Sentences with phrase «not only distinction»

But this is not the only distinction.

Federalism is not only distinction from and rivalry between the federal government and the states; it is also rivalry among the states and among local governments within the states.

Not exact matches

The distinction between «free from» the necessity to turn a profit and «non-profit» is important: These companies are not only willing to experiment with new ideas for delivering and managing care, they're eager to do so — whatever the time (and presumably, financial) investment might be.

She holds a unique distinction, not just as a woman running a Fortune 500 company but as the only woman to have run more than one — first eBay, now Hewlett Packard Enterprise.

MGM had the distinction of being one of the few movie studios that not only used technicolor but also remained profitable during The Great Depression.

And that's because the store not only knows who its customers are but can make meaningful distinctions among them.

I call this ability to stand out from the crowd Managed Distinction, and it will be instrumental in helping you position yourself as not only an expert in your field, but one with a distinctive background, skill set, and perspective.

Not only did Kalanick build a $ 70 billion empire and upend the taxi industry, he created a service so ubiquitous that its name has become a verb — an honor that gives Uber a place of distinction alongside Google in Silicon Valley lore.

PEOPLE Powerline Plus not only has the distinction of attracting the most experienced, union trained and certified workers in the industry, but these employees stay and grow with us over time.

We found that the distinction of «normal» and «not normal» is important not only for the asset class that we are referencing, but also in a cross-asset test.

The nature by birth of any Westerner is not better than the nature of any Muslim Arab or Turk, it is only the true faith which could make a distinction.

The only distinction is that atheists are not so diverse in their premises of atheism in itself; there are really only two flavors.

We do not just go to the world; rather, we bring with us beliefs which determine the kind of data we select.2 The traditional distinction between reason and faith in which the scientist uses only the cold light of reason while the theologian uses the light of faith is not strictly true.

But when I read about and see young, emerging lives being destroyed by neglect, hunger, war and enraged parents, the distinction refocuses, and I say, «Life, real life, is being not only destroyed but twisted, deformed, «unholy» life is being created.»

This attempts to make the soul - spirit distinction piggy - back upon the «real» distinction of essence and existence; to maintain not only man's essential transcendence from the creator but the existential possibility of him becoming one with God.

This article will situate his theology of sex not only in the plan of creation and the Incarnation but, significantly, on the distinction between how the sexual urge operates now and how it would have operated beforethe Fall.

Ogden seems to take this to mean that all are equally responsible for not actualizing authentic existence, since the primordial revelation of God already contained the content of the revelation in Jesus the Christ.50 This is, of course, the basis for Ogden's well - known rejection of the distinction between Christian existence as a «possibility in principle» for all men but a «possibility in fact» only for some.51

It must be soberly realized that no human enactment, whether old or new, has advantages only and no disadvantages; that the old days were good only for those who enjoyed the benefits of them, but not for all without distinction and that for the most part they only begin to look splendid when they are past and gone; that even the new age will produce tribulation, inadequacies and defects, and that the reform of the Church is never at an end.

Some of the differences become theologically technical, with distinctions drawn not only between mainline and conservative churches, but also between different varieties of evangelicalism, fundamentalism, and pentecostalism.

Still, the case against teleological ethics may here offer this response: Granting the difference between direct and indirect applications, this yields only the familiar distinction between «act - teleology» and «rule - teleology, «3 is problematic for the following reason: Social practices or patterns of social cooperation can not be validated teleologically without a comparative assessment of the good and evil consequences differing possible systems of rules or norms (for instance, differing sets of rights) are likely, if adopted, to produce.

Nor did the list - making approach play to the strong suit of Thomism, which requires not only definitions and conclusions but also a deeply textured set of questions and distinctions.

Arminians often met this objection to foreknowledge by appealing to a logical distinction between necessity and certainty.5 The fact that God foreknows that choice X is going to be made (freely) means only that X is certain to occur; it does not mean that God's foreknowledge, or any other cause, necessitated X.

Such distinctions are necessary — not only because to call upon the state to love» is self - contradictory, insofar as the state's actions are rooted in power and not voluntarism, but because the claims of love are rooted in sectarian acknowledgment as opposed to universal norms of justice.

That distinction is a half - truth at best, and it misses two important points: the widespread reading of such books not only tells us something important about the overall religious temper of our times; it may also give us a clue to one possible theological expression of the future.

From the standpoint of Whitehead's final theory, as interpreted in terms of Hartshorne's distinction between God's abstract nature and concrete totality, it is quite natural to interpret the last sentence as Griffin does: «The passage does not say that God as a whole must be unchanging; it only says that God's nature must remain self - consistent» (PS 15:200).

In any case, this distinction between the given and The Given is anticipated in the correspondence, as seen in Brightman's willingness to admit some degree of «faintness» in the given.40 The real difference may lie in Brightman's methodological desire to have the self (and what is given to and as the self, the shining present) clearly defined, while Hartshorne insists that not only the self, but also the given «is more or less vague,» and must be so.

