Sentences with phrase «necessary for military action»

Not exact matches

Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those reflected in such forward - looking statements and that should be considered in evaluating our outlook include, but are not limited to, the following: 1) our ability to continue to grow our business and execute our growth strategy, including the timing, execution, and profitability of new and maturing programs; 2) our ability to perform our obligations under our new and maturing commercial, business aircraft, and military development programs, and the related recurring production; 3) our ability to accurately estimate and manage performance, cost, and revenue under our contracts, including our ability to achieve certain cost reductions with respect to the B787 program; 4) margin pressures and the potential for additional forward losses on new and maturing programs; 5) our ability to accommodate, and the cost of accommodating, announced increases in the build rates of certain aircraft; 6) the effect on aircraft demand and build rates of changing customer preferences for business aircraft, including the effect of global economic conditions on the business aircraft market and expanding conflicts or political unrest in the Middle East or Asia; 7) customer cancellations or deferrals as a result of global economic uncertainty or otherwise; 8) the effect of economic conditions in the industries and markets in which we operate in the U.S. and globally and any changes therein, including fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates; 9) the success and timely execution of key milestones such as the receipt of necessary regulatory approvals, including our ability to obtain in a timely fashion any required regulatory or other third party approvals for the consummation of our announced acquisition of Asco, and customer adherence to their announced schedules; 10) our ability to successfully negotiate, or re-negotiate, future pricing under our supply agreements with Boeing and our other customers; 11) our ability to enter into profitable supply arrangements with additional customers; 12) the ability of all parties to satisfy their performance requirements under existing supply contracts with our two major customers, Boeing and Airbus, and other customers, and the risk of nonpayment by such customers; 13) any adverse impact on Boeing's and Airbus» production of aircraft resulting from cancellations, deferrals, or reduced orders by their customers or from labor disputes, domestic or international hostilities, or acts of terrorism; 14) any adverse impact on the demand for air travel or our operations from the outbreak of diseases or epidemic or pandemic outbreaks; 15) our ability to avoid or recover from cyber-based or other security attacks, information technology failures, or other disruptions; 16) returns on pension plan assets and the impact of future discount rate changes on pension obligations; 17) our ability to borrow additional funds or refinance debt, including our ability to obtain the debt to finance the purchase price for our announced acquisition of Asco on favorable terms or at all; 18) competition from commercial aerospace original equipment manufacturers and other aerostructures suppliers; 19) the effect of governmental laws, such as U.S. export control laws and U.S. and foreign anti-bribery laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act, and environmental laws and agency regulations, both in the U.S. and abroad; 20) the effect of changes in tax law, such as the effect of The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the «TCJA») that was enacted on December 22, 2017, and changes to the interpretations of or guidance related thereto, and the Company's ability to accurately calculate and estimate the effect of such changes; 21) any reduction in our credit ratings; 22) our dependence on our suppliers, as well as the cost and availability of raw materials and purchased components; 23) our ability to recruit and retain a critical mass of highly - skilled employees and our relationships with the unions representing many of our employees; 24) spending by the U.S. and other governments on defense; 25) the possibility that our cash flows and our credit facility may not be adequate for our additional capital needs or for payment of interest on, and principal of, our indebtedness; 26) our exposure under our revolving credit facility to higher interest payments should interest rates increase substantially; 27) the effectiveness of any interest rate hedging programs; 28) the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting; 29) the outcome or impact of ongoing or future litigation, claims, and regulatory actions; 30) exposure to potential product liability and warranty claims; 31) our ability to effectively assess, manage and integrate acquisitions that we pursue, including our ability to successfully integrate the Asco business and generate synergies and other cost savings; 32) our ability to consummate our announced acquisition of Asco in a timely matter while avoiding any unexpected costs, charges, expenses, adverse changes to business relationships and other business disruptions for ourselves and Asco as a result of the acquisition; 33) our ability to continue selling certain receivables through our supplier financing program; 34) the risks of doing business internationally, including fluctuations in foreign current exchange rates, impositions of tariffs or embargoes, compliance with foreign laws, and domestic and foreign government policies; and 35) our ability to complete the proposed accelerated stock repurchase plan, among other things.

Hard just war theory reverses these emphases, replacing them with the following: a presumption against injustice and disorder rather than against war; an assumption that war is tragic but inevitable in a fallen world and that war is a necessary task of government; a tendency to trust the U.S. government and its claims of need for military action; an emphasis on just war theory as a tool to aid policymakers and military personnel in their decisions; an inclination to distrust the efficacy of international treaties and to downplay the value of international actors and perspectives; a less stringent or differently oriented application of some just war criteria; and no sense of common ground with Christian pacifists.

That this House notes that ISIL poses a direct threat to the United Kingdom; welcomes United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249 which determines that ISIL constitutes an «unprecedented threat to international peace and security» and calls on states to take «all necessary measures» to prevent terrorist acts by ISIL and to «eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria»; further notes the clear legal basis to defend the UK and our allies in accordance with the UN Charter; notes that military action against ISIL is only one component of a broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria; welcomes the renewed impetus behind the Vienna talks on a ceasefire and political settlement; welcomes the Government's continuing commitment to providing humanitarian support to Syrian refugees; underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria; welcomes the Government's continued determination to cut ISIL's sources of finance, fighters and weapons; notes the requests from France, the US and regional allies for UK military assistance; acknowledges the importance of seeking to avoid civilian casualties, using the UK's particular capabilities; notes the Government will not deploy UK troops in ground combat operations; welcomes the Government's commitment to provide quarterly progress reports to the House; and accordingly supports Her Majesty's Government in taking military action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIL in Syria; and offers its wholehearted support to Her Majesty's Armed Forces.

«That this house notes that ISIL poses a direct threat to the United Kingdom; welcomes United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249 which determines that ISIL constitutes an «unprecedented threat to international peace and security» and calls on states to take «all necessary measures» to prevent terrorist acts by ISIL and to «eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria»; further notes the clear legal basis to defend the UK and our allies in accordance with the UN Charter; notes that military action against ISIL is only one component of a broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria; welcomes the renewed impetus behind the Vienna talks on a ceasefire and political settlement; welcomes the Government's continuing commitment to providing humanitarian support to Syrian refugees; underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria; welcomes the Government's continued determination to cut ISIL's sources of finance, fighters, and weapons; notes the requests from France, the US and regional allies for UK military assistance; acknowledges the importance of seeking to avoid civilian causalities; using the UK's particular capabilities; notes the Government's will not deploy UK troops in ground combat operations; welcomes the Government's commitment to provide quarterly progress reports to the House; and accordingly supports Her Majesty's Government in taking military action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIL in Syria; and offers its wholehearted support to Her Majesty's Armed Forces.»

Containment, backed by credible military threat and, as necessary, limited military action, sadly remains the best option in Syria for the time being.

Courts are utterly unqualified to determine proper diplomatic or military actions to take, or to evaluate whether the President's actions were enough to meet the requirement of «do what's necessary to restore security;» foreign policy is a case where a country needs a unified face (because other countries aren't particularly willing to deal with US internal politics), and where the courts could easily screw up what the government is doing; and whether to send Americans to war is a question that is clearly a matter for those accountable to the people.

In mid-January 2003, Lord Goldsmith told Blair that a further Security Council resolution would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action.