Sentences with phrase «minimum harmonisation»

The key shortcomings that are identified are: the Merger Directive's objective is not stated precisely; minimum harmonisation does not lead to a common tax system; exhaustive lists are used as legislative techniques; the Merger Directive does not add much to the outcomes reached through negative harmonisation; and the definitions of qualifying operations are not fully aligned with corporate law.

The Court again reaffirmed its initial understanding of the «minimum harmonisation» exception by emphasising that both the provisions of EU law and those of the international convention must lay down minimum requirements for the exception to apply (para. 120).

The message of the CJEU is clear: minimum harmonisation is emphatically rejected, partial harmonisation warmly endorsed.

The «minimum harmonisation» exception was reaffirmed in Opinion 1/03 on the Lugano Convention, where a full court summarised the exception's rationale by stating that «the Court did not find [in Opinion 2/91] that the Community had exclusive competence where, because both the Community provisions and those of an international convention laid down minimum standards, there was nothing to prevent the full application of Community law by the Member States» (para. 123).

If followed in future judgments, this would helpfully tidy up the Court's ambivalent stance on minimum harmonisation prior to Philip Morris.

The difficult relationship between minimum harmonisation and competence issues has troubled the CJEU for quite some time.

Having opted for the wholesale approach advocated by the Commission, the ECJ did not follow its AG on the issue of minimum harmonisation.

Nonetheless, the Court in Neighbouring Rights did not go as far as to overturn Opinion 2/91; the «minimum harmonisation» exception remained good law.

Further, Article 24 indicates that the Directive pursues minimum harmonisation only in that it allows Member States to adopt stricter rules than those laid down in the Directive.

It explains and contextualises the ECJ's treatment of the «minimum harmonisation» exception to the ERTA principle first introduced in Opinion 2/91, invoked more recently in Neighbouring Rights (C - 114 / 12), and today again in this Opinion.

It followed that the «minimum harmonisation» exception did not apply.

Despite the ECJ rejection of the retail approach to ERTA analysis, and the rejection of the conception of the «minimum harmonisation» exception proposed by AG Sharpston in Neighbouring Rights, in Opinion 3/15 a number of Member States (but, interestingly, not the Council) advanced an argument similar in some respects to the one advanced in Neighbouring Rights.

By rejecting the Member States» argument that exceptions to rights established in Directive 2001/29 ought to be understood as minimum standards, the Court in Opinion 3/15 reaffirms its original understanding of the «minimum harmonisation» exception.

The recent Philip Morris ruling is a bold move against minimum harmonisation that has potential to considerably narrow the EU legislator's room for manoeuvre, if followed in subsequent cases.

In normative terms, the stark contrast between minimum harmonisation being unequivocally dismissed and partial harmonisation being happily sanctioned is striking, not least because the Court accepts that partial harmonisation too does not remove all obstacles to trade.

In Opinion 3/15, several Member States had invoked the «minimum harmonisation» exception in response to the Commission's argument that the Marrakesh Treaty is covered by an ERTA effect.

Second, if Member States enjoy a wide margin of discretion in choosing what method of harmonisation they want to pursue, it is hard to discern why the popular minimum harmonisation tool should be removed from the box when its overall harmonising effect is identical to that of partial harmonisation: both do not eliminate all obstacles to trade, but they do eliminate some.

Not exact matches

Killing off both minimum and partial harmonisation as hinted at in Tobacco Advertising I would have left the EU legislator with nothing but full harmonisation; allowing both would have run the risk of rendering harmonisation under Article 114 TFEU into no more than harmonisation attempts, which would soon be undermined by ever more divergent national rules.