Not exact matches
John Cobb, Jr. and Charles Hartshorne, for instance, hold that the only actual
entities are
microcosmic actual occasions.
An actual occasion is
microcosmic; the durational
entities of everyday experience and of history are composed of such microevents.
So what is first required is a distinction, right on the level of the «life world,» between genuine
entities and «things,» rather than a reversion to
microcosmic event - units.
In his perspective it is necessary to leave the plane of experience and go back to the ultimate
microcosmic event - units, since it is only in the microcosm that the desired concept of an «actual
entity» as an organic unity of process can find a place.
The rigid adherence to
microcosmic ultimate event - units as the sole actual
entities seems to us to be not only inadequate with respect to the [254] higher forms of unity, but also to introduce an inconsistency in Whitehead's thinking.
Hanging on to this concept would thus include recourse to such ultimate
microcosmic event - units, so that in the end even the higher totalities could only be conceived as «societies» of such «
entities.»
On Whitehead's view, the human body is a macrocosmic nexus of
microcosmic actual identities, but — and this is the crucial point over against the mechanist view — these actual
entities are interdependent rather than independent.
As the Wiener quotations suggests, this process of communication has relevance at both the macrocosmic level («societies») and the
microcosmic level («actual
entities»).