«Many subprime
loans during the housing bubble were made by nonbank mortgage brokers.
Not exact matches
In the mad scramble for
loan creation
during the final phase of the
Housing Bubble, the government created an environment of essentially free money by allowing the big agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (or Phony and Fraudie, as I often affectionately refer to them), to securitize
loans to the bottom of the barrel risks with crazy terms like no money down and incredibly low «teaser» interest rates.
In addition to the concern about lenders» strong incentives to offer predatory
loans, they argue that such «teaser» payment
loans have the risk of boosting
housing bubbles as they are popular with both borrowers and lenders, who expect
housing prices to continue to rise
during bubbles.
FHA guidelines have always allowed lower down payments and looser credit qualifications than conventional financing; but
during the freewheeling time before the
housing bubble burst in 2003 - 2007, conventional
loans were just as easy to obtain and many had zero - down - payment options so FHA
loans were less popular.
But much like the country's private lenders
during the first several years of the present century, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's drive to increase profits helped create the
housing bubble (thanks to lowered underwriting standards, approvals for subprime borrowers and the bundling of
loans into mortgage - backed securities).
However,
during the
housing bubble, many
loans issued to subprime borrowers have since gone into default.
During the
housing bubble people took
loans against their equity and bought a boat.
The couple's interest - only, 100 percent - financed
loan was a classic
bubble product that became a formula for foreclosure
during the
housing crash.
The lender recognizes that the borrower «could» be taking home more money than the IRS taxes, however,
during the
housing bubble of the 2000s many brokers used «no doc»
loans as a tool to qualify a borrower even though they knew the borrower did not meet income requirements (thus the name «liar's
loan» came to be).
The underlying assumptions that support caveat emptor, the idea that sellers and consumers occupy equal bargaining positions and that they share access to the same information governing a
loan product's quality or suitability, were simply untrue at the height of mortgage lending
during the
housing bubble.