Sentences with phrase «moral hazard for»

The insurance it provides creates a moral hazard for banks to engage in risky investments and loan too much money to unsuitable borrowers.

While environmental insurance is not new in the west and the goal of the Green Insurance scheme is to fairly compensate environmental pollution victims and also help enterprises manage environmental risks, GLF is left to wonder to what extent such insurance schemes create moral hazards for polluting enterprises.

Not exact matches

A combination of deregulation and «moral hazard» bailouts — for the top of the economic pyramid, not the bottom — will polarize the economy all the more.

The homosexual issue, like adultery, fornication, etc.) is not a «save you for heaven» issue,» it's a «save you from harm» issue, complete with moral and relational traps and hazards, and myriad negative consequences.

«If moral hazard is sweeping the problem under the rug, and pushing more of it to future generations, and making it look like you are meeting the targets when you are not,» he says, «that is for sure what's happening with BECCS now.»

THE HITMAN»S BODYGUARD is violent and bloody romp that dares to consider the hazards of moral relativity in a milieu where life is cheap, and the redemptive power of true love for even the souls most lost.

This just sets up the system for greater moral hazard in the future.

Reasons for resistance include the possibility of moral hazard in reducing principal, unfairness to borrowers who are able to pay their mortgages, and harm to the banks bottom lines.

The Department of Education is currently seeking to address similar moral hazard issues by addressing program eligibility for schools that may not be preparing graduates for employment that helps them repay their debt.

FHA Commission David H. Stevens says the «FHA is well aware of the potential for moral hazard in principal reduction.

As an alternative to help the hoousing supply problem without the unintended consequences of govt meddling, moral hazard, taking on more risky assets, and trying to convince people to buy for the wrong reasons, like 4.5 % rates.

The «moral hazard» argument against CDR goes something like this: CDR could be a «Trojan horse» that fossil fuel interests will use to delay rapid decarbonization of the economy, as these fossil interests could use the prospect of cost - effective, proven, scaleable CDR technologies as an excuse for continuing to burn fossil fuels today (on the grounds that at some point in the future we'll have the CDR techniques to remove these present - day emissions).

In conclusion, it's simply not worth worrying about a «moral hazard» problem that we won't have for at least decades, and are most likely to never have all — especially when the problems of not developing CDR solutions today could be much more severe.

For this «moral hazard» argument to be valid, we would have to believe that CDR approaches will be able to not only catch up to other renewable technologies in cost within a short - time frame, but then continue to reduce costs more quickly.

Lest one think that this risk is remote, the legal aftermath of the earthquake in L'Aquila, which embroiled scientists in charges of manslaughter for their alleged failure to warn the community, vividly illustrates the legal and moral hazards that are incurred when the public is not informed (or misinformed) of the full envelope of identifiable risks arising from scientific findings.

Second, both sets of intervention also bring some similar ethical risks, such as potential for certain forms of «moral hazard»: the likelihood that rates of emissions mitigation will be lower than otherwise, in the belief that SRM or CDR can rectify the «overshoot» at some future date.

For my part I think we need a lot more careful research across the whole panoply of possible techniques; and carefully targeted policy and funding effort to develop and deploy selected CDR techniques in a timely fashion, alongside governance frameworks that minimize the effects of moral hazard.

Another focus is on how CE might reduce efforts into mitigation and adaptation, commonly referred to as the «moral hazard» or «risk compensation» problem (see, for example, Bunzl 2009, 2; Shepherd et al. 2009, 37; Corner and Pidgeon 2010, 30; Heyen 2012, 43; Burns 2013, 209; Lin 2013; Michaelson 2013, 100; Corner and Pidgeon 2014, 2; Rayner 2014, 6; Reynolds 2014, 2).

[/ note] So there is potential for moral hazard.

The arguments raised against such a concern by advocates for geoengineering research often include ones from three groups: first, largely semantic objections to the term «moral hazard»; second, arguments that taking on more climate risk would be the rational response; and third, claims that experience with the adaptation debate somehow disproves the effect.

Paul Krugman, for example, defines moral hazard simply as «any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly.»

Carbon removal solutions will not lead to moral hazard around reducing emissions, as carbon removal proponents will work to build carbon removal as a complement to GHG abatement solutions for mitigating climate change.

The case of carbon capture and storage (CCS) suggests that in practice, geoengineering is tailor - made for moral hazard.

Dr. Morrow walks carefully through the main arguments against support for SRM research — moral hazard, slippery slope, un-governability, and «inherent immorality» — and offers a careful weighing of the strengths of those contentions against what he terms the «core argument» in favor of SRM research, namely that SRM should be examined as a potentially valuable component of a portfolio of responses to climate change.

For these advocates, the moral hazard problem evaporates because there is nothing wrong with reducing abatement incentives if a cheaper means of responding to climate change is available.

Regrettably, this kind of surveillance leads directly to real moral and legal hazard for members of a government that have permitted it to start.

These moral hazard powers can impose liability on individuals who fall within the statutory tests for being connected or associated with the employer.

More seriously, it enforces compliance with statutory «moral hazard» requirements that can operate to impose joint and several group - wide liability for pension scheme underfunding — without any question of fault or bad faith arising.

In this webinar We examined the actual and threatened exercise of the moral hazard powers, the implications of regulatory investigations, and the impact for corporates.

In particular, he has litigated disputes relating to avoidance for fraud, misrepresentation, non-disclosure, moral hazard and coverage disputes.

This means the moral hazard, if it's anywhere, will be on the plaintiff side — but not if the ethical prohibitions against participating in frivolous suits (as well as rule 11 etc.) were incorporated into insurance company contracts, so that plaintiffs would not have the opportunity to moral - hazardly overuse their insurance lawyer services for frivolous litigation... in fact, the whole notion of moral hazard with lawyers seems to be implausible, since unlike doctors, one generally knows when one is being screwed and needs the legal system.

This Policy shall ordinarily be renewable for lifetime except on grounds of fraud, moral hazard or misrepresentation or Non-Cooperation.

Renewal - Your Policy shall ordinarily be renewable for lifetime except on grounds of fraud, moral hazard or misrepresentation or non ‐ cooperation by you / any of the Insured Persons.

It is important to note that this type of coverage is rather exclusive, for obvious reasons such as the potential for moral risk or hazard, insurers offer this coverage only to clients who meet insurance company underwriting criteria.

First and foremost, the company's stated guidelines for moral hazards..

If there were coverage for losses caused intentionally by an insured, even if that coverage were only available to other insureds on the policy, that would create a moral hazard by encouraging people to cause a loss in order to get the money from the claim.

That exclusion is specifically designed to negate the moral hazard of someone setting their home on fire to collect the money for their personal property coverage.