In my September post, I wrote that Daniel's blog provided «an intriguing perspective on the litigation system as
nonlawyers see it.»
Not exact matches
See also Rule 5.3 for the (duties of lawyers and law firms with respect to the conduct of
nonlawyers); Rule 8.4 (a)(duty to avoid violating the Rules through the acts of another).
The «protectionist instincts» that I and others have are (1) to protect the independence of the bar (sure to be lost eventually under
nonlawyer ownership), (2) to protect the health of the legal marketplace (sure to be badly harmed by the cartelization of ABS (
see the 5 % commissions charged by the cartel of real estate agencies who still control the vast majority of the realty market, and especially
see the ridiculously high costs of dealing with the American title insurance industry where four companies have upwards of 87 % of the conveyancing and title insurance market after first decimating the real estate bar with predatory pricing and other unfair business practices)-RRB-, and (3) to protect the public from those ravages.
[43]
See generally Derek A. Denckla, «
Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters,» Fordham Law Review 67 (1999): 2581 - 2599, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3572&context=flr.
• The establishment of alternative business structures that could
see different types of lawyers and
nonlawyers managing and owning legal practices.
For a lawyer's duties when sharing information with
nonlawyers outside the lawyer's own firm,
see Comments [3] and [4] to Rule 5.3.
A critic of what he
sees as a caste system within law firms, he was glad to
see the FT refer to «non-legal staff» rather than use the demeaning label «
nonlawyer.»
But I don't
see any «millionaires» — at least
nonlawyer millionaires among the decision - makers.»
However bad you
see the profit motive of the personal injury bar, it would only worsen if they had to share those profits with
nonlawyer investors.
Having experienced it here in the UK, I think that they should
see how other countries, like the UK, work because
nonlawyer ownership has worked for my firm.
Rarely, however, have I
seen the impacts of mergers on
nonlawyer employees discussed until this article, Are Mergers A Threat or Opportunity, from The Recorder (2/7/2007).
On the other hand, if the
nonlawyer is happy to provide services to the firm only, such as in the role of a Technology Officer or Executive Director, it is easier to
see how Rule 5.4 can work.
I have heard the arguments that bringing a
nonlawyer into the ownership or management of a law firm will erode ethics, but I
see no reason why that should be the case.
They are not able to
see nonlawyer ownership and management as the fantastic advantage that it is.
The D.C. approach does not place a cap on
nonlawyer ownership (although, as
seen below, regulators in D.C. esteem that a cap applies nonetheless), nor does it impose a «fit to own» test on
nonlawyers).
See also, for example, Thomas R. Andrews, «
Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?»
We are already
seeing a combination of computerization, outsourcing, and
nonlawyer practice radically reshape the market for law from one that centers on individualized, hourly work done for clients to a market of much cheaper, commoditized legal products.
(
See my article at http://www.florida-attorneys-at-law.com/therapeutic-jurisprudence.htm The problem is particularly bad when advertising solicits members of the public to «contact any professional» — including
nonlawyers — to obtain legal information.