By 2016 QQE had succeeded in lowering real interest rates through
both lower nominal rates and increased inflation expectations.
Not exact matches
In many cases, acceleration should
lower their costs, as
nominal interest
rates will likely be higher two years from now than they are today, and idle construction crews in Alberta are relatively abundant.
Nominal interest
rates, both short and long term, have been much
lower and more stable.
One, you've got
lower nominal GDP growth, and long - term
rates correlate with
nominal GDP.
There is, of course, a great deal of skepticism about the 7 % real GDP growth
rate that China has reported, but we should remember that in the first quarter,
nominal GDP growth was much
lower, 5.8 %.
Low inflation and the impossibility of pushing
nominal interest
rates significantly below zero meant that there was little scope for
lowering real interest
rates and easing credit conditions by conventional means.
While stocks have a terminal value beyond a 10 - year period, the effects of interest
rates and
nominal growth on those projections largely cancel out because higher
nominal GDP growth over a given 10 - year horizon is correlated with both higher interest
rates and generally
lower market valuations at the end of that period.
As long as this government debt is rolled over continuously at non-repressed interest
rates, which will be
low as
nominal GDP growth drops, China can rebalance the economy without a collapse in growth.
Because
low - risk investments return roughly 20 % on average in a country with 20 %
nominal GDP growth, financial repression means that the benefits of growth are unfairly distributed between savers (who get just the deposit
rate, say 3 %), banks, who get the spread between the lending and the deposit
rate (say 3.5 %) and the borrower, who gets everything else (13.5 % in this case, assuming he takes little risk — even more if he takes risk).
In a
low - inflation environment,
nominal interest
rates are also
low, and households are able to service much higher levels of debt than they could in the past.
There are so many reasons why this is wrong (to list just the most obvious, poor countries have much
lower debt thresholds than rich countries, Japanese debt can not possibly be dismissed as not being a problem, and because it is almost impossible to find an economist who understands the relationship between
nominal interest
rates and implicit amortization, Japanese government debt has probably only been manageable to date because GDP growth close to zero has permitted interest
rates close to zero) and yet inane comparisons between China's debt burden and Japan's debt burden are made all the time.
There is a growing sense that the world is demand short — that the real interest
rates necessary to equate investment and saving at full employment are very
low and may be often unattainable given the bounds on
nominal interest
rate reductions.
Originally, the Liberals adjusted the private sector average forecasts (
lower real and
nominal GDP and increased interest
rates).
Thank God someone in the US government understands that Japan is being hurt by falling NGDP, and that the easier money required to end the deflation will likely lead to a
lower nominal exchange
rate.
Even if the growth
rates of
nominal GDP and U.S. corporate revenues (including foreign revenues) over the coming 20 years match their 4 % growth
rate of the past 20 years, and even if the most reliable valuation measures merely touch their historical norms 20 years from today, the S&P 500 Index two decades from now will trade more than 20 %
lower than where it trades today.
Lower nominal — but higher effective — tax
rates would eliminate bad incentives and bring in more corporate income tax revenue.
Interest
rates of intermediaries in Australia remain historically
low, both in real and
nominal terms, and by international standards (Table 7).
Other factors driving
rates lower —
low nominal global growth, an older population,
lower fixed income supply and the disinflationary pressure of technology — will likely remain in place.
The large
nominal exchange
rate appreciation also helped to contain inflationary pressures in an environment of strong growth in domestic demand and a decline in the unemployment
rate to relatively
low levels.
This is a percentage point
lower than average potential growth in the decade prior to the crisis... We estimate that the real neutral policy
rate is currently in the range of 1 to 2 per cent... This translates into a
nominal neutral policy
rate of 3 to 4 per cent, down from a range of 4 1/2 to 5 1/2 per cent in the period prior to the crisis.»
In 1991, the
nominal GDP growth
rate hit a
low of 2.9 %.
McAndrews J (2015), «Negative
Nominal Central Bank Policy
Rates: Where is the
Lower Bound?»
Of course that 25.6 % number is still quite a bit
lower than the
nominal tax
rate of 35 %, the highest in the world behind only Japan.
