Says coordinator Mary Anne Anselmino, «The children have established relationships with many
nonhuman beings that share their garden.»
The functioning which it does actually exhibit is nothing especially exalted when compared to other beings, even a great many
nonhuman beings.
Understanding
Nonhuman Beings.
«The Rights of
Nonhuman Beings.
The concept of
the nonhuman is an inseparable component of Asian American identity construction, deriving from a historical racialization of Asians as a subspecies.
Strands of its story can be found in The Terminator (relentless android that can't be stopped), Predator (
a nonhuman being with hightened senses and infrared sight preying on humans) and even in Crichton's later and more popular work Jurassic Park (high - concept amusement park that goes awry and becomes deadly.)
Long - term species - specific studies of lateralization in
nonhumans are required to determine if pawedness shifts over time or varies with context, experience and genetic predisposition.
Not exact matches
And they exist in juvenile
nonhuman primates that
are not exposed to human gender - specific socialization efforts.
As a result, many people believe Carson
is a flat - out mass murderer - not a hero who beautifully blended care for human health and
nonhuman nature in one of the most important and challenging books of the 20th century.
Soon after 1 -800-Flowers launched its bot in April, CEO Chris McCann says his team realized customers didn't mind texting with a
nonhuman, but they wanted the company to
be transparent about it.
Corporate personhood
is easily ridiculed on late - night television, but as Eric Posner pointed out in Slate, the law often «treats various
nonhuman, nonsentient entities as «persons» for certain legal purposes.»
A paraphilia
is a disorder that
is characterized by recurrent intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies generally involving:
nonhuman objects; the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner (not merely simulated); or animals, children, or other nonconsenting persons.
If, to the contrary, the difference between humans and some sub-humans
were slight (if, for instance, humans
were only slightly superior to
nonhuman primates, so that human existence
were a species belonging to what we now call the
nonhuman animal world), it would not
be clear that the appearance of humans represents the maximal importance of subhuman existence as such.
but projects the issues of life into a
nonhuman, magical realm where ritualistic performances
are believed to have influence.
If, as Hartshorne does, one uses one's prior understanding of various types of human experience as the source of generalized descriptions which together constitute the final concept of experience, how does one decide whether the generalizations have
been radical enough to support application to all — including
nonhuman — experiences or
were sufficient only to cover human experiences?
Equally important
is the violence worked on the
nonhuman world because of the virtual absence of nature from economic thinking.
Indeed, the plight of indigenous peoples and of the
nonhuman species with whom we share the planet should touch our consciences as too high a price for us to
be paying even in terms of immediate consequences.
And these
nonhuman creatures, sheep and lilies and birds,
are always represented as worthy of, or as flourishing within, the love and the care of God.
If we
are capable of extinguishing ourselves and most, if not all, other life, metaphors that support attitudes of distance from, and domination of, other human
beings and
nonhuman life must
be recognized as dangerous.
We
are part and parcel of the web of life and exist in interdependence with all other
beings, both human and
nonhuman.
But corporations
are not established to serve future generations or
nonhuman creatures.
When this philosophic dimension
is admitted, the natural sciences become prime sources of knowledge of man, not only in respect to those material properties shared with the
nonhuman world, but also in respect to the uniquely human qualities of mind and spirit.
But it does not, so man will forever
be exiled in a
nonhuman world.
But this does not justify the shift of power from the political system which can express the concerns of people for their grandchildren and for the
nonhuman world to economic institutions for which these considerations
are typically felt as interfering with their primary goals.
Also the view that
nonhuman things have their value only in relation to human
beings is false.
The fact that animals
are nonhuman makes no difference.
The only value that can
be attributed to the
nonhuman world
is instrumental.
If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a person, it appears that the newborn baby does not either, and the life of a newborn baby
is of less value to it than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee
is to the
nonhuman animal.
It
is derived from the idea that the
nonhuman world
is available for the market, so that market forces can price it.
If the
nonhuman natural world
is of instrumental value only, those seen as closest to it
are also of instrumental value only, inferior, and in need of domination.
The theory generalizes the repetition of the past that
is evident in conscious, mnemonic occasions of human experience into a feature of all actual occasions, human or
nonhuman.
We do not simply create the
nonhuman realities — plants, animals, and inorganic materials — that we interpret; rather we experience these realities as given to us for interpretation, and in their givenness values
are disclosed.
It
is an extension to others, both human and
nonhuman, of that empathetic identification we normally feel toward our own personal pasts and futures.
Just as God
is appreciative and affirming of life, human and
nonhuman, so an «ethic of life»
is appreciative and affirming.
And we must allow ourselves to
be influenced and shaped by the poor and victimized, human and
nonhuman, whose cries can unmask our ideologies.
With its emphasis on stewardship it allows us to affirm that the
nonhuman world ought to
be used in an ecologically responsible manner for the benefit of all humans.
Some proponents of the land ethic — Callicott, for example —
are suspicious of ethical preoccupations with individual
nonhuman creatures.
As the Church and Society sub-unit of the World Council would emphasize, our immanent neighbors
are both human and
nonhuman.
Amid our self - structuring dependent origination, which in Zen
is the very nature of the true self, we ought to respect as much as possible the capacities of others, both
nonhuman and human, to originate dependently in their own self - structuring ways.
In terms of this principle, I expect, one might speak of the prima facie «rights» of
nonhuman animals, at least of those that
are conscious, and in a more extended sense of the term, the prima facie «right» of the natural order to its own diversity
From this perspective, God would not
be a cosmic Person who relates first and foremost to people and who also, in some less important way, also relates to
nonhuman organisms.
And it
is in this Leopoldian vein that he opens the door, perhaps unwittingly, to the second question mentioned above: What, if anything,
is the ethical status of individual
nonhuman organisms, as they exist in and for themselves?
There
is intrinsic value, or richness of experience, in every living creature, human or
nonhuman.
In so doing, we learn to feel the presence of others,
nonhuman and human, as part of who and what we
are.
In comparison with
nonhuman worldly existence, human activities enjoy opportunities for good that
are vastly extended.
Asking what sorts of value
nonhuman creatures might have, Warren writes: «The environmentalists» answer
is that they
are valuable as organic parts of the natural whole.»
The health of eco-systems
is essential to our survival, and their integrity must
be respected both for human self - interest and because of the intrinsic value of the
nonhuman world.
This recognition of the intrinsic value of the
nonhuman world, and of its claim upon human
beings, involves a deep shift for the Western psyche, raising a whole range of questions to which we
are not accustomed.
Rolston laments that many influenced by the mechanistic worldview of industrial civilizations think of
nonhuman nature as something devoid of value until assigned importance by human
beings.
The result
is that dualism gives way to a monism in which the integrity of
nonhuman creatures
is denied or disappears from view altogether.