Siegel's own
liberal interpretation was trumped by a more forceful hard - right reading.
Students thoroughly enjoy this documentary
as it is engaging and promotes good debate between literal and
liberal interpretations of Biblical accounts of creation.
(On the other hand, the figures were,
as Stanley Temple has said, «not actual data» [6] in the first place, so I suppose that does allow for some rather
liberal interpretation.)
As the New York Times explains, you're going to have to be a little bit
liberal with your
interpretation of «costs» to include things like the economic value of improved human health from cleaner air — invaluable, to some, but not exactly the sort of thing the fossil fuel industry includes in its bottom line.
Although the Court of Appeal shared the sympathies which Mr Justice McCombe had previously expressed for police officers «who have to confront day in and day out the realities of life rather than the black letter law which this court has to apply» (see Bonner v DPP [2004] EWHC 2415 (Admin), [2004] All ER (D) 74 (Oct)-RRB-, it recognised,
as indeed it must, that if the law were to be changed, it was to be achieved by Parliament using the legislative process rather than by the courts according the statutory provision a «
liberal» (or illiberal)
interpretation.
As this provision triggers a substantial monetary penalty, we must guard against a
liberal interpretation that extends the scope of the essential elements, which are already quite broad, given the fact that the person who has committed the violation has absolute liability, that the prosecutor has a considerably reduced burden of proof and that the person who has committed a violation risks higher penalties in the event of a subsequent violation (see sections 5 and 6 and Schedule 3 of the AMPs Regulations).
A review of the long line of Supreme Court decisions descending from Chief Justice Dickson's and Mr. Justice LaForest's decision in Sparrow in 1990 shows a Court that began its consideration of these matters by describing s. 35 (1) «
as a promise» and that promises needed to be considered with a
liberal and generous purposive
interpretation.
The Privy Council in Edwards accepted the Lambe proposition
as being generally valid, but added that the BNA Act should not be construed strictly,
as penal or tax statutes are, and should instead be given a
liberal interpretation since it was «passed to ensure the peace, order and good government of a British Colony.»
In Kazakewich v. Kazakewich, [1936] A.J. No. 10 (C.A.), the Alberta Court of Appeal summed up the ratios in Lambe, Severn and Edwards in this way at paragraph 86: I take it then that in approaching the
interpretation of the pertinent sections of The B.N.A. Act with respect to the administration of justice, a Court should keep in mind that these sections are embodied in an Imperial statute to which the ordinary rules for the
interpretation of statutes apply, that therefore the intention of the framers of this Imperial statute must be ascertained
as at the date of the enactment by having regard to the words employed without extraneous aids to
interpretation where the language is unambiguous, and that having regard however to the nature of the statute, a great constitutional charter, the widest and most
liberal construction of the words used should be adopted with a view to giving effect to the whole scheme of Canadian union [Emphasis Added].
'' [A] s the manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the states and of the United States, is to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self - incriminating kind from a party or a witness, the
liberal construction which must be placed upon constitutional provisions for the protection of personal rights would seem to require that the constitutional guaranties, however differently worded, should have
as far
as possible the same
interpretation...»
Note that the CCH decision never describes the first - stage purposes test
as having a low threshold, though a broad and
liberal interpretation may lead to that conclusion,
as it ensures that the user's right of fair dealing will benefit from a full analysis of whether the use is fair.