Sentences with phrase «margin debt which»

One of the biggest negatives is the margin debt which is at levels seen in prior stock market tops.

I know we are at all time highs of margin debt which in the past has signaled market tops.

Not exact matches

Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those reflected in such forward - looking statements and that should be considered in evaluating our outlook include, but are not limited to, the following: 1) our ability to continue to grow our business and execute our growth strategy, including the timing, execution, and profitability of new and maturing programs; 2) our ability to perform our obligations under our new and maturing commercial, business aircraft, and military development programs, and the related recurring production; 3) our ability to accurately estimate and manage performance, cost, and revenue under our contracts, including our ability to achieve certain cost reductions with respect to the B787 program; 4) margin pressures and the potential for additional forward losses on new and maturing programs; 5) our ability to accommodate, and the cost of accommodating, announced increases in the build rates of certain aircraft; 6) the effect on aircraft demand and build rates of changing customer preferences for business aircraft, including the effect of global economic conditions on the business aircraft market and expanding conflicts or political unrest in the Middle East or Asia; 7) customer cancellations or deferrals as a result of global economic uncertainty or otherwise; 8) the effect of economic conditions in the industries and markets in which we operate in the U.S. and globally and any changes therein, including fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates; 9) the success and timely execution of key milestones such as the receipt of necessary regulatory approvals, including our ability to obtain in a timely fashion any required regulatory or other third party approvals for the consummation of our announced acquisition of Asco, and customer adherence to their announced schedules; 10) our ability to successfully negotiate, or re-negotiate, future pricing under our supply agreements with Boeing and our other customers; 11) our ability to enter into profitable supply arrangements with additional customers; 12) the ability of all parties to satisfy their performance requirements under existing supply contracts with our two major customers, Boeing and Airbus, and other customers, and the risk of nonpayment by such customers; 13) any adverse impact on Boeing's and Airbus» production of aircraft resulting from cancellations, deferrals, or reduced orders by their customers or from labor disputes, domestic or international hostilities, or acts of terrorism; 14) any adverse impact on the demand for air travel or our operations from the outbreak of diseases or epidemic or pandemic outbreaks; 15) our ability to avoid or recover from cyber-based or other security attacks, information technology failures, or other disruptions; 16) returns on pension plan assets and the impact of future discount rate changes on pension obligations; 17) our ability to borrow additional funds or refinance debt, including our ability to obtain the debt to finance the purchase price for our announced acquisition of Asco on favorable terms or at all; 18) competition from commercial aerospace original equipment manufacturers and other aerostructures suppliers; 19) the effect of governmental laws, such as U.S. export control laws and U.S. and foreign anti-bribery laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act, and environmental laws and agency regulations, both in the U.S. and abroad; 20) the effect of changes in tax law, such as the effect of The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the «TCJA») that was enacted on December 22, 2017, and changes to the interpretations of or guidance related thereto, and the Company's ability to accurately calculate and estimate the effect of such changes; 21) any reduction in our credit ratings; 22) our dependence on our suppliers, as well as the cost and availability of raw materials and purchased components; 23) our ability to recruit and retain a critical mass of highly - skilled employees and our relationships with the unions representing many of our employees; 24) spending by the U.S. and other governments on defense; 25) the possibility that our cash flows and our credit facility may not be adequate for our additional capital needs or for payment of interest on, and principal of, our indebtedness; 26) our exposure under our revolving credit facility to higher interest payments should interest rates increase substantially; 27) the effectiveness of any interest rate hedging programs; 28) the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting; 29) the outcome or impact of ongoing or future litigation, claims, and regulatory actions; 30) exposure to potential product liability and warranty claims; 31) our ability to effectively assess, manage and integrate acquisitions that we pursue, including our ability to successfully integrate the Asco business and generate synergies and other cost savings; 32) our ability to consummate our announced acquisition of Asco in a timely matter while avoiding any unexpected costs, charges, expenses, adverse changes to business relationships and other business disruptions for ourselves and Asco as a result of the acquisition; 33) our ability to continue selling certain receivables through our supplier financing program; 34) the risks of doing business internationally, including fluctuations in foreign current exchange rates, impositions of tariffs or embargoes, compliance with foreign laws, and domestic and foreign government policies; and 35) our ability to complete the proposed accelerated stock repurchase plan, among other things.

