Sentences with word «nonmoral»

The door is thus opened for the classical theist to affirm the genuineness of nonmoral evil as the evil clashes between nature and human aspirations need not be acknowledged as willed by God by the classical theist who consistently draws out the implications of the free - will defense for the natural order.

In short, if those dissatisfied with the classical account of nonmoral evil currently under discussion are not able to present a better world, «the (classical) theist does not have to show that it was impossible for God to create a better set of world - constituents or natural laws, or even that this is the best of all possible worlds» (IPQ 179 - 98).

They alert us to constraints upon congregational practices, and they help us identify certain nonmoral goods relevant to theological and ethical reflection.

It is the force of this reasoning that leads proportionalists to reject the double effect, and thus to argue that it can be morally licit to directly intend certain nonmoral evils.

The more people Greene scanned, the clearer the pattern became: Impersonal moral decisions (like whether to throw a switch on a trolley) triggered many of the same parts of the brain as nonmoral questions do (such as whether you should take the train or the bus to work).

At the psychological level we may basically be talking about feelings — moral and nonmoral feelings.

Psychological treatments of human tendencies and needs alert us to important nonmoral goods that fill in the content of mutual regard.

Furthermore, the research found that what differentiates the characteristics of moral character (from positive yet nonmoral attributes) is that such qualities are non-negotiable in social relationships.

Impersonal moral ones and nonmoral ones tend to take about the same time to answer.

Now of course someone might set out on this different enterprise; he might try to explain the existence of evil, or of nonmoral evil, from the theistic perspective; he might try to explain why it is that God permits the various sorts of evil we do in fact find.

It determines the moral status of nonmoral goods and it furnishes the ultimate basis for the assessment of practice.

It is one thing to grant that a moral world must contain natural regularities and that some nonmoral evil is an unavoidable by - product of such regularities, but quite another thing to grant that we must have the exact types and amount of natural evil which we in fact experience in the actual world.

The critic, then, is left only with the claim that the nonmoral evils might not be justifiable in that there might be a better conceivable order.

Plantinga, in positing «Satan and his cohorts» as the «explanation» for nonmoral evil is admittedly only attempting to defend the consistency of belief both in God and nonmoral evil.

Given the above analysis, nonmoral evils do not have to be seen as incompatible with the goodness of the classical God.

The classical response to nonmoral evil we have been discussing begins by affirming «C» omnipotence in relation to humans and then argues that there do exist good reasons to believe that such a moral world would include instances of genuine nonmoral evil and plausible reasons for assuming that such a world would have the types and amount of genuine nonmoral evil we presently experience.

Nonmoral evils exist as unwanted, though unavoidable, by - products of an otherwise good natural order.

In other words, there is a meaningful sense in which the classical God does not directly will nonmoral evils.

Both present internally consistent and possible explanations which can, in principle, account for the presence of nonmoral evil and, most importantly, do not deny the reality of nonmoral evil or the goodness of God in the process.

A nonmoral economic system tends to create a society either of acquisitive or of collective automatons, depending on the principles relied upon to regulate economic behavior.

Just as life came from the nonliving, so also the moral came from the nonmoral.

Numberless hordes of atheologians have claimed that a proposition most theists believe — God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good — is logically inconsistent with another proposition they believe, namely, that there is evil (or that there is some specific kind of evil such as e.g., nonmoral evil).

We can not convene the symposiasts to respond to Mr. Baer's questions, but we suspect that some of them would note that it is confusing to call knowledge of foreseeable consequences «intention,» and they might ask for clarification of, inter alia, what defines «nonmoral evils.»

Let the people decide on what they should be able to do what is moral or what is nonmoral.

The research team answered that question by leading people to construe the exact same trait as either moral or nonmoral.