Sentences with phrase «nature of actuality»

Everything that is actual participates in the same kind of existence, what might be called the essence or nature of actuality.

Not exact matches

Granted, therefore, that God's infinite conceptual valuation of pure possibility may justly be termed «free» since it is «limited by no actuality which it presupposes (PR 524), yet the temporal integrative activity of his consequent nature, whereby he loves particular occasions of the actual world, may also be called «free,» though in a somewhat different sense.

But his insistence that» [t] he envisaging creativity, the continuum of extension, B's anticipatory feeling of C, the disjunctive plurality of attained actualities, the multiplicity of eternal objects, and the primordial nature of God are all alike involved in the creation of C's dative [i.e., purely receptive] phase» (326) would lead one to believe that some sort of objective medium must he present to facilitate the transmission to the new occasion of so many non-objective factors in its self - constitution (e g creativity, the anticipatory feelings of B and other past occasions, the multiplicity of eternal objects, the divine primordial nature, etc.).

Using human experience as a model to depict the nature of reality, Whitehead argues that every actuality (i.e., every actual event) has both a present subjective immediacy and a past objectivity.

These assertions, linked mainly to Aristotle's concept of nature, are confirmed and deepened where Aristotle in his metaphysics explicitly asks about the actuality 1219] of the actual.

But if we hold, as for example in Process and Reality, that all final individual actualities have the metaphysical character of occasions of experience, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's immediately present occasion of experience with one's immediately past occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the connectedness of all occasions in nature.

There is still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings... (ii) The «consequent nature» of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe... (iii) The «superjective» nature10 of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.

A kind of rational intuition is needed to perceive the general principles which are there ready - made in actuality.6 Or if patterned on the genetic - functional model, the generalizations have as their subject - matter «distinctions that arise in and because of inquiry into the subject - matter of experience - nature, and then they function or operate as divisions of labor in the further control and ordering of its materials and processes» (DWP 175).

Whitehead insisted that «this final phase of passage in God's nature is ever enlarging itself» (PR 530 — italics mine), that it is «an unresting advance beyond itself» (PR 531 — italics mine), that «the actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity of actual components in process of creation (PR 531 — italics mine) and that «in every respect God and the World move conversely to each other in respect to their process» (PR 529 — italics mine).

, the divine consequent nature is everlasting or infinitely temporal, entailing that God has been interacting with the domain of finite actualities for an infinitely past time, and that God will continue to interact with finite actualities infinitely in the future.

Having thus far spoken of the need to speculate about the nature of finite actualities in themselves, including their causal relations, I now move to the question of God.

«The consequent nature of God is the fulfillment of his experience by his reception of the multiple freedom of actuality into the harmony of his own actualization» (PR 530).

This first function, then, would not require the functions of the consequent nature except as they are needed to complete the actuality of the entity (God) to which the function belongs.2

The consequent nature of God is «the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe» (PR 134).

It is by means of this very complex speculative hypothesis, involving the nature of God, creation, worldly actualities, and possibilities, that process theology can reconcile God's goodness and providence with genuine evil.

(This is not as fantastic as it sounds; actualities inherit habits of selection, and these habits are so strong that scientists call them laws of nature.)

To say that God in his consequent nature can prehend a contemporary actual entity, a then - concrescing occasion, is to provide a ground for the datum (viz, the actuality of the then - concrescing occasion) but is to make an exception of God in order to prevent the collapse of the system.

Whitehead naturally calls this entity «God»; more exactly, this consideration defines the «primordial» side of God's nature, which is «the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things.»

It does not belong to the nature of symbols to hover timelessly over concrete actualities.

As before, the question of such survival is left open, but a new note is struck by the reference to the everlasting nature of God, which is his consequent nature as the weaving of his temporal physical feelings of actualities upon his nontemporal conceptualizations of all pure possibilities (PR 524).

In Aristotle's language, God is pure actuality; there is nothing that is possible in Him which is not actually realized — His will, His knowledge, and His action, the whole of His nature.

Whitehead asserts that «every occasion of actuality is in its own nature finite.

This doctrine of the essential relation of time to self - constituting actualities strictly determines what the nature of time must be.

Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 88) Whitehead further comments that God's «primordial nature directs such perspectives of objectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance.»

So God's consequent nature has an effect on the temporal world,»... each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience.»

Whitehead notes, «The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever - present fact.»

The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature.