«Notwithstanding some operational issues in the latter part of the financial year, Karouni still managed to generate a strong cash margin of $ 26 million during its first six months, which assisted with paying down $ 55 million in debt repayments and financing costs.»

HPFS gross margin decreased for the three and nine months ended July 31, 2011 due primarily to lower portfolio margins from a higher mix of operating leases and higher transaction taxes, the effect of which was partially offset by higher margins on lease extensions and lower bad debt expense as a percentage of revenue.

We have replaced our Margin Debt data with FINRA data, which includes data for all firms, not just NYSE member firms.

Much of the recent growth in margin debt has reflected an increase in the average loan size, which has risen by around $ 13,000 to $ 107,000 over the past year.

A debt / GDP ratio margin of 2.38 % equate to a 90 percentile — A debt / GDP ratio of 2.38 % is considered by NIA to be «really dangerous», which implies that the stock market is risking a dramatic fall in the short - term.

Taking the context in real terms, it implies that the margin debt of the NYSE amount currently to about 2.87 % of US GDP, surpassing the previous all - time high of 2.78 % which has been set at the peak of the biggest stock market bubble in global history, in March 2000.

The «officially tabulated» mainstream b.s. reports are not picking up the numbers, but the large credit card issuers (like Capital One) and auto debt issuers (like Santander Consumer USA) have been showing a dramatic rise in troubled credit card and auto debt loans for several quarters, especially in the sub-prime segment which is now, arguably the majority of consumer debt issuance at the margin.

I usually figure that we'll end up at a 70LTV which also helps the debt cover and provides a larger margin of safety, which is half the battle from a value investing standpoint.

Again, we'll split the difference between FCF & peak operating margins — which suggests a 1.5 P / S multiple is still appropriate, with no adjustments necessary for cash / debt (net debt's actually $ 2.7 million):

Yet even that may be ending: since we are looking at the margin, it makes sense to present David Rosenberg's observations on what it is that he is looking at the moment, which appropriately enough, is NYSE margin debt, whose 12 month trailing average has just turned negative: traditionally an important inflection point.

The reason is that there are so many risks: government regulations of short - selling (SEC Rule 204), special government regulations put in place during market panics (e.g. the 2008 SEC ban on short selling financials), forced buy - ins, unlimited losses, debt to the brokerage, interest one is charged for being short which can vary arbitrarily, brokerages could change margin requirements to any arbitrary amount, arbitration clauses, you agree to indemnify the brokerage for anything it did even if it did the wrong thing, some brokerages also do market - making and thus have further incentive to fleece the client, and all the other «screw you» legal language that you agreed to when opening an account.

With net finance cost just under 10 % of trading margin, an additional $ 0.7 billion debt adjustment is appropriate — which we'll haircut by 50 %, as usual.

And Saga's LTM finance expense of EUR (2.0) million can be expected to decline with the recent / ongoing decline in receivables & debt — meanwhile, it stands at 13.5 % of Saga's LTM adjusted operating margin (of EUR 14.8 million), which remains within my usual zone of comfort.

As of end - September 2017, margin debt on the NYSE was a record $ 559.6 billion, which is to be expected as U.S. equity indices were also near all - time highs, and stock market peaks and record levels of margin debt often coincide.

For a full - fledged crisis in US corporates, we need the current high issuance of corporates to mature for 2 - 3 years, such that the cash is gone, but the debts remain, which will be hard amid high profit margins.

Thanks to unusually high debt levels and unusually low labor compensation in recent years, the earnings peak in 2007 was based on profit margins that were about 50 % above the historical average, and which have now collapsed.

By paying down debt (and therefore reducing interest costs) and by slashing operating expenses: gross margin actually increased which is very rare when revenues decline, as fixed costs are spread out across fewer sold units.

In simplified fashion, let's say our hypothetical law firm has $ 100 million in annual revenues ($ 8.33 million per month); an operating margin — or profit — of 36 percent of annual revenues, which are distributed at 55 percent of forecast to partners each month, plus a year - end distribution; no debt other than its revolving credit line; and $ 5 million in monthly operating expenses.