Now this totality is not given but demanded; it can not be given, not only because the critique of the transcendental illusion accompanies it without fail, but because practical reason, in its dialectic, institutes a new antinomy; what it demands, in fact, is that happiness be added to morality; it thus requires to be added to
the object of its aim, that this object may be whole, what it excluded from its principles, that they might be pure.
Not exact matches
It was
aimed at critics
of the deal known as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, including left - leaning politicians in Europe as well as the clamouring anti-trade civil society movement, as an «unambiguous statement» to assuage concerns over «provisions that have been the
object of public debate and concerns.»
It's a cool trick:
Aim your smartphone camera at a building or an
object, and — onscreen, anyway — other things seem to suddenly materialize out
of thin air.
A photo lightbox is a tent - like container with several light bulbs
aimed at its interior that photography professionals often use to create well - illuminated images
of objects.
God moves things as their final cause: the
aim of their growth and motion, the
object of their desire.
(3) At first Whitehead tries to derive the subjective
aim from the activities
of the occasion itself, as it seeks to unify its multiple past in the light
of the multiple interrelatedness
of the realm
of eternal
objects (i.e., the nontemporal actuality
of God objectified).
What is clearly stated by Whitehead is that the initial
aim is derived from God's ordering
of the eternal
objects and that this
aim limits the range within which the occasion can find its satisfaction.
Such an
aim is the feeling
of a proposition
of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal
object is the predicate.
If so, the initial phase
of the subjective
aim is also the feeling
of a proposition
of which the occasion itself is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal
object the predicate.
Again, no serious confusion need result, for the eternal
object can constitute the
aim only when an occasion is actively
aiming at its realization; the satisfaction
aimed at is always the actualization
of some determinate possibility (eternal
object); and the act
of aiming is always directed toward such an actualization.
It prehends both the eternal
objects and the temporal entities in its past in terms
of this
aim, and in successive phases
of its own becoming it fashions a new creative Synthesis which is itself.
This
aim is primordial and unchanging, and it determines the primordial ordering
of eternal
objects.
(4) A key difficulty with Whitehead's theory
of initial
aim lies in its exclusive reliance upon eternal
objects.
Selection among eternal
objects would imply the so - called unity
of the subject, its
aim, would be a multiplicity, not a unity.
But insofar as Whitehead conceives
of eternal
objects as a multiplicity
of discrete specifications among which actualities select, coherently conceiving the
aim as one is problematic at best.
For Whitehead the real
object is thereby adumbrated: the intentional
object is the real
object under the aspect
of prehension N in accordance with the subjective
aim of the becoming occasion.
As primordial, God is «the unlimited conceptual realization
of the absolute wealth
of potentiality» guided by a subjective
aim toward the maximal actualization
of the entire realm
of eternal
objects (PR 521, 47).
The restriction
of the primordial nature to pure conceptual feelings would leave out the various propositional feelings that are required for relating the eternal
objects to specific actual occasions and giving the initial
aim.
In what immediately follows, Whitehead writes
of God's urge toward the actualization
of the eternal
objects, an actualization which is effected by the giving
of the initial
aim.
I do not know why Whiteheadians should
object (PS 6:219) to this monistic theme, since they are committed to think in terms
of a God who supplies the initial subjective
aim of each actual entity, and
of the completion
of the development
of the actual entity by «the final reaction
of the self - creative unity
of the universe» (PR 75 — italics supplied).
One sentence links God's provision
of aim with Whitehead's reconception
of God as the nontemporal concrescence
of eternal
objects: the creativity for the nascent occasion «is conditioned by the relevance
of God's all - embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilities
of transmission from the actual world» (PR 244G).
There is secondary origination
of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal
objects forming the data in the primary phase
of the mental pole; the determination
of identity and diversity depending on the subjective
aim at attaining depth
of intensity by reason
of contrast.
That
aim determines the initial gradations
of relevance
of eternal
objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase
of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes.
Hence in social terms the disorderly turmoil
of individuals pursuing conflicting and egotistical
aims; and, on the national scale, the chaos
of armed conflict in which, for want
of a better
object, the excess
of accumulated energy is destructively released... «Idleness, mother
of all vices.»
In this final section I will suggest in a tentative manner how the two remaining roles
of God (as ontological ground for eternal
objects and as source
of subjective
aims in temporal occasions) could be rendered superfluous in a naturalistic, neo-Whiteheadian, system.
So my twofold task is first to show what it is about the treatment
of eternal
objects in Science and the Modern World which makes the Aristotelian move possible, and then secondly to suggest a way
of handling the source
of subjective
aims without there being any need to implicate God in the procedure.
To bring about that awakening
of conscience was a major
object of his work, certainly the major
aim of most
of the parables.
It may be
objected that it is not the
aim of the book to alleviate any
of these problems in the Church — quite.
The good intentions
of the climber don't matter if they
aim at the wrong
object.
Furthermore, the exigencies
of his system required him to conceive
of the initial
aim in terms
of single definite form: the «
aim determines the initial gradations
of relevance
of eternal
objects for conceptual feeling and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase...» (PR 244).