The latter principle blurs the distinction because it holds that one occasion is present in another, not simpliciter, not in itself, but only as reproduced, only as objectified.

The distinction therefore mattered not only in the past, but also in the present and future.

3 In the only passage from The Problem of Christianity where the doctrine of the Trinity is discussed at length, Royce does not make clear whether he affirms an ontological triunity of persons within the Godhead or simply a distinction of divine persons within the religious experience of the believer (PC 135 - 39).

Not only does he fail to utilize the terminological distinction which Mays adopts, Whitehead controverts it, for here he acknowledges the scope of metaphysics and cosmology as equally general.

By this distinction of two modes of passivity — of receiving forms - Aristotle sets off the world of conscious experience from the world of nature, but in such a way that not only the objects but the very workings of nature are included as part of what is felt.

Along with this rigorous distinction of primary from secondary qualities there has often gone a belief that only the primary qualities could be called really real (their persistence throughout accidental changes being the criterion of their reality), and that secondary qualities are not part of the real world.

It is true that a distinction is made also in paganism, as well as by the natural man, between being in despair and not being in despair; that is to say, people talk of despair as if only certain particular individuals were in despair.

This perspective unmistakably reveals the unwholesomeness, not to put it more strongly, of our way of life: our obsession with sex, violence, and the pornography of «making it;» our addictive dependence on drugs, «entertainment,» and the evening news; our impatience with anything that limits our sovereign freedom of choice, especially with the constraints of marital and familial ties; our preference for «nonbinding commitments;» our third - rate educational system; our third - rate morality; our refusal to draw a distinction between right and wrong, lest we «impose» their morality on us; our reluctance to judge or be judged; our indifference to the needs of future generations, as evidence by our willingness to saddle them with a huge national debt, an overgrown arsenal of destruction, and a deteriorating environment; our unsated assumption, which underlies so much of the propaganda for unlimited abortion, that only those children born for success ought to be allowed to be born at all.

One might wish that Taylor had considered more fully a possibility that emerges only in one rather long footnote — the possibility that a distinction, though not utter separation, of the spheres of politics and ethics might go some way toward addressing the problem that concerns him.

And since the distinction within God is one of reason only (God's two natures are not correlative), and in keeping with the ontological principle, there is no metaphysical interval between God's two natures.

Baptismal water was the universal solvent not only of traditional religious distinctions within Judaism but also of the foundation stones on which the ancient city rested; for the church, it was the sole initiation and was not confined to a single family, clan, race, or social class.

If Aquinas at least tacitly acknowledges this by making all analogical predications depend upon the clearly literal distinction between Creator and Creature, he can also seem not to acknowledge it by flatly declaring that we can not know of God quid sit, but only an sit or quod sit.

Using the distinction introduced by our own James Poulos, he claims that Scorsese doesn't traffic in the sublime, but only the «sense of the....

If it is not, then the distinction of possible and actual is not that of indefinite and definite; rather the possible is the fully - knowable, the actual the only - partially - knowable.

The distinction Hartshorne insists on making here as applied to our present question can be expressed by saying that, whereas mere experience or feeling of God can be not only direct but immediate, high - level thought or cognition of God, being mediated, as it is, by the conscious judgment or interpretation of such feeling, is of necessity mediate.

Such passages as these not only contain an exact affirmation of the essence of the eucharistic mystery, but also make an equally exact distinction between the essential mystery and the further effects in which its fecundity is manifested: the growth of Christ's mystical body, the consecration of the cosmos.

Assuming this distinction, which turns upon his more basic distinction between «all,» «some,» and «none,» he can assert that God's love and knowledge differ in principle from ours without denying, as he appears to do, that the difference is still not absolute and hence expressible only in nonliteral concepts.

But the way to fix that is not, I think, by bringing justification and sanctification closer together, since making the distinction in the first place only displays the problem.

Then, by his third distinction, Maritain makes clear both that Christian faith can not be made subservient to democracy as a philosophy of life and that democracy can not claim to be the only form of regime demanded by Christian belief.

Paul's application of the unity principle to the church in his soma Christou metaphor not only necessitates the distinction between the Body and its Head, Christ, but also distinctions within the membership (the eye is not the hand, and so forth).

As in the case of the bishop of Cuernavaca, the reasons for this distinction are not only theological but also eminently empirical.

I think you've made an important distinction about reading the Old Testament not only in light of the New Testament, but in light of Jesus and what his life and sacrifice tell us about the character of God.

It is also on the basis of this distinction, along with the notion that there are various levels of actualities, that Whitehead explains our common belief not only that some macroscopic beings have freedom, but also that some have more freedom than others.

Furthermore, death is decisive in its absolute certainty and equality: not only does it come to all, but it makes all equal, obliterating the distinctions that we make so much of in life.