Sentences with phrase «not plaintiff and defendant»
We'll help you identify and come to agreement on a parenting plan and all relevant parenting issues as mom and dad - not plaintiff and defendant.
https://www.equitablemediation.com/ Not exact matches
Plaintiff did not reveal any confidential information to Defendant, and did not show Defendant any of its source code, either at this meeting or otherwise.»
I was an expert witness for the plaintiff and we were able to show that the anonymous site was in all likelihood linked to another site known to be run by the defendant because of an under - the - hood WordPress config variable he probably wasn't aware existed (X-Pingback-Url FTW).
Legal redress for those who suffered injury and are still living (Holocaust survivors, Japanese - Americans imprisoned during World War II, African - Americans who are not hired or can not obtain housing due to their race) is a difficult and politicized process, but as long as the plaintiffs and defendants are still living it is somewhat straightforward.
Small claims court cases are much cheaper than superior court cases for both the plaintiff (the person doing the suing) and the defendant (the person being sued) because the parties are not allowed to have any attorneys represent them and other rules that simplify the lawsuit process, making the whole thing much cheaper, faster, and easier.
Not only was the printed matter on the McIlhenny bottle and carton copied, but defendant adopted a bottle and carton of the same size and shape and strikingly similar to that of plaintiff.
The defendant, in answer, denies that plaintiff or its predecessors now use, or have ever used, the word «Tabasco» as a trade - mark or identifying name for sauce, and specially avers that the word «Tabasco» could not and can not be appropriated as a trade - mark, because it is geographical and descriptive; that plaintiff continually acquiesced in the descriptive use of the word «Tabasco,» and never made a bona fide attempt to establish the trade - mark it now asserts; and that any rights that plaintiff may have had in the name as a trade - mark were lost by the patenting of the process and the expiration of such patent.
Defendant Bulliard, concededly, has a perfect right, so far as plaintiff is concerned, to make sauce in accordance with the patent, but he does not pretend to be doing so, and, in fact, since the adoption of the National Prohibition Amendment to the Constitution and the passage of an enforcement statute by Congress, he may not do so, as the patented process provided for a mixture of alcohol as well as vinegar with the pepper pulp.
The fact that defendant has not only dressed his product in imitation of that of the plaintiff, but has, in addition, likewise used plaintiff's trade - mark, gives added reason why the Court should require that hereafter defendant not only discontinue the use of the name «Tabasco,» but that he adopt a new and distinctive bottle and carton, such as will clearly and unmistakably differentiate his sauce from the «Tabasco Pepper Sauce» manufactured by plaintiff.
Not only did defendant adopt the name and imitate the bottles and cartons in use by plaintiff, but at the very beginning, when he started the manufacture and sale of his sauce in competition with the long established business of plaintiff, he printed on his bottle labels a caution to use «only the genuine Evangeline,» thus apparently seeking to create the impression that such «Evangeline» Tabasco Sauce was an old and established brand, against spurious imitations of which the public should be warned.
«They'll say, «I don't mind paying for my kids, but I don't want to pay for her too,»» says Schwartz, who specializes in paternity litigation, representing plaintiffs and defendants.
The plaintiff is seeking: A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the provisions of the 1992 Constitution, particularly Articles 88 (5), 218 (a) and (e), 284 and 287 thereof, the 1st defendant can not act as the legal representative for Honourable Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori Atta, the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Ghana, in a pending investigation bordering on conflict of interest and abuse of office before the 2nd Defendant; A further declaration that the purported response filed by the 1st Defendant on behalf of the said Honorable Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori Atta in respect of the petition concerning conflict of interest and abuse of office before the 2nd Defendant is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whdefendant can not act as the legal representative for Honourable Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori Atta, the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Ghana, in a pending investigation bordering on conflict of interest and abuse of office before the 2nd Defendant; A further declaration that the purported response filed by the 1st Defendant on behalf of the said Honorable Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori Atta in respect of the petition concerning conflict of interest and abuse of office before the 2nd Defendant is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whDefendant; A further declaration that the purported response filed by the 1st Defendant on behalf of the said Honorable Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori Atta in respect of the petition concerning conflict of interest and abuse of office before the 2nd Defendant is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whDefendant on behalf of the said Honorable Kenneth Nana Yaw Ofori Atta in respect of the petition concerning conflict of interest and abuse of office before the 2nd Defendant is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whDefendant is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever;
Plaintiff states again that C.I. 94 only re-state the mandate of the 1st Defendant vested discretion of determining the filing fees with respect to the 2016 general elections and not the specific fees to be charged and basis of the fees charged as required by law.
Plaintiff further states that the proper instrument to govern the exercise of the 1st Defendant's vested discretionary power to charge fees or to request of a deposit of fees for the general elections 2016, ought to be a statutory instrument and not a constitutional instrument.
Plaintiff further avers that 1st Defendant could only exercise that discretionary power upon publishing a statutory instrument with regulations that are not inconsistent with PNDC Laws 284 and 286 and also the provisions of the 1992 Constitution to govern the exercise of the discretionary power.
