Sentences with phrase «not peirce»

Does not Peirce's argument for the improbability of an exact zero of a property found in highly variable degrees, and in highly variable extents of space, hold against the exact truth of Euclidian geometry?

Not exact matches

But... the infinite regress in question is an example of the «non-vicious» type of regress, since it concerns possibilities, and these not (on one view of potentiality) as a definite multitude, whose number is infinite, but as a continuum, which in the words of Peirce is «beyond all multitude,» as God was formerly described as being; and indeed, as we shall see, the continuum of possibilities is one aspect of God which may be truly so described.

It is not even true that the omniscient must know details of the future, unless it can be proved, against Bergson, Whitehead, Peirce, James, and many others, that the future has any details to know.3 (Of course it will be detailed, but this does not imply that it has detailed will - be's as parts of itself now...)

According to Neville, Peirce is correct in holding that «the only thing that does not need an explanation is pure chaos»; consequently order and first principles are not self - explanatory but need explanation (p. 59f).

The latter is a tangled problem at best, but it is clear that among the important founders of the process perspective — specifically I mean James, Peirce, Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, and Hartshorne — it is Hartshorne's work which comes closest to being a kind of personalism.1 Whitehead explicitly sets aside the personalist perspective in Religion in the Making, considering its claims beyond the possibility of being established.2 On the other side, a number of personalists have been sympathetic to process thought, and Brightman is surely principal among them.3 Here I will not investigate the question of whether personalism in general, or even the idealistic type, is reconcilable with process thought.

Peirce had a mixture of good and not at all good in both his marriages.

A distinguished English mathematician, Sylvester, said of Charles Peirce, that he was a «much greater» mathematician than his father, Benjamin.14 The word «great» has not been used of Whitehead as mathematician, though his pupil Bertrand Russell said of him that as teacher of that sub1ect he was «perfect.»

Right away on receiving the information about natural selection as factor in the becoming of animal species Peirce said to Chauncey Wright that he'd have to give up his determinism; animal habits are not absolute regularities.

I agree but add: God had no alternative to willing that there be some free creatures, first because (pace Alston) the idea of not creating at all could occur (if I may say so) only to a confused creature, second because, as Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have seen, by a «creature» we can consistently mean only a lesser form of the freedom or creativity which in eminent form is deity.

«44 This statement exhibits an mischaracterization of Bergson so extreme it defies words; if ever there was a more persistent opponent of Descartes» conception of natural science than Bergson, I do not know who it might be — with the possible exception of Bergson's process blood brothers — Peirce, Dewey, James, Whitehead and Hartshorne.45 In Lowe's defense it might be said that the eight or ten books that do the most to establish just how non-Cartesian, and indeed revolutionary Bergson's view of science was were all published after Understanding Whitehead.

Peirce was aware of some but not all of these features.

The most egregious example recently is the handsomely illustrated Oxford history of «Western Philosophy» (Kenny) wherein the names of Peirce, William James, John Dewey Josiah Royce, G. H. Mead, and George Santayana do not appear.

That it is pure potentiality is argued by Peirce when he indicates the grounds for saying that it can not remain inactive.

* There is now a superb biography of Charles S. Peirce, with an excellent concluding essay on his thought by the historian, who is also a capable philosopher, Professor Joseph Brent, who has become a close friend, although I had not heard of him until a year or so ago.

Peirce did not propose agapism as a premise, but rather as a hypothesis based on both inference and the experience of love.

If, as Peirce says, agapasm is the proposition that the law of love is operative, this law could not be a regularity of any specific determinateness (6.302).

Peirce's sensitivity to the fruitfulness of the notion of agape is foreshadowed in his writing of 1877 - 78, if not earlier.

Hartshorne believed that Peirce and Whitehead were not widely enough appreciated in philosophy and that occasionally they were not appreciated for their best insights; for these reasons he was often their champion.

Yet, his articles, not counting book reviews, on Peirce could fill a small volume, similar to his book of essays on Whitehead.

Nor is it clear on Peirce's account that the initial state is to be identified under the category of firstness, for it is not, since it is prior to the universe, a condition in which chance functions or in which sheer qualitative suchness is manifest phenomenally.

