Sentences with phrase «mode of perception in»

One can see that listening invokes the sensory mode of perception in human beings.

Not exact matches

Our dominant modes of perceptions fill in what others have blind spots to, and vice versa.

Thus perhaps we should conclude that Whitehead uses «perception» in an extended sense, like many other terms he appropriates from ordinary language, such that one need not be conscious to have perceptions in the mode of CE.

In particular, I argue that Whitehead's account of perception in the mode of causal efficacy is question - begginIn particular, I argue that Whitehead's account of perception in the mode of causal efficacy is question - begginin the mode of causal efficacy is question - begging.

Since a given actual entity is causally affected by every other actual entity In its past, this theory would tend to support my original «detailed» interpretation of CE in IWTP, according to which Whitehead is committed to a theory of perception in the mode of CE which yields very specific knowledge of causeIn its past, this theory would tend to support my original «detailed» interpretation of CE in IWTP, according to which Whitehead is committed to a theory of perception in the mode of CE which yields very specific knowledge of causein IWTP, according to which Whitehead is committed to a theory of perception in the mode of CE which yields very specific knowledge of causein the mode of CE which yields very specific knowledge of causes.

In these passages, Whitehead does not seem to distinguish between the appearance and reality of perception in the mode of causal efficacIn these passages, Whitehead does not seem to distinguish between the appearance and reality of perception in the mode of causal efficacin the mode of causal efficacy.

In the night, in the jungle, visual and discrete modes of perception are replaced by the tactile, the visceral, and the more synesthetic forms of cognizancIn the night, in the jungle, visual and discrete modes of perception are replaced by the tactile, the visceral, and the more synesthetic forms of cognizancin the jungle, visual and discrete modes of perception are replaced by the tactile, the visceral, and the more synesthetic forms of cognizance.

8.1 assumed in IWTP that perception in the mode of CE is necessarily a conscious experience, and that assumption may be mistaken.

Berry sees hope in the outcropping of movements and modes of perception that suggest an awakening.

Unfortunately, this interpretation would yield a vacuous infallibility for CE, since it would be a matter of definition that under it the subject's perceptions in the mode of CE would be of (ale the actual causes operating on it.

(3) Quite likely Whitehead assumes CE is reliable on systematic grounds: the doctrine of prehension, according to which one actual entity is (objectively) in another (PR 50), ensures that perception, in whatever mode, as a special instance of prehension, can never be completely delusive?

This would make perception of X in the mode of CE essentially identical to being causally affected by X.

In particular, he argues that Whitehead's account of perception in the mode of causal efficacy is question - begginIn particular, he argues that Whitehead's account of perception in the mode of causal efficacy is question - begginin the mode of causal efficacy is question - begging.

The first involves a spatial mismatch between the two pure modes of perception, presentational immediacy (PI) and causal efficacy (CE), in symbolic reference (SR).»

The only reason for accepting that perception in the mode of causal efficacy is accurate or reliable is that the perception occurs (where the perception is considered strictly as an experience without any cognitive or epistemic significance).

Although he does not speak specifically of prototaxic, parataxic, and syntaxic modes of experience, the same sequential patterns are reflected in his description of the first cycle of intellectual progress, which runs «from the achievement of perception to the acquirement of language, and from the acquirement of language to classified thought and keener perception» (AE 31).

Perception in the mode of presentational immediacy objectifies the actual entities «within one particular duration»: «the «presented duration»» (Process 321).

Utilizing Whitehead's doctrine of «perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.»

We in fact share this mode of perception with nonhuman occasions of experience.

Whitehead thinks of perception in the mode of presentational immediacy as the presentation of clear, obvious sensory data, such as vision most strikingly affords, and which are the basis for the Humean notion of impressions.

In this way there is a combination of presentational immediacy with what Whitehead terms «perception in the mode of causal efficacy,» a direct perception of the causal relation between the sense presentation and the object which it stands foIn this way there is a combination of presentational immediacy with what Whitehead terms «perception in the mode of causal efficacy,» a direct perception of the causal relation between the sense presentation and the object which it stands foin the mode of causal efficacy,» a direct perception of the causal relation between the sense presentation and the object which it stands for.

Perception in its primitive mode, as we have seen, is perception of causal efficacy, that is, the causal efficacy of concrete singular entities, and, as a subjective response to such influence, it is emotional rather than Perception in its primitive mode, as we have seen, is perception of causal efficacy, that is, the causal efficacy of concrete singular entities, and, as a subjective response to such influence, it is emotional rather than perception of causal efficacy, that is, the causal efficacy of concrete singular entities, and, as a subjective response to such influence, it is emotional rather than cognitive.

If anything may he termed passive, it is the object in perception according to the mode of presentational immediacy, which is passive merely insofar as it is not felt as exerting a causal influence on the percipient.

One could hardly accept such an identification as fully true to Santayana's intentions, yet there is a certain intriguing affinity between Whitehead's distinction between perception in the mode of presentational immediacy and perception in the mode of causal efficacy and Santayana's distinction between intuition and intent.