Plaintiff states again that 2nd Defendant has not said a word against this marauding show of power without any legal justification by the 1st Defendant's request of a deposit of filing fees for the 2016 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections thereby embolden 1st Defendant in perpetuating these obvious illegalities against the political parties and individual candidates in this 2016 general elections.
A declaration that the statements that Plaintiff is «managerially and administratively inept» because Plaintiff has no respect for the organisational structure of the Electoral Commission, «has poor human relations not befitting of any leader in public space», has «unilaterally transferred District Electoral Officers perceived to be pro-NPP», ``... polarized the Commission along political lines» and disunited its members out at paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 20, 21 and 26 of the petition attached to Defendant's letter conveying the petition to his Excellency the President of the Republic of Ghana are defamatory of Plaintiff.
And that «if payments have been made to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants under agreements other the two * dated 26th April 2006 *, which were terminated, issues relating to those payments would have to be determined in a forum other than this Court (Supreme Court) and in a different action, since they do not come within the issue of constitutional interpretation raised by the Plaintiff's writ&raquAnd that «if payments have been made to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants under agreements other the two * dated 26th April 2006 *, which were terminated, issues relating to those payments would have to be determined in a forum other than this Court (Supreme Court) and in a different action, since they do not come within the issue of constitutional interpretation raised by the Plaintiff's writ&raquand 3rd Defendants under agreements other the two * dated 26th April 2006 *, which were terminated, issues relating to those payments would have to be determined in a forum other than this Court (Supreme Court) and in a different action, since they do not come within the issue of constitutional interpretation raised by the Plaintiff's writ&raquand in a different action, since they do not come within the issue of constitutional interpretation raised by the Plaintiff's writ».
They prayed the court for «an order nullifying the conduct of the congresses of the Ogun State chapter of the 1st defendant (PDP) held on October 27, 2017, October 28, 2017, and November 4, 2017, electing and or constituting another Executive Committee of the 1st defendant in Ogun State when the tenure of the plaintiffs have not expired.
In giving her judgment in the case, Her Lordship Barbara Ackah - Yensu pointed out that: «I find both 2nd and 3rd defendants, particularly Catherine Afeku, not to be credible witness and they mounted the witness box to tell the Court a pack of lies, and it is for this reason that I preferred the evidence of plaintiff that she never saw the company's regulations».
Delivering the ruling, Tsoho said, «The plaintiff raised two issues in the written address for determination, to wit: Whether or not the 1st defendant (Saraki) can reject a valid statutory appointment made by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Office (of the Chairman) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in accordance with the provisions of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004 and whether or not the 1st defendant is bound by the provisions of the EFCC Act, 2004, with respect to the confirmation of any appointment made by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the office of the Chairman of the EFCC.»
He also sought an order of interim injunction restraining the second and third defendants, whether by themselves, servants, agents, privies or howsoever called from forwarding a fresh name or governorship aspirant to the first defendant, when the plaintiff was still alive and had not withdrawn his candidacy for the governorship election of Bayelsa State, pending the determination of the substantive suit.
In the Originating Summons marked FHC / ABJ / CS / 232/2018, the plaintiff 8 issues for determination by the court, including: Having regards to the combined provisions of sections 79,116,118,132,153,160 (1) and 178 of the 1999 constitution as amended, the constitution read together with paragraph 15 (a) of the third schedule to the same constitution, whether the 3rd defendant (Independent National Electoral Commission) is not the only institution or body constitutionally vested with the powers and vires to organized, undertake and supervised elections to the offices of the president, the vice president of the federal republic of Nigeria, the Governor and deputy governor of a state, the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each state of the federation, including fixing the sequence and dates of the elections to the said offices?
«To stop discriminating and comply with the law, the defendants must allow people seeking a same - sex relationship to access all the services and features of eHarmony.com, not a separate site,» added Jeremy Pasternak of The Law Offices of Jeremy Pasternak, who is also representing the plaintiffs.
As I also testified, one of my goals (and I believe this to also be a goal of the plaintiffs» writ large) is to (a) get the state of New Mexico to release the data to an external evaluator to evaluate the models» functionality (this person certainly does not have to be me) or (2) release the data to the «expert witnesses» on both the plaintiffs» side (i.e., me) and the defendants» side (i.e., Thomas Kane of Harvard), so that we can both examine these data independently, and then come back to the court with our findings and overall assessments regarding the model's overall strengths and weakness, as per the actual data.
As defendants, the state and its two biggest teachers unions tried to persuade the judge that in four weeks of testimony, the plaintiffs — nine students — did not present enough evidence to prove that the five contested statutes governing teacher dismissal, tenure and layoffs deny students right to an effective education.
All of us involved in the case — recall that Jesse Rothstein and I served as the expert witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs, and Thomas Kane of the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) Project and John Friedman of the infamous Chetty et al. studies (see here and here) served as the expert witnesses on behalf of the defendants — knew that all of the plaintiffs» claims would be tough to win given all of the constitutional legal standards would be difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy (e.g., that evaluating teachers using their value - added scores was not «unreasonable» was difficult to prove, as it was in the Tennessee case we also fought and was then dismissed on similar grounds (see here)-RRB-.
