Not exact matches
The idea that every
voter in the country was profiled using between 4,000 and 5,000
data points aggregated, blended, and
matched to
voter registration files was unprecedented and deeply distressing.
Even if third parties could only get a little of your
data — your hometown, say, or your gender — they could
match it up with all kinds of other records, such marketing databases or
voter registration databases, to paint a more complete picture of you as a person.
According to the Statistical Policy Working Paper 22, the two main sources of disclosure risk for de-identified records about individuals are the existence of records with very unique characteristics (e.g., unusual occupation or very high salary or age) and the existence of external sources of records with
matching data elements which can be used to link with the de-identified information and identify individuals (e.g.,
voter registration records or driver's license records).