The prehension of God's consequent nature (how God has prehended the past actuality of that occasion) reveals a specific response to the past occasion.

But if the world provides any clue to the nature of deity, for God to be God must imply vital actuality and ceaseless capacity for adaptation; and this may properly be said to define deity as «living» and not as a static entity.

Process thought, reflecting upon the mutual interaction among God, humanity, and natural actualities, conveys a sense of ecological balance between both nature and God.

On the contrary, what goes on in the world is a genuine manifestation of the living process which is his own nature; and it also makes a difference to him, for it makes possible the novelty of adaptation, the emergence of new actualities, and the appearance of real possibilities, which otherwise would not be available to him.

The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever - present fact (Process and Reality, An Essay in Cosmology 531).20

The infinity of possibilities in God's nature is inexhaustible in actuality even by divine power, or any conceivable power.

The conclusion that they must be analogous follows not from their evident similarity, but as a deduction from the metaphysics of materialist physicalism, with its «Democritean doctrine of mereological supervenience, or microdeterminism» (SM 96), according to which all the features of all wholes are ontologically reducible to the most elementary constituents of nature, This metaphysics, according to which these elementary constituents are devoid of experience and thereby of internal relations, does not allow for the evolutionary emergence of higher - level actualities with genuine causal powers of their own.

Since laws of nature are abstractions from an environmental order, one can deduce predictions as to behavior and properties of the actualities of ae2; the actualities of ae2 will conform to the laws expressing the dominant order of environment E.

This means that an analysis of the structure and relations of any finite actuality should, at the same time, reveal intimations about the nature of its ground.

Among these are perception, the question of time, existence and actuality, personal identity, and the nature of God.

In the theology of Charles Hartshorne, the primordial nature (PN) of God is that determinable potentiality which underlies the actuality of the world that has already been realized in a determinate form.

Because Whitehead conceives the human psyche not to be a single actuality, but a temporally - ordered society of occasions of experience, and further believes all actual entities to be occasions of experience, he is able to use «the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's immediate present occasion of experience with one's immediately past occasions... to suggest categories applying to the connectedness of all occasions in nature» (AI 284).

The nineteenth century saw the reality of the «historical facts» as consisting largely in names, places, dates, occurrences, sequences, causes, effects — things which fall far short of being the actuality of history, if one understands by history the distinctively human, creative, unique, purposeful, which distinguishes man from nature.

The contribution to an occasion of its initial aim is not simply one among several equally important contributions to its actuality and nature.

The divine attributes of actuality, immanence and transcendence are not problematic in any way: all of them characterize the God in two natures for which Whitehead is so well known.

«Conceptual actuality,» rather than «conceptual nature,» indicates that God's actuality as a whole is constituted solely Out of conceptual feelings.

For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience» (351) 3 Some interpreters refer also to Whitehead's reference to the «superjective nature» of God in Process and Reality: «The «superjective» nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances» (88).4 In this case, however, the actual warrant lies again on page 351, as it is under the light of that particular passage that the «superjective character» on page 88 is interpreted as a reference to the objectification of the consequent nature.

In his primordial nature God prehends the infinite realm of possibilities; in his consequent nature he prehends the actualities of the world his superjective nature is a result of weaving his consequent prehensions upon his primordial vision.

The incompatibility between the description made, in Process 32, of God as the non-derivative actuality and the concept of God in two natures is blatant.

Ethical mysticism, on the other hand (also called «mysticism of actuality»), results in world - and life - affirmation, holds that the World - Spirit or God remains ultimately a mystery, and bases its incomplete view of the nature of things on an encompassing life view.

The «togetherness» of possibility in the primordial nature is basic, for in this way possibility is given ontological status (PR 73) and rendered accessible to actuality (PR 46, 48, 64, 73).

Therefore, the statement that God «combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential» is incompatible with the concept of God in two natures developed in the last chapter of that book where, as we have seen above, God is temporal in the consequent nature.

I argue that God exists in all three time - dimensions simultaneously: as a determinate past actuality in virtue of the divine consequent nature, as an indeterminate future reality in virtue of the divine primordial nature, and as a concrescing present reality in virtue of the ongoing integration of the divine primordial and consequent natures.1 Yet, while I agree with Ford that there is no way for finite actual occasions objectively to prehend that integration of the primordial and consequent natures within God even in terms of their own self - constitution here and now, I would also contend that finite actual occasions still feel the feelings of God toward themselves as a result of that integration of the primordial and consequent natures within the divine being.