Sentences with phrase «measures of market»
These measures are remnants of Seller Side real estate and tell 1/2 the story but are still upheld to the public by CREA and TREB and even banks as true measures of a market.
http://www.remonline.com/
Regular labour and civil law advice including representation before courts and debt collection measures of the market leader in the windsurfing industry
But in short, the reason why any of the macro measures of the market don't move in lockstep with the market is that market economies are dynamic.
The indices are good measures of the market, but flawed investment strategies for the reasons outlined in a few places here on Greenbackd (for example, see my summary of Greenblatt's / Rob Arnott's fundamental indexation idea, «Equal Weight and Fundamental Indexing Beats The Market «-RRB-.
There are five companies that dominate life reinsurance globally, and in my opinion, RGA is the best, though they are a close number 2 by most measures of market share.
My point is that there are a variety of highly predictive, methodologically distinct measures of market - level valuation (I used the Shiller PE and Tobin's q, but GNP or GDP - to - total market capitalization below work equally as well) that point to overvaluation.
While I believe the Shiller PE and Tobin's q to be predictive, there are other measures of market valuation that perform comparably.
Other measures of market participation have been equally problematic.
Recall that our measures of market internals shifted negative in October 2000, following what was until that point a reserved but still constructive stance.
Provided that renewed Fed intervention is sufficient to improve our measures of market action, I expect we would have some latitude to respond with a more constructive position until an overvalued, overbought, overbullish syndrome is re-established.
It's important to recognize that our measures of market action have much more to do with broad market internals, spread behavior, price / volume action and industry and security group dispersion than they have to do with simple observation of the major indices.
As I've noted recently, there may be latitude to take a more constructive stance between the point that any new monetary intervention produces an improvement in our measures of market internals, and the point where we re-establish an overvalued, overbought, overbullish syndrome.
A good week in the market is unlikely to change our assessment unless it produces a material improvement in our measures of market internals.
Undoubtedly, the best outcome would be a strong improvement in valuations, followed by signs of improvement in our measures of market action, which is the typical sequence of events that complete a market cycle and can launch a very favorable investment environment.
The latitude for a constructive position at present valuations would lie between the point where our measures of market action improve and the point where an overvalued, overbought, overbullish syndrome reasserts itself.
To address this issue, some investors have turned to cyclically adjusted P / E ratios or they look at other popular measures of the market's value, such as dividend yields and price - to - book value.
Indeed, when our measures of market internals have been unfavorable (signaling risk - averse investor psychology), the S&P 500 has historically lost value, on average, even during periods of Fed easing, falling interest rates, or interest rates pinned near zero.
Both benefit from solid valuation methods and reliable measures of market action, but investment weighs valuation more strongly, while speculation weighs market action more strongly.
A good week in the market is unlikely to change our assessment unless it produces a material improvement in our measures of market internals.
This is why any willingness to accept risk will far more tied to our longstanding measures of market action and other testable factors than to some novel «Bernanke faith factor» that we have no way of testing historically in any kind of rigorous manner.
As I've noted recently, there may be latitude to take a more constructive stance between the point that any new monetary intervention produces an improvement in our measures of market internals, and the point where we re-establish an overvalued, overbought, overbullish syndrome.
Undoubtedly, the best outcome would be a strong improvement in valuations, followed by signs of improvement in our measures of market action, which is the typical sequence of events that complete a market cycle and can launch a very favorable investment environment.
The chart below shows historical instances where overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions matched current extremes, and where bubble - tolerant overlays (based on measures of market internals and credit spreads) were also unfavorable, and where the S&P 500 had established an all - time high.
That's certainly not to rule out the possibility that the recent advance could carry further and shift our measures of market internals to a more favorable condition, and it's certainly not to rule out a further short - squeeze.
A clear improvement in our measures of market internals would defer the immediacy of that concern, and would also create an environment where monetary easing would tend to support speculation in the financial markets.
