It is subjects that depend on objects,
meaning by objects simply what are given to subjects.
Not exact matches
That
means the progressive denizens of This Town can't get distracted
by the shiny
object that is our ideological champion (who, it should be mentioned, hasn't visited Iowa once this campaign cycle, has repeatedly stated she will not run for President in 2016, and signed a letter encouraging Clinton to run) primarying the presumptive nominee.
Its
object is to make broader health insurance coverage available to women and,
by that
means, both to improve women's health and to eliminate disparities between men and women in the cost of health care.
Yet critics have frequently
objected to the transformation of Cheever's characters
by means of midnight cloudbursts or the beaming of light into a dark place.
By approbation is
meant that when Muhammad saw something done, or heard words uttered in his presence and did not
object, such actions or words are approved.
Stengers rightly
objects to the classification of Deleuze as a «post-structuralist,» on the grounds that this heading is an American importation of no interest for the French who were reading Deleuze since before 1968, and who recognized him as a «master,»
meaning deserving of a heading
by himself.
He
means that these
objects are not intentional types or essences, but are class concepts expressed
by means of mathematical functions.
Aristotle
means that in perception the individual form is actualized in the mind of the perceiver and in the
object as perceived, and that the universal is then potentially reachable
by application of the actualized form to other similar particulars.
In order to interpret this core - principle of revelation, we must understand its essential presupposition; namely, that events are present «in» other events - present not just abstractly (through «eternal
objects»), i.e., mediated
by the «general,» but as singular events that effect their further history
by their unique concreteness (PR 338).12 Whitehead recognizes precisely this constellation when he says:» [T] he truism that we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched to
mean that we can only feel in terms of universals.
By the repetition, or causal objectification, of an earlier occasion in a later one, let me hasten to add, Whitehead did not
mean, as so many of his interpreters have erroneously taken him to
mean, merely that some eternal
object ingressed in the earlier occasion is also ingressed in the later occasion.
This
means that for Whitehead perception is not mediated
by internal representatives of its ultimate
objects but is directly of those ultimate
objects themselves.
For that matter, Dei Filius asserted that God is the «Lord of the Sciences,» that faith and reason have distinct yet mutually supportive
objects and ends, and that the «assent of faith is
by no
means a blind movement of the mind.»
In particular, they may be interrelated indirectly
by means of their conceptual feelings of one and the same eternal
object.
In contrast, in the putative S - O - T nexus, S and T are interrelated indirectly
by means of their conceptual feelings of an eternal
object.
Those past states of my body were causally affected
by the physical
object (e.g.,
by means of light waves).10
the eliminativist could enlarge the above interpretation of the fourteenth category of explanation as follows: A nexus is a set of actual entities that are linked together
by means of an eternal
object, the relation of prehension.
They are nexus of actual entities that are ordered
by means of a «defining characteristic» (i.e., an eternal
object).
In the second place, Whitehead's panexperientialism, combined with his doctrine of eternal
objects, shows how we can speak meaningfully of the correspondence between an idea, in the sense of a proposition (the
meaning expressed or elicited
by a linguistic sentence), and a nexus of actualities.
For when Santayana explains what it is for an essence to be exemplified, or for a truth to be about something, he typically talks of their instances or
objects as «facts,»
meaning by this some particular bit of the natural world as it is at a specific time and place (as it is directly if physical or derivatively if mental).
That created
object clearly occurred through artificial
means, whereas we procreate in a natural fashion as dictated
by our biology.
To begin with, I think we must admit that when Whitehead speaks of the subject being constituted of its
objects and the cause passing into the effect, he
means, at least in part, that the
objects / causes are reproduced
by way of likeness insofar as the subject / effect assumes the same forms.
The images are not «
objects» at, all, but simply
means by which we perceive
objects.
If the basic purpose of the study of man is defined
by the image of man as the creature who becomes what only he can become through confronting reality with his whole being, then the specific branches of that study must also include an understanding of man in this way, and this
means not only as an
object, but also, to begin with, as a Thou.
«Because God has chosen war as one
means by which He judges the nations, Christians are best advised not to take a stand opposing and
objecting to all wars.
When people live
by the principle of want - satisfaction, they will employ any available
means for acquiring the wanted
objects.
Now if it could be shown that Whitehead
means the same thing
by «event» that he
means by «enduring
object,» then Cobb would have his point, but (a) there are no grounds I can find at all to ground such an equivalence, and (b) quite to the contrary, «events» can be, though they need not be, spatially extended.