In contrast stands the more basic perception in the mode of causal efficacy; which «is our general sense of existence, as one item among others in an efficacious external world» and «of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future»; its data «are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion.&raquIn contrast stands the more basic perception in the mode of causal efficacy; which «is our general sense of existence, as one item among others in an efficacious external world» and «of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future»; its data «are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion.&raquin the mode of causal efficacy; which «is our general sense of existence, as one item among others in an efficacious external world» and «of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future»; its data «are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion.&raquin an efficacious external world» and «of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future»; its data «are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion.»

(This, of course, would be Whitehead's perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.)

Whitehead makes the interesting suggestion at one point that if «animal faith» (in the sense of «intent») refers to perception in the mode of causal efficacy then Santayana's position is virtually the same as his (see PR 52, 81 and 142).

As is well known, there are many significant points of divergence between the two philosophers, but we shall keep to our topic of human experience as manifested in its basic mode, primitive perception.

Having made this correlation, I should add that the hard - core commonsense notions are not limited to elements derivable from perception in the mode of causal efficacy, or what Whitehead also calls physical feelings.

Whitehead calls this new kind of experience «perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.»

In the twentieth century, such research has relied almost exclusively on perception in the mode of presentational immediacy, that is, on quantified sense data devoid of a sense of past inheritance and thus devoid of meaning, emotion or purposIn the twentieth century, such research has relied almost exclusively on perception in the mode of presentational immediacy, that is, on quantified sense data devoid of a sense of past inheritance and thus devoid of meaning, emotion or purposin the mode of presentational immediacy, that is, on quantified sense data devoid of a sense of past inheritance and thus devoid of meaning, emotion or purpose.

We have seen that research in nonhuman experience corroborates Whitehead's epistemological scheme in which perception takes the two forms of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, propositions and concepts are primarily nonlinguistic, feeling is the dominant mode of world - and self - disclosure, and animals experience both morally and aesthetically.

The knowledge of causality may be grounded in experience only by paying attention to the mode of experience in which causality is the principle constituent; but it is precisely this mode of perception that both Hume and Kant ignore.

We see this in his discussion of perception in the mode of causal efficacy.

10 Given my stress in the previous section on the importance of Whitehead's theory of perception in the mode of causal efficacy, it is revealing to notice that Russell apparently coined both the term and concept, leaving it to Whitehead to make use of it (BR, p. 51).

The two pure modes of perception consist in a direct recognition which can not be mistaken.

Whitehead» s description of perception in the mode of causal efficacy already cited seems especially appropriate to dreams.

One root of cause of this splitting, which results in the exclusion of the spiritual, is a world view that emphasizes one pure mode of perception (presentational immediacy) over against the other pure mode (causal efficacy).

The form of the argument is roughly: If the modes of the therapy's theory of self can correlate with Whitehead's modes of perception, and these same modes can correlate with the stages of gestalt formation, which in turn correlate with the phases of concrescence, then it is quite possible that Whitehead's mode of perception can correlate with the phases of concrescence.

This is the case for perception in the mode of «presentational immediacy»» (PR 253/386; also, 122 / 186).

«7 It is the former mode of pre - or subconscious perception — exhibited in the behavior of bodily organs and tissues, manifest and directly observable also throughout the sentient but nonhuman world, and bearing a close resemblance to William James's «stream of consciousness» or «blooming, buzzing confusion» — upon which our conscious knowledge of the «causal nexus» may be grounded.

Rather, it is a projection by a percipient subject onto a (fictitious) contemporaneous spatiotemporal manifold of certain highly refined and analyzed features of entities directly (but more vaguely and dimly) encountered in the percipient's immediate past through the mode of causal efficacy.8 The important distinction between true perception — what we might now in Rortyan jargon call nonmentalistic «unanalyzed raw feels» — and this second - order symbolic projection of select percepta characteristic only of higher - order conscious organisms is somewhat blurred by terming both equally «modes of perception.»

The physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer once said, «There are children playing in the streets who could solve some of my top problems in physics, because they have modes of sensory perception that I lost long ago.

Causal efficacy, Whitehead's other pure mode of perception, makes up for these deficiencies of presentational immediacy, but what it gains in relatedness and explanatory power it loses in vividness and sharpness of definition.

It means that an awareness of the cause of a perception — in the mode of causal efficacy — must be copresent with the experience of the effect — in the mode of presentational immediacy.

«In order to find obvious examples of the pure mode of causal efficacy we must have recourse to the viscera and to memory; and to find examples of the pure mode of presentational immediacy we must have recourse to so - called «delusive» perceptions» (PR 121f / 186).

Whitehead tries to avoid radical bifurcation by introducing a second mode of perception, CE, which discriminates the same sorts of entities (events, sensa, geometrical objects) in the same total field as PI (S 8, 30, 49, 53; PR 255 - 59).

Perception in the mode of presentational immediacy is confined to an awareness of spatial areas and the sense qualities inhering in them (PR 121 / 185).

In this way, he thinks, we have direct awareness of our bodies as the cause of our perception in the mode of presentational immediacIn this way, he thinks, we have direct awareness of our bodies as the cause of our perception in the mode of presentational immediacin the mode of presentational immediacy.

He seems to indicate not only that it presents a vague sense of activities and dynamic relations in nature, but that it also discloses in considerable detail the causal mechanism by which the perceptions in the mode of presentational immediacy were produced.