Sentences with phrase «nullius as»

The Mabo decision is usually associated with overturning terra nullius as the basis of the acquisition of British sovereignty which in turn allowed the courts to recognise native title.

In Mabo the High Court rejected terra nullius as a basis for colonisation in Australia on three grounds;

What has replaced terra nullius as a legitimate explanation for the establishment of what is now the Australian nation?

Finally the Court was influenced by the decision of the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of Western Sahara (1975) ICJR that rejected terra nullius as the basis for Spanish sovereignty in Western Sahara.

(88) Recent reports from the UN have provided further analysis which leads to a rejection of terra nullius as a legitimate basis for the acquisition of territory.

The second report that critically appraises terra nullius as a discriminatory instrument of colonization is the final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Erica - Irene A. Daes entitled, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land.

The International Court of Justice has also discarded terra nullius as a legitimate means of acquiring sovereignty.

There is no doubt that the recognition of native title as a domestic law concept on which Indigenous property rights were founded is inextricably linked to the overturning of terra nullius as an international law concept on which Australia's sovereignty was founded.

Not exact matches

De Morgan's version put the Royal Society's back into its original context of Horace's first Epistle (lines 13 — 15): «Ac ne forte roges que me duce, quo lare tuter, / nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, / quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes» (And lest by chance you ask by which leader, by which household god I am sheltered, I, bound to swear according to the dictates [lit: «into the words»] of no master, am carried off as a guest, whithersoever the storm takes me).

Perhaps the most famous Australian example of this is the Mabo v Queensland (No. 2)[1992] HCA 23, commonly known simply as the Mabo case, where the High Court of Australia overturned the principle of terra nullius.

It is res nullius, the thing nobody owns, and as such it is appropriation i.e. fishing, which creates property; it is not property before that, that I know of.

The doctrine of terra nullius was overturned in the Mabo decision, or as Brennan CJ put it, the Court «discarded»:

Recognition is understood as overturning terra nullius by giving legal status to, and so protecting Indigenous rights to land.

The refusal of the common law to construct native title in a way that accepts Indigenous forms of social organisation in their own terms can be seen as a return to the terra nullius approach overturned in the Mabo decision.

If the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified as terra nullius no longer commands general support, the doctrines of the common law which depends on the notion.can hardly be retained.

The re-evaluation of the doctrine of terra nullius is discussed above as a consequence of changes in contemporary values and particularly in the principle of equality.

(76) What is argued in this section is that, even though terra nullius has been discarded as an international law doctrine, the recognition of native title does not require that the nexus between international law and the common law treatment of Indigenous people within the legal system of a sovereign state be discarded.

One of the effects of the High Court rejecting terra nullius in Mabo (No. 2) as a past discriminatory practice, and recognising native title as a pre-existing right was that acts of dispossession which failed to recognise the procedural or substantive rights of native title holders were, after the implementation of the Racial Discrimination Act (Cth)(RDA) in 1975, unlawful.

The fiction [terra nullius] by which the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as non-existent was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this country.

In rejecting terra nullius the High Court rejected the discriminatory denigration of Indigenous people as having no social organization, laws or recognised sovereign.

In overturning terra nullius the High Court has not overturned the effect terra nullius had of denying Indigenous people their status as subjects of international law.

There are many reasons why the notion of terra nullius no longer holds legitimacy as a basis for the establishment of a colony already inhabited by Indigenous people.

While sovereignty is uncontestable at law, as a result of the overturning of terra nullius, it is also without justification or legitimacy.

By recalling times when exploration was conducted through a «terra nullius» management system, these comparisons are encouraging an approach as dismissive of Indigenous rights as it was then.

Indeed native title as a bundle of rights reinforces terra nullius's depiction of Indigenous people as being «without laws, without a sovereign and primitive in their social organisation».

Ignoring those rights and interests, the Crown's sovereignty over a territory which had been acquired under the enlarged notion of terra nullius was equated with Crown ownership of the lands therein, because, as Stephen C.J. said, there was «no other proprietor of such lands».

Prior to these decisions the processes of recognition and extinguishment represented a troubling disjuncture in the law of native title with recognition understood as overturning terra nullius by giving it legal status and so protecting Indigenous rights to land.

When the British arrived on our lands, rather than respect our rights, laws and customs, the story of terra nullius was fabricated: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples simply did not exist as fellow humans in the eyes of our colonisers.

To allow Indigenous sea rights to be relegated to the same legal status as recreational fishermen would be to hold to an outdated and defective doctrine of mare nullius, wholly inconsistent with contemporary international rules and principles.

Unlike Indigenous societies in other nations, such as Canada and New Zealand, the presumption of terra nullius by the colonizer meant that the sources and pretexts of Indigenous law and custom were not sought, which compounds the difficulty of defining the authority of customary law in the contemporary context.

affirming our place as the first peoples of Australia and recognising the untruth of terra nullius in our founding document