Might the influence of
nominalism in the subsequent century be relevant?
The present Humanism, whether we call it scientific or existentialist, is only the natural and nal culmination of those principles of autonomy and
nominalism in philosophy, which oversowed the New Learning.
Not exact matches
What
nominalism called
in question is the universal, those principles and causes larger than the mechanism of nature or ideas generated out of nature seen as mechanistic by man.
That may mean rejecting the medieval world» the «Dark Ages»» or embracing the medieval world as if that were our most recent Eden,
nominalism poisoned our intellectual life, whether one takes himself to be of the left or right, insofar as one justifies order merely
in terms of history or these mechanisms collectively referred to as «nature.»
Such existentialism
in many ways resuscitates medieval
nominalism.
It is fashionable at present, among some theologians, to attempt precise genealogies of modernity, which
in general I would rather avoid doing; but it does seem clear to me that the special preoccupations and perversities of modern philosophy were incubated
in the age of late Scholasticism, with the rise of
nominalism and voluntarism.
What Rorty favors
in pragmatism is its
nominalism and its historicism.
Hume's insight had roots
in the fourteenth - century revolt of
nominalism against those Scholastics whose descendants inhabit my «Traditional» category.
It is precisely
in the introduction of formative elements as conditions of the possibility of actual entities, according to Collingwood, that Whitehead differs from Alexander.25 Furthermore, the status of one of these formative elements, the «eternal objects,» is analogous to that of the «abstract entities»: 26 both are situated between the realism of ideas and pure
nominalism.
This is explained as the philosophical change from realism to
nominalism, from a belief
in universals as real to a belief
in the fundamental reality of unrelated particulars.
The very intellectual weakness of keeping science at arm's length invites the dominant dualistic mindset to interpret scientific as well as other observational data
in a reductive manner, which leads to
nominalism.
They both also acknowledge that this was
in the context of the rising challenge against the idea of «the nature of something» from the school of
Nominalism.
Among the many references, I suggest the following: SDE 137 - 82 (see, e.g., 141); Man's Vision of God (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941), p. 225, pp. 244 - 47, and p. 315; «Chance, Love, and Incompatibility,»
in RSP 85 - 109 (see especially 94 and 98f; also see [
in a later chapter] 118); TDG 193 «Abstraction: The Question of
Nominalism,» chapter IV of CSPM 57 - 68 (see especially 61 - 64; also see [
in an earlier chapter] 22f and [
in a later] 122).
In Ockham's nominalism the value of human abstractions is relativised and truth is found only in God's revelation, which can be understood, nonetheless, according to logical and grammatical law
In Ockham's
nominalism the value of human abstractions is relativised and truth is found only
in God's revelation, which can be understood, nonetheless, according to logical and grammatical law
in God's revelation, which can be understood, nonetheless, according to logical and grammatical laws.
Kathleen Sweeney historically roots the problem
in the philosophy of
nominalism and links it with the heart issue of the place of Christ
in creation.
A third heresy that often appears
in the electronic - church message is
nominalism («Speak the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and you will be saved») which fits nicely into the electronic church «s emphasis that the individual need merely «name the name» or «accept the Lord Jesus Christ» to be saved.
It arose largely from the individualism of Protestant then Enlightenment thinking with its roots
in the
Nominalism of the late Middle Ages which denied any intrinsic connection, any common «natures», between entities.
In philosophy this would be called Nominalism: the denial of mutual inter-definition both to be at all, and to be fulfilled rightly and beautifully, and in true order, in one's bein
In philosophy this would be called
Nominalism: the denial of mutual inter-definition both to be at all, and to be fulfilled rightly and beautifully, and
in true order, in one's bein
in true order,
in one's bein
in one's being.
This disturbed processing, embedded as it became
in the dialectical method of inquiry (thesis, antithesis, synthesis), generated polarized and competing forces: rival powers (such as popes versus emperors), competing orders (such as the simple Franciscans versus the sophisticated Dominicans), competing pieties (such as natural realism versus Gothic symbolism), and competing inquiries (such as
nominalism's empiricism versus realism's idealism) The dialectic between spirit and matter was pressed beyond its limits, resulting
in both collapse and rigidification.
This makes sense of Hartshorne's contention
in his chapter «Abstraction the Question of
Nominalism,» that the novel forms emergent
in a creative event are not determinate before the event but become determinate by decision
in the event; to deny this is to deny any real meaning to creativity.
Professional philosophers consider him the chief exponent of «
nominalism,» a powerful late - medieval philosophical movement which denied that universal concepts and principles exist
in reality» they exist only
in our minds.
Often presented as a crucial moment
in the history of epistemology,
nominalism also had a tremendous influence on moral theology.
Again and again he sees the same underlying issue, which he poses
in terms of a long - standing philosophers» controversy between «realism» and «
nominalism.»
(PiP I, p. 22) Moreover because the individual known is part of and
in relation to a unified cosmos, the dangers of
nominalism are obviated.