If you really
object to or are offended
by it then
by all
means make fun of people for blessing some I - beams.
By «
object» here I do not
mean a mere thing in contrast to a person, but rather an intentional or epistemological
object, which can be either personal or impersonal.
If you really
object to, are offended
by, or simply think it's stupid then
by all
means make fun of people for blessing some I - beams.
Rather, we actually perceive the former
by means of the mediating function of the latter (the «relational character of eternal
objects»).
The
object is not venerated; Beauty is,
by means of the resemblance mysteriously conveyed
by the icon.
This entire relationship is born and lives
by means of the common interest in the
object of study.
I have read and heard some visionaries talk about how you can know what you are
meant to do
by asking yourself the question, «If money were no
object, and failure was impossible, what would you do?»
By means of this creativity, the occasion achieves further determination of aim resulting in a final definite eternal
object.
Whitehead's insistence upon the organismic connectedness of things is certainly conducive to answering this question
by means of analogy and metaphor, mapping in isomorphic fashion characteristics of the actual occasion onto the macrocosmic
objects of human experience.
Thus we experience precisely in freedom what is
meant by God, even if we do not name or consider this ineffable, incomprehensible, infinite goal of freedom, which makes possible the distance to the
object of our choice, the actual space of freedom.
Third, in our situation today, the specific requirements of these two criteria are such that no theology can be adequate unless it makes the assertion of the experience of God,
by which I
mean that it must assert, in some formulation or other, that the strictly ultimate reality termed «God» is the
object as well as the subject of experience, and this in relation to others as well as to self.
For far from being a deviation from biblical truth, this setting of man over against the sum total of things, his subject - status and the
object - status and mutual externality of things themselves, are posited in the very idea of creation and of man's position vis - a-vis nature determined
by it: it is the condition of man
meant in the Bible, imposed
by his createdness, to be accepted, acted through... In short, there are degrees of objectification... the question is not how to devise an adequate language for theology, but how to keep its necessary inadequacy transparent for what is to be indicated
by it...» Hans Jonas, Phenomenon of Life, pp. 258 - 59; cf. also Schubert Ogden's helpful discussion on «Theology and Objectivity,» Journal of Religion 45 (1965): 175 - 95; Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice - Hall, 1966), pp. 175 - 206; and Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
The subject -
object dichotomy gives way,
by means of the archaeology of the subject, to a subject -
object relationship.
I don't
object to the government i.e., we the collective people of American, being «charitable» if
by charitable it is
meant to give to those in need, the most vulnerable among us; to sustain them.
«The best view is
by no
means the closest view... we consciously stand back and create distance in order to look at the world, i.e., at
objects as parts of the world: and also to be unembarrassed
by the closeness of that which we wish only to see; to have the full liberty of our scanning attention.»
By this formidable term Kant merely
meant the fact that the consciousness «I think them» must (potentially or actually) accompany all our
objects.
Neither do we
mean by God any lovely being easily made the
object of our affection.
3 In speaking of the two basic elements as «poles,» I
mean to accept the classical distinction of subject («noetic») and
object («ontic») rather than any so - called dialectical analysis such as that provided
by Paul Tillich in speaking of «polarities,» (Systematic Theology, vol.
As a first approximation, we may say that the poetic function points to the obliterating of the ordinary referential function, at least if we identify it with the capacity to describe familiar
objects of perception or the
objects which science alone determines
by means of its standards of measurement.
If
by the latter we
mean the description of familiar
objects of perception or of the
objects which science defines
by its methods of observation and measurement, then the reference of poetic language projects «ahead» of itself a world in which the reader is invited to dwell, thus finding a more authentic situation in being.
We can never look directly at them, for they are bodiless and featureless and footless, but we grasp all other things
by their
means, and in handling the real world we should be stricken with helplessness in just so far forth as we might lose these mental
objects, these adjectives and adverbs and predicates and heads of classification and conception.
But to these three traits the poetic function adds a split reference
by means of which emerges the Atlantis submerged in the network of
objects submitted to the domination of our preoccupations.
It is important to make it abundantly clear at this point that the crucial problem is the spiritual problem, and we here
mean by spiritual that area which is the
object of attention in philosophy and theology as against that area in which the
object of attention is mechanical contrivance.
By «realization» in this passage Whitehead is often read as
meaning «ingression»: no pattern as a particular manner of relatedness can obtain without the simultaneous ingression of other eternal
objects (sensa) that constitute its matter: «The realization of a pattern is through the realization of this contrast,»