First of all, we should observe that Peirce believed his thesis that there is spontaneity to be explanatory of «the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each lawless event is to be.»

It should be emphasized, to be sure, that Peirce does not affirm an anancastic teleology.

Since my purpose is not to offer a study of Peirce's thesis, but rather to indicate the significance of his insight, I shall illustrate his recognition of radical creativity with only a few references.

I should emphasize at the outset that although I begin with Peirce and shall refer to what I understand to be his view, the discussion will not be restricted to a straightforward exposition.

Peirce's notion of agape offers a conceptual frame for articulating, if not resolving, this paradox at the same time that it extends his thesis of spontaneity.

Furthermore, I shall extrapolate rather freely from Peirce's statements — and to such an extent that I should acknowledge that the result may not resemble Peirce as he is ordinarily interpreted.

In Hartshorne's view, following Peirce, metaphysics is not a game to be played from the sidelines where one's own metaphysical commitments (or hunches) go unquestioned.

I mention this not only as a point in relation to Gunter's statement that creation ex nihilo never occurs for Bergson but also with Peirce in mind.

But I do want to insist that Peirce's conviction that evolution includes teleological direction is crucial to a view of evolution that does not stop with a restricted Darwinian view and recognizes that evolution does occur not simply as process as such, but as progress.

Peirce's intuitions are not themselves cognitive but are subject to and contributory to triadic experience, which is interpretive, critical, and fully cognitive.

He knew about Lawrence, but did not know about Peirce or Whitehead — he was tickled to death.

6Hartshorne does not express which citation of Peirce he had in mind, but it might be 1.362 in which Peirce describes God as manifested by the completely evolved universe in the infinitely distant future.

Peirce says that metaphysics is not factual: it is an analysis of concepts.

By these definitions lam not an idealist, nor were Peirce or White - head.

So was Peirce, who said so, and Whitehead, who did not say so but who did affirm what he called «reformed subjectivism.»

This is not because of the influence of Peirce or Whitehead, but because of that of my Harvard teachers (Hocking, Perry, and Lewis) and of the writings of William James.

Peirce distinguished psychics from physics by attributing to the former but not the latter the admission of final causes.

In agreement with Peirce, James, Dewey, and even Whitehead, I hold that a belief which could not be expressed in action is only verbal.

In so far as minding is not a direct confrontation with actualities, but is rather a process dealing with floods of possibilities, the semiotic imagery is highly appropriate since signs, as Peirce insists, belong to the order of possibilities.

But then, as Peirce said, the only thing that does not need an explanation is pure chaos; order is most of all in need of explanation, and the explanation of a state of affairs in terms of first principles is not as penetrating as the explanation of the first principles themselves.

He was, as I was not, in the technical sense a pupil of Whitehead, while also helping greatly to edit Peirce.

Hartshorne has recently argued that Peirce's categories should be distinguished not according to the number of terms they involve but according to the types of dependence which Peirce rightly identified with each (CAP 77 - 84, 106f; (ICE 324).

Peirce has not reached the final level of analysis.

Peirce scholars are indebted to Charles Hartshorne not only for his work in coediting with Paul Weiss the first six volumes of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1 but also for three stimulating papers on Peirce's theory of categories.2 In the second of these papers (1964) Professor Hartshorne argues that «Peirce's greatest single mistake..

I do not know whether he would have done this or not, since I believe that with his pragmatism he might have accommodated relativity physics without altering his epistemology, though I can not go into the question here.16 What seems to me clear is that the philosophical issues underlying Hartshorne's criticisms of Peirce can not be settled by theories of physics or the mathematics of continuity.

It is of first importance not to forget that Peirce is definitely and unambiguously committed both to external and to internal relations.

I do not intend by my remarks about space - time to imply that, if Peirce had known relativity physics, he would have given up his notion of individual identity as consisting in a continuity of reactions and accepted the idea of a definite single event as intelligible by itself.

Would Peirce's argument against definite intuitions then not hold?

The fact that Peirce conceived of individual identity in this way is not, I would urge, simply the result of an uncritical love for continuity.

I agree with Thompson that Peirce is not a systematic writer.