The court's proposal, that a document not referred to either in evidence or an argument could be inferred by the court to be unimportant, was generally acceptable to counsel as a pragmatic approach, but not to the extent that
it limited appellate review.
Not exact matches
The 2003 version of Family Proceedings Rules 1991, r 8.1 (3) requires that the judge, as
appellate tribunal, «be
limited to a
review of the decision or order of the district judge», save where the «judge considers that... it would be in the interests of justice to hold a rehearing» — as happened, for example in R v R (Lump Sum Repayments)[2003] EWHC 3197 (Fam), [2004] 1 FLR 928, where Mr Justice Wilson (as he then was) decided that the evidence before the district judge needed to be revisited by him.
Recently, in Sattva Capital Corporation v Creston Moly Corporation et al [2014] 2 SCR 633, the court confirmed that the
appellate jurisdiction to
review written construction cases must necessarily be
limited given the legal requirement for the first instance court to reach its decision as a mixed question of law and fact.
The Federal Circuit applied Cuozzo, which suggested the
limits of § 314 (d)'s prohibition on
appellate review.
In the majority opinion, Circuit Judge Moore stated that the court granted rehearing to reaffirm the
limits of
appellate review, including
review of claim construction issues in light of Teva Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
In B.C. the scope of
appellate intervention in commercial arbitration is narrow: there is
limited jurisdiction for
appellate review of arbitration awards because B.C. is statutorily
limited to questions of law (Arbitration Act, s. 31); even where such jurisdiction exists, the S.C.C. held that a deferential standard of
review — reasonableness — «almost always» applies to arbitration awards (Sattva Capital v. Creston Moly Corp., [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, at paras. 75, 104 and 106).
The most plausible explanation lies in the very
limited scope that exists for
appellate review in this area.