Sentences with phrase «many knowers»

Terra's Kitchen CEO Mike McDevitt says there are learners and there are knowers.
i hope one day the entire earth will have only one faith and that will be «There is no one worthy of worship except One who is unseen and knower of everything and Muhammad, Jesus, Moses Abraham are all prophets of God»...
This truth is known to all true truth knowers!
Knower of all secrets and declarations, He is the Most Wise, the Cognizant.
As I have argued in my book Moral, Believing Animals, all human beings are believers, not knowers who know with certitude.
«And if thou (Muhammad) ask them: Who created the heavens and the earth, they will surely answer: The Mighty, the Knower created them» (Surah XLIII, 9).
He introduced the knower into the world of nature.
Later the idea gained ground that we can not «speak of nature apart from human perception in the historical development of knowledge», that all knowledge is «a creative interaction between the known and the knower» and that therefore there is no System of scientific knowledge or of technology which does not have the subjective purposes and faith - presuppositions of humans built into it.
Nevertheless, his work of that period left many readers with the impression that nature and its structures are ontologically autonomous and also that the knower may be understood as a part of nature.
Many of the Names are difficult to translate from the Arabic, for example, Allah is the One, the Eternally Besought of All, the First, the Last, the Beneficent, the Powerful, the Almighty, the Wise, the Knower, the Creator, the Shaper out of Naught, the Fashioner, the Guardian, the Majestic, thc Superb, the Glorified.
The knower, the percipient event, provides the clue to nature in general.
Its intent is neither to deepen the personality of the knower nor to enhance the charm, autonomy, dignity, and mystery of the known.
In thomistic terms, form - as - intellectual - species is a «likeness» of the knowable thing, ordered towards the same, and adequate to the knower's task of knowing.
And all our experience supports the view that knowing and loving constitute the knower or lover, not what is known or loved.
One could accordingly treat the knower as a being when the knower was viewed as a body.
The other solution was to say clearly that, Yes, the knower is also a being, and then to think of that being in analogy with tables and stones.
There then arose the question: what about the knower?
If one still wanted to know about the knower and the knower's experience, this could be treated in a secondary way as a particular form of the body or a relation of the body to external objects.
In the Thomistic doctrine, this applied to all knowers except the Supreme Knower: «It was indeed the Thomistic doctrine that in knowledge, apart from God, it is the knower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knower....
And there can be no efficacy in a systematic philosophy that loses sight of the vocation of the human knower to the whole of reality.
Just as Hartshorne claimed that God is not only the knower of all, but known by all, he now claims that God not only causes all (in a supreme but non-determinative sense), but is the supreme effect of all.
Just as we would say that the person in the Chinese Box has no real knowledge of Chinese, Hartshorne would say that God does not have real knowledge of the world unless God is a sympathetic knower.
Indeed, it is You who is Knower of the unseen» (109)[The Day] when Allah will say, «O Jesus, Son of Mary, remember My favor upon you and upon your mother when I supported you with the Pure Spirit and you spoke to the people in the cradle and in maturity; and [remember] when I taught you writing and wisdom and the Torah and the Gospel; and when you designed from clay [what was] like the form of a bird with My permission, then you breathed into it, and it became a bird with My permission; and you healed the blind and the leper with My permission; and when you brought forth the dead with My permission; and when I restrained the Children of Israel from [killing] you when you came to them with clear proofs and those who disbelieved among them said, «This is not but obvious magic.»
The knower must be related to the object, not the other way around.
Hartshorne is counter-intuitive, saving that, not only is God relative to the known, but more related to the known than are human knowers.
And He is the All - Hearer, the All - Knower.
Part of the impetus for the idea of divine relativity comes from Hartshorne's interpretation of the Thomistic theory of knowledge in which the knower is in an internal cognitive relation to the known.
God knows all things, but in such fashion (it was held) that there is zero relativity or dependence in God as knower, and maximal dependence in the creatures as known.
This point of the knower's being the knowledge while not being aware of itself is central to the epochal theory of time, and the theory of prehension.
A driving force in this tradition has been the philosophical «turn to the subject,» a shift of focus from the thing known to the knower who knows it.
Had I known you «great knowers of the universe» were holding all the absolute answers I would have given up on the faith that lead me to peace, happiness and compassion long ago.
These are «limit - experiences,» places that usually test the integrity and purpose of knowers and the durability and responsiveness of their knowing.
Among the most important dimensions of this critique is its insistence that knower and «knowee» are, in relation to one another and before God, both subjects and objects.
Allah is Hearer, Knower.
Insulated by the wealth of possibilities the privileges of power confer, powerful knowers can ignore limits and resolve ambiguities.
She calls it «strong objectivity,» and its particular strength rests of the participation of many knowers, beginning with the least favored, and requires a commitment to critical examination of the causes of beliefs, especially those that pass for «objective truths.
It refuses to recognize or share the global claims power - knowers make; instead it lives — often uncomfortably — with ambiguity and doubt.
Fueled by this suspicion, it questions the legitimacy of the powerful as knowers and their right to decide who is and is not «one of them.»
-- power - knowers read these as humiliations rather than as features of the daily human landscape that should require only sobriety, not courage, to acknowledge.
To begin with, an epistemology of the cross can not be used by knowers whose claims to objectivity are predicated on domination, for it harbors a deep suspicion of power - based knowledge claims and those who make them.
«7 It challenges the definition of power as domination and insists on the partialness of what can be known by any of its knowers and / or by all of us together.
These knowers occupy epistemological standpoints that are salutary precisely because of, and almost in direct relation to.
Little significance has been attached to questions like, «Who qualifies as a «knower,» and who doesn't, and why?»
In the former the knower can not be merely a detached scientific observer but must also himself participate, for it is through his participation that he discovers both the typical and the unique in the aspects of human life that he is studying.
The knower, to be sure, must enter with his whole being into what he knows; he must bring unabridged into the act of knowing the experience which his binding with the situation presents him.
Then we turn to the All - knower, who knows our bad, but knows this good in us also, and who is just.
Classical theology has typically responded to this difficulty by alleging that, since all things other than God depend on God for their existence, their relations to the divine knower are constitutive of them rather than of God.
There are differences, secondly, as to the nature of the subject, which is variously regarded as pure consciousness, will to life, will to power, the scientific observer, or the intuitive knower.
Primary qualities are viewed as objective, i.e., independent of the knower's frame of reference, while secondary qualities are judged to be subjective, i.e., involving the complicity of the subject imposing his own peculiar sensory apparatus on the bodies perceived.
We cast ourselves with our repentance on his mercy: only by an All - knower can we finally be judged.
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