Sentences with phrase «logical subject»

While we are still on the topic of coat variety in context with dog grooming then the next logical subject matter is coat length.

Zebrafish are a logical subject choice in the study of neural development for many scientists.

The baby here becomes the logical subject» of the proposition and the cry of distress the «predicative pattern» (PR 393).

It is true if the actual occasion or nexus that is the logical subject of the proposition in fact sustains that relation to the eternal object that the proposition attributes to it.

The sense of obligation is the subjective form of an imaginative feeling of a proposition of which one's future self is the logical subject and a possible mode of behavior is the predicate.

Each logical subject becomes a bare «it» among actualities, with its assigned hypothetical relevance to the predicate.

We will assume that God's aim for it, a propositional feeling for which the new occasion is the logical subject and some complex eternal object the predicate, will in every case be prehended and play a decisive role in the determination of the subjective aim of the occasion.

Truth or falsity is established by means of the anchor that the logical subject has in given fact, but truth value is not intrinsic to the proposition in itself.

He continues: «Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.

Rather, in the provocative words of «The Metaphysical Scheme of March 1927,» a proposition «contains» two subjects, the logical subject and the «percipient subject» for whom the proposition is or is not a valid element in experience; a proposition is not only about its logical subject, but is for any one of its percipient subjects, and thus relevant for the future (MS 321, 322).

To recapitulate: the two subjects embraced by the proposition, the logical subject in a potential predicative pattern and the prehending, e.g., entertaining subject; the two correlative conditions for the truth and falsity of propositions, the fact that they both «can» and «must» be true or false; the fact that a proposition is a «real possibility» for an «entertaining subject,» gives to the proposition its fundamental trait: according to Whitehead, a proposition is a lure for feeling.3

The intrinsic togetherness of the indicated state of affairs as logical subject and the assigned predicative pattern in their potentiality for realization is phenomenologically distinct from the eventual truth or falsity of the proposition.

If the proposition does not already contain the locus of the prehending subject and logical subject, the proposition can not be entertained.

In a proposition a predicative pattern is asserted either to be, or not to be, in whole or in part, exhibited in some logical subject or subjects.

3 If the logical subject is a future actual occasion, it must be anticipated on the basis of the feeling of the objective immortality inherent in immediate fact (PR 425).

The subject of a proposition (the «logical subject») is in a sense a really existing subject.

If so, the initial phase of the subjective aim is also the feeling of a proposition of which the occasion itself is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object the predicate.

The classical expression, e.g., in Aristotle (PA 77a10) and Kant (CPR A151 = B190), of the principle of noncontradiction is that a logical subject can not contain contradictory predicates together.

Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.

Along with the logical subject - predicate paradigm, the related metaphysical doctrine of enduring substratum with changing attributes is also to be rejected in favor of a conception of process evolving towards more and more interconnection between apparently separate existents.

One can see here the connection between the internal relation between eternal objects, and the fact that from the standpoint of the prehending occasion, its datum, as a logical subject placed within a functional context, is internally related to it.

In a proposition, «The definite set of actual entities involved are called the «logical subjects of the proposition»; and the definite set of eternal objects involved are called the «predicates of the proposition.»

Hence I have previously proposed that initial aims be derived from propositional feelings by God, whose logical subjects constituted the entire past actual world of a nascent occasion (PPCT 292n9; IPQ 13:350 - 52).

The emotional pattern of the feeling of the intuitive judgment reflects the original disconnection of the predicate from the logical subjects.

A proposition proposes that certain select matters of fact, called «logical subjects,» be interpreted, or theorized about, in terms of a particular «predicate.»

The problem confronted by such a poem is not that of understanding, of explanation or of establishing the rational relation among the logical subjects — wheelbarrow, rainwater, and white chickens.

In a proposition, the «logical subjects» are not tied down to objectivity, given as already realized.

The logical subjects, however, are not capable of doing more than indicating how the proposition could be realized: if the logical subjects to which the predicative pattern refers could, in themselves, make the proposition «tell tales» as to its ingression, it would be to cast the world's lot in advance, it would be to prescribe exhaustively creative unfolding and thus vitiate creativity.

The proposition is the potentiality of an assigned predicative pattern finding realization in indicated logical subjects (PR 24/35, 186/283, 257f / 393f, 261/398).

«Thus no actual entity can feel a proposition, if its actual world does not include the logical subjects of that proposition» (PR 259/396; cf. 203/309, 260/397).

The subjective aim, which as Ford clarifies it, is a proposition whose logical subjects indicate the past actual world the novel occasion is to unify, guides the feeling of the nascent subject, the source of which, for Whitehead, is God (DP 292n9).

Taking propositions concretely, however, means having recourse not only to its logical subjects, but to the contextual conditions brought to bear with the prehending subject entertaining the proposition.

The restrictive abstractness of the predicative pattern, and the abstract definiteness of the indicative logical subjects provide the necessary indeterminacy and determinacy for a proposition to be true or false.

While the objectified facts are invested with a certain levity, no longer fully sedimented, the logical subjects as an indicative system, on the other hand, restrict the freedom of the proposition to apply to any actual entity in absolute generality.

Rather, in the unity of the proposition, actual entities assume the form of «logical subjects» and eternal objects are transformed into the «predicative pattern.»

The particular facts function no longer as «factors,» but become «bare its,» that is, function as logical subjects with a hypothetical relevance to a predicative pattern now potentially determinate of these logical subjects.

Yet a proposition regarded simply in terms of its logical subjects admits too much vagueness to have a de facto truth value.

Existing as entertained in experience, propositions not only can be true or false, a capability afforded by their logical subjects, but are in fact true or false (AI 245; PR 11 / 16f, 258/394).

It is to realize that the proposition regarded simply in terms of its logical subjects is vague in the sense of poly - valence and that to become what it is, the proposition requires valuation, i.e., an interpretive matrix.

Quite simply, a proposition is true when the logical subjects do in fact exemplify the predicative pattern, or differently stated, when a member of the proposition's locus admits the proposition into feeling in such a way that the predicative pattern actually conforms to the indicative logical subjects.

The indicative character of logical subjects disciplines the scope of the predicative pattern; they enjoy the function as «food for possibility» and enable the proposition to refer to the actuality of the world, to existential particularity.

A proposition is not simply that fusion or «contrast» of predicative patterns and logical subjects, for it does not «contain» only one subject, i.e., the logical subject.

But this assertion concerns the logical subjects merely and neglects the unique way in which a proposition «contains» two subjects.

The logical subjects of the proposition are all those actual occasions constituting its past world.

The basic elements of an imaginative proposition are named: the origin of the logical subjects from one portion of the original (objectified) nexus and the eternal object (for the predicate) from another part of the nexus.

It would make more sense to reconceive initial subjective aims in terms of propositional feelings.9 The indicated logical subjects of the proposition can specify the standpoint (PR 283) whereas a pure eternal object can not.

In interpretation, the reader entertains propositions whose logical subjects include entities in the reader's (and author's) past world; only as such do they become components of the interpreter's «forms of subjectivity»; so there is always an element of objective reference.

And among the «proposals» entertained in a given moment there are those whose logical subjects include the percipient subject; but these are not the only «proposals» there are.

In any proposition it is always «a matter of convention as to which of the proximate societies are reckoned as logical subjects and which as background» (PR 192/293).

The proposition could be written as «It is Socratic and mortal,» where each of the possible logical subjects would presuppose actual worlds which would exemplify certain systematic schemes in which the predicates would be realizable (PR 264f.