For
him the object of conscious experience — and he knew of no other kind of experience — was primordially the sensuously given world.
The object of conscious experience presupposes the agent and the transmission of forms.
Not exact matches
Most
of our
conscious waking
experiences are sunlit, and in some kind
of relationship with
objects and ideas.
The
objects of vision and hearing dominate our
conscious experience, and these are not found within the body.
Our most fundamental
conscious experience has generally been taken to be the perception
of sensa, i.e.,
of relatively clear and distinct
objects such as red, bitter, etc..
By this distinction
of two modes
of passivity —
of receiving forms - Aristotle sets off the world
of conscious experience from the world
of nature, but in such a way that not only the
objects but the very workings
of nature are included as part
of what is felt.
Though it has been done, it is philosophical stupidity to deny either that we
experience spatially extended
objects or that we
experience ourselves as active
conscious centers
of feeling,
experience, thought, intention, attention, volition, desire, emotion, satisfaction, etc..
And this precisely is the facet
of the
object that extends beyond
conscious experience, for it is doubtless true
of any arising entity that it must take, and perhaps even take in, the world as it finds it.
Whereas Aristotle, as we have seen, took the first factor to be peculiar to
conscious experience and the second to be the more general factor lying at the base
of consciousness, Whitehead took the subject -
object structure as general and fundamental and interpreted causal efficacy in terms
of it.
The subject -
object structure, as he himself indicates, stands out clearly only in the upper reaches
of conscious experience.
The psychic processes, which were the content
of conscious and unconscious
experience, became for them also the
objects of awareness, and these were, to an astonishing degree, thereby subjected to
conscious control.
Illusion is now thought to be omnipresent in definite,
conscious perceptual
experience — yet the dichotomy between physical
objects and illusions was introduced to express observable differences within the field
of conscious perception.
Brooks is asking for the strongest instances
of structural complexity, which will clearly introduce it into the
conscious mind; not, perhaps, as an
object of contemplation, but as an effective agent within the
experience, whose stresses are definitely felt.
In his letter
of December 10, 1934 Brightman shares Hartshorne's worry, «that other selves are merely inferred but never given,» and goes on to present his own empiricist colors «I'd like to be able to make sense out
of the idea
of a literal participation in other selves... whenever I try, I find myself landed in contradiction, in epistemological chaos, and in unfaithfulness to
experience...» Brightman's argument is that any «intuition» (for him a synonym for «
experience»), «is exclusively a member
of me,» but the
object of that intuition is «always problematic and distinct from the
conscious experience which refers to it.»
A
conscious field plus its
object as felt or thought
of plus an attitude towards the
object plus the sense
of a self to whom the attitude belongs — such a concrete bit
of personal
experience may be a small bit, but it is a solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a mere abstract element
of experience, such as the «
object» is when taken all alone.
The
objects possess a spectral quality, one that addresses the absence
of a
conscious experience.