Nominal interest
rates are at historical
lows and new fiscal measures have shifted the budget into a sizeable deficit.
Although it now seems that the «zero
lower bound» for
nominal interest
rates wasn't actually zero, it is not clear that the recent negative
rates implemented by a handful of central banks in Europe offer some new vista of policy effectiveness.
In this paper, the authors started with the following question: «Do persistently
low nominal interest
rates mean that governments can safely borrow more?»
The housing recovery is being supported by an historically high level of affordability of houses which, in turn, reflects the
low level of
nominal interest
rates.
Even if the Bank of Japan did keep real and
nominal interest
rates low after the country returned to inflation, the old «deflationary equilibrium» would be broken.
If she had added: «Plus, even though we are currently above the Effective
Lower Bound on
nominal interest
rates (which is probably below 0 %) we are worried that the margin of safety is getting a bit small, and are pleased that fiscal policy is making that margin of safety a bit bigger than it otherwise would be» that would also be an internally consistent thing for the Bank of Canada to say.
The much
lower nominal interest
rate structure prevailing in Australia in the 1990s reflects, in part, the large decline in inflation since the late 1980s.
Although the
low interest
rate environment over the past decade has compressed bank NIMs, we expect U.S. - led reflation — rising
nominal growth, wages and inflation — to accelerate.
The level of yields — around 4 1/4 per cent at present — looks
low not only on historical comparisons but also relative to normal benchmarks such as the growth
rate of
nominal GDP, which in the US is currently around 6 per cent (Graph 16).
Now, we're sympathetic to the idea that prospective real growth and inflation may be sufficiently
lower in the future to place us into a
low nominal growth world, which would also justify
lower equilibrium interest
rate levels.
Other factors driving
rates lower —
low nominal global growth, an older population,
lower fixed income supply and the disinflationary pressure of technology — will likely remain in place.
Basically, the
lower interest
rates are, the more cash or reserves («base money») people are willing to carry around, per dollar of
nominal GDP.
It also seems very odd to me that this bank would advertise the (
lower)
nominal rate instead of the higher 1.005 actual APY!
Interest
rates, both
nominal and real (i.e. after inflation), are incredibly
low, but other measures of financial conditions are less benign.
In an environment in which
nominal rates are going up due to the Fed, but inflation expectations are falling, real
rates would be rising sharply, albeit from a
low level.
You see, many Eastern European borrowers like the idea of borrowing in Swiss francs or Euros, because the
nominal interest
rate is currently drastically
lower than what they'd pay on a local currency loan.
And while you might lose money in real terms if
rates rise your probability of losing money in
nominal terms is fairly
low.
Maximum ratios 29/41 30 year fixed
rate loan only Interest
rate must be
lower than the existing loan to be refinanced If the final settlement statement shows
nominal cash back to the borrower, that amount must be applied as a principal curtailment.
What concerns me most is that interest
rates — real and
nominal — are so
low everywhere.
Inflation - indexed securities have a tendency to react to changes in real interest
rates, which represent
nominal (stated) interest
rates lowered by the anticipated effect of inflation.
The yield of a global portfolio is about as
low as its ever been from a cyclically adjusted P / E, credit spread, and
nominal interest
rate standpoint, while the global economy is more likely to be in the later (than early) stages of the business cycle.
I set its dividend growth
rate to 5.0 %
nominal, which is
low but matches that of the S&P 500.
Low nominal and real interest
rates on bonds mean a wider risk - premium spread on stocks and a cheaper relative valuation.
Also given the
low growth,
low inflation and
low interest
rate environment and the somewhat above average valuation numbers, one has to expect
lower nominal returns from equities as compared to the past.
Some of the thinking is that since gains are taxed in
nominal dollars without consideration of inflation, the
lower rates on longer term investment offset the taxation on some of the phantom gain that only exists because of the devaluation of the currency.
In 1991, the
nominal GDP growth
rate hit a
low of 2.9 %.
[10][12] «One of the main goals of financial repression is to keep
nominal interest
rates lower than they would be in more competitive markets.