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (2011), defendants in New Hampshire argued the tax credits are not appropriations and, as such, the plaintiffs had no standing to file suit.
Various persons, who are known and unknown to Plaintiff, and not named as defendants in this action, including senior executives of the Publisher Defendants and Apple, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the cdefendants in this action, including senior executives of the Publisher Defendants and Apple, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the cDefendants and Apple, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the cDefendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Finally, the suit also claims that «various persons, who are known and unknown to Plaintiff, and not named as defendants in this action, including senior executives of the Publisher Defendants and Apple, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiradefendants in this action, including senior executives of the Publisher Defendants and Apple, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiraDefendants and Apple, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiraDefendants in the offense alleged and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.»
Specifically, and without limitation, Plaintiff will show that the private loans held by Defendant were not incurred «solely to pay qualified higher education expenses,» per 26 U.S.C. § 221 (d)(1), and were not «attributable to education furnished during a period during which the recipient was an eligible student,» as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 221 (d)(1)(C).
Plaintiff has further reason to believe that the private loans held by Defendant were not «school certified loans» and as such did not satisfy the requirements of a «qualified educational loan» as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8)(B).
A judgment is basically the courts determination of if the defendant owes, or does not owe the plaintiff, and may add additional accrued interest, court costs and attorney fees.
«we are not only talking about fraud and deception of inconceivable sums, but also a complex and extensive operation created by the defendants in order to hide behind straw companies, false and fictional names and identities, and all this in order to persuade the plaintiff to fall into a trap in which they buried her and which to her regret she fell into»
«Crytek has not been compensated for Defendants» unlicensed use of Crytek technology in the Squadron 42 game, and has been substantially harmed by being deprived of that compensation, which would ordinarily include a substantial up - front payment as well as a substantial royalty on game sales,» plaintiffs argue.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants did not adequately protect the Network Platforms and, as a result, unauthorized people were able to access certain accountholder information.
«Plaintiff has not accepted the estimated completion date of August 2019,» the complaint reads, «and is suing Defendants now thereon.»
It can't be shown again and the defendants have to «deliver up for impounding, destruction, or other disposition, as Plaintiff determines, all infringing copies of the photographs, including the paintings and unsold copies of the Canal Zone exhibition book» and any other image materials for reproducing «infringing copies.»
«In spite of these efforts, and in light of the hazards that are here and worsening, Plaintiffs are spending, and must continue to spend, millions of dollars to protect their property and residents from the impacts of climate change... Despite receiving the warning that «fossil fuel use should not be encouraged,» Defendants spent decades selling and promoting fossil fuels without disclosing the dangers that continued fossil fuel over-use posed.»
It alleges that defendants» actions and inactions — whether or not they violate any specific statutory duty — have so profoundly damaged our home planet that they threaten plaintiffs» fundamental constitutional rights to life and liberty.
Scholz v. Scholz 2013 BCCA 309 Trusts — Constructive trusts — General principles — Circumstances when not imposed In 2001, Scholz and his wife (defendants), invited Scholz's mother (the plaintiff), to build a coach house on their property in Vancouver.
If they don't know the difference between a plaintiff and a defendant, they may not be the right fit for your firm.
Even if a settlement of the claim was not forthcoming, it enabled the plaintiff to obtain an understanding of the defendant's position and the reasons for that position.
It ensures that a defendant will not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries where they «may very well be due to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of anyone»: Snell v. Farrell, at p. 327, per Sopinka J.
After all, having a juror who's preoccupied with other matters or who's so eager to finish a case that he won't seriously deliberate can prove damaging to both plaintiffs and defendants alike.
«I am not totally sure what I think about this tactic, but it does make me wonder whether this is a good use of government resources (possibly, but I would bet there are better uses), whether it is fair to the defendant (no), and whether since I would normally decry a private plaintiff (or defendant, for that matter) who tried to use a lawsuit for a public relations purpose, I should think any differently just because it is a government agency (I don't see why).»
This factor is not concerned with how intimate the plaintiff and defendant were or with their physical proximity, so much as with whether the actions of the alleged wrongdoer have a close or direct effect on the victim, such that the wrongdoer ought to have had the victim in mind as a person potentially harmed.
The plaintiffs lawyers opposed the motion, but also complained that if the defendants had shown the video earlier, they wouldn't have invested 21 months worth of litigation time, cost, doctors fees and judicial resources.
(2) Exceptionally, a plaintiff may succeed by showing that the defendant's conduct materially contributed to risk of the plaintiff's injury, where (a) the plaintiff has established that her loss would not have occurred «but for» the negligence of two or more tortfeasors, each possibly in fact responsible for the loss; and (b) the plaintiff, through no fault of her own, is unable to show that any one of the possible tortfeasors in fact was the necessary or «but for» cause of her injury, because each can point to one another as the possible «but for» cause of the injury, defeating a finding of causation on a balance of probabilities against anyone.
My summary of the case is: A trial judge — he wasn't named in the Court of Appeal but his name can easily be discovered — had dismissed plaintiff's claim against the defendant bank and a solicitor for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.