First, he distinguishes from classical empiricism a revisionary description of experience according to which sense perception is neither the only nor even the primary mode of experience, but is rather derived from a still more elemental awareness both of ourselves and of the world around us» (PP 78).6 On Ogden's analysis, both the classical and this first type of revisionary empiricism «assume that the sole realities
present in our experience, and therefore the only objects of our certain knowledge, are ourselves and the other creatures that constitute the world» (PP 79) 7 With these «two more conventional types of empiricism» he contrasts a «comprehensive» type of revisionary empiricism distinguished from them by its consideration of the
possibility (and then also by its claim) that the internal awareness it asserts together with the former revisionary type is «the awareness not
merely of ourselves, and of our fellow creatures, but also of the infinite whole in which we are all included as somehow one» (PP 87, 80, 85).
This may not be due
merely to their weaker theological talents, but may indicate a positive insight: although history is determined by
present possibilities and decisions, it can not be dissolved into a series of
present situations.
If the kingdom is simply future, then it exerts no power to which the
present must respond, but remains
merely an inert
possibility we hope someday might be realized.