The main points here are that QE has encouraged the dramatic overvaluation of virtually every class of investments; that these elevated valuations don't represent «wealth» (which is embodied in the future stream of deliverable cash flows, not in the current price); that extreme valuations promise dismal future outcomes for investors over a 10 - 12 year horizon; and that until a clear improvement in market
internals conveys a resumption of speculative risk - seeking by investors, the current combination of extreme valuations and increasing risk - aversion, coming off of an extended top formation after
persistent «overvalued, overbought, overbullish» extremes, represents the singularly
most negative return / risk classification we identify.
As usual, I don't place too much emphasis on this sort of forecast, but to the extent that I make any comments at all about the outlook for 2006, the bottom line is this: 1) we can't rule out modest potential for stock appreciation, which would require the maintenance or expansion of already high price / peak earnings multiples; 2) we also should recognize an uncomfortably large potential for market losses, particularly given that the current bull market has now outlived the median and average bull, yet at higher valuations than
most bulls have achieved, a flat yield curve with rising interest rate pressures, an extended period of
internal divergence as measured by breadth and other market action, and complacency at best and excessive bullishness at worst, as measured by various sentiment indicators; 3) there is a moderate but still not compelling risk of an oncoming recession, which would become more of a factor if we observe a substantial widening of credit spreads and weakness in the ISM Purchasing Managers Index in the months ahead, and; 4) there remains substantial potential for U.S. dollar weakness coupled with «unexpectedly»
persistent inflation pressures, particularly if we do observe economic weakness.