Sentences with phrase «necessary existence»

If this is true, then how can perfection be both a predicate and include necessary existence?

It deserves emphasis that Hartshorne's understanding of God's necessary existence means that this divine existence does not make any empirical difference whatever in the world.

It is God's nature as Necessary Existence, as Self - Subsistent Being that holds the key as to why the processions of knowledge and love in God «result» in Persons.

I am not claiming for God either eminent reality or necessary existence in contrast to contingent existence.

If we suppose that God possesses all positive properties, Leibniz argues, then necessary existence is a positive property and must pertain to God.

The modern philosopher Jonathan Sobel argues that we are thus driven back to Spinoza's problem, in which God is in everything and everything is in God, because we can not distinguish between necessary existence and contingent existence.

We take Anselm's reflections concerning divine perfection and necessary existence to have demonstrated a symmetrical truth: if God could possibly exist, he must; but if God could possibly not exist, then his existence is forever impossible.

To prove the necessary existence of God he must show that at least some universe necessarily exists.

It will then be clear that it is impossible to argue validly for the necessary existence of the neoclassical God.

Hence, Hartshorne not only has not proved God's necessary existence, he can not.

Thus, on this analysis, the conception of necessary existence need not deny the distinction between the concrete and abstract.

The preceding discussion shows, I think, that Hartshorne has no convincing arguments for the necessary existence of at least some universe.

However, if those arguments can be refuted, it will be shown that Hartshorne has not proven God's necessary existence.

This, in connection with our earlier analysis, shows that Hartshorne has not proven the necessary existence of God, but only the conditional necessity of God.

In this regard, we shall proceed now to explicate Hartshorne's arguments for the necessary existence of some universe and to show why the arguments are not successful.

Since such a view can not possibly be defended on the classical view (which holds that God is in all ways absolute and has no relative states), Hartshorne is actually maintaining that the case for God's necessary existence is made by holding that God is in some ways contingent!

Further, if «necessary existence» must be part of the divine essence, and Hartshorne says it must, then Hartshorne's concept of God can not be an adequate concept of God.

This essence is perfection: perfect knowledge, perfect love, necessary existence.

Indeed, the unconditional need for such a Being to exist could be viewed as a part of God's own nature, something explaining God's necessary existence, rather than as something standing outside God and creating God.

The only alternatives that remain are either to affirm that «God» means necessary existence or means nothing at all (or is nonsense).76 Hence Hartshorne's conclusion that the only logical way left to reject theism is not to deny the existence of God but to affirm that the very idea of God is either vacuous or selfcontradictory.77

A typical Hartshornian restatement of Anselm's argument in the language of modern modal logic runs about like this: Since God is by definition not conceivably surpassable, and since a being whose existence is necessary surpasses one whose existence is merely contingent, therefore, God's existence must be necessary existence.

The abstract aspect of God is his absolute, eternal, and necessary existence; and, as such, this aspect can be known by abstract metaphysical argument and logical proof.

But each occasion in the divine life is an instance of necessary existence.

That is, there must be some existing actual entity exhibiting the metaphysical conditions, although how that necessary existence is actualized relative to the contingencies of the other events in the world is itself contingent.

The property that conjoins all positive properties also must be a positive property; and because «necessary existence» is a positive property, this property - of - all - positive - properties must include necessary existence; Gödel defines it as the «God - like property.»

Moreover, because «necessary existence» is one of these positive properties, God must exist in all possible worlds.

(Dean Koons has suggested a possible if problematic repair of Gödel's proof in which only the cosmos itself is considered to have necessary existence.)

Like its Leibnizian model it turns on the notion of «necessary existence,» although it contains additional intermediate steps.

The very intelligibility to us of scientific «law» and causality implications concerning spiritual mind which, in the Faith theology, implies the necessary existence of a supreme spiritual being.

Creation does not mean sheer autonomy but a gift by which what is by definition contingent is made able to share through Christ in the very Fullness of Necessary Existence that is God Himself.

But he also believes that a fully coherent idea of One who necessarily exists would entail the necessary existence of that One.

But this in no way weakens the ontological inference from the concept of deity to necessary existence.