Again, if our measures of market internals were to improve, we would allow for the possibility that reliable measures of market valuations could surpass their 2000 extreme, and we would not place a «cap» on how high stock prices could move.
Conversely, my adoption of a constructive or leveraged investment stance after every bear market decline in the past three decades typically reflected the combination of a material retreat in valuations coupled with an early improvement in our measures of market action (though my early measures were rather crude).
But investors in hedge funds that bet on cryptoassets have less reason to gripe: these funds are comfortably beating broad measures of market performance.
At present, we continue to identify one of the most hostile market environments we've observed in a century of historical data, not only because obscene valuations and extreme «overvalued, overbought, overbullish» syndromes are in place, but also because our measures of market internals remain in a deteriorating condition.
Since valuation is something I've never overlooked, the periodic challenges I've encountered in the past three decades have invariably centered on measures of market action.
Our own measures of market action extract a signal from the behavior of thousands of securities, and are not captured by simple indicators like 200 - day moving averages or advance - decline lines.
Overall, our current market outlook remains strongly negative, but we would be inclined to adopt a more neutral outlook if our measures of market internals were to improve.
In the chart below, I've coupled one of our «Bollinger band» variants, limited to periods featuring explicit deterioration in our measures of market internals.
Our measures of market action are still broadly unfavorable, and allowing even the mildest adjustment for profit margins and the position of earnings in the economic cycle, valuations remain rich.
After the third longest bull market advance on record, fresh deterioration in key trend - following components within our measures of market internals (see Support Drops Away) recently joined this extended, overvalued, overbought, overbullish peak, even as the S&P 500 hovers at the top of its monthly Bollinger bands (two standard deviations above the 20 - period average) and cyclical momentum rolls over from a 9 - year high.
Recall that our measures of market internals shifted negative in October 2000, following what was until that point a reserved but still constructive stance.
Other measures of market participation have been equally problematic.
Our own measures of market internals remain unfavorable, and trading volume has been persistently weak, suggesting that the rebound may be more reflective of short - covering than a resumption of the insistent yield - seeking speculation observed prior to mid-2014.
Our measures of market internals have also deteriorated.
As I've regularly noted in recent months, our immediate outlook is essentially flat neutral for practical purposes, though we're partial to a layer of tail - risk hedges, such as out - of - the - money index put options, given that a market decline on the order of even 5 % would almost certainly be sufficient to send our measures of market internals into a negative condition.
These indicators included measures of advancing versus declining volume, as well as measures of market breadth such as the McClellan Oscillator.
Put simply, extreme market conditions can hold us to a rather neutral outlook (as we continue to maintain at present), but we no longer adopt a hard - negative outlook if our measures of market internals are constructive, regardless of how overextended the market might become.
Second, our own admitted difficulty in the advancing period since 2009 did not reflect a shortfall in either our measures of valuation or our measures of market internals.
We've long argued, and continue to assert, that the most historically reliable measures of market valuation are far beyond double their historical norms.
Last week, our most sensitive measures of market action clearly reversed to a favorable condition.
That's why we hold over 200 individual investment positions in Strategic Growth, why we diversify across industries, why I left complete put option coverage underneath the Fund's portfolio even in response to a favorable shift in our measures of market action two weeks ago (now neutral), why the dollar value of our shorts never materially exceeds our long holdings, and why even in the most favorable conditions, the Fund can establish leverage only by investing a small percentage of assets in call options (never on margin).
As always, the best opportunities are likely to emerge when a material retreat in valuations is joined by an early improvement in our measures of market action (which, following our stress - testing earlier in this half - cycle, are robust to every market cycle we've observed across history).
As always, the strongest prospective market return / risk profile is associated with a material retreat in valuations followed by an early improvement in broad measures of market internals.
The savviest among them use ever - more - quantitative measures of market opportunity, technical capability and financial scalability.
We then ranked the remaining names by a simple measure of the market's perceived bankruptcy risk - Market Cap (MC) divided by Enterprise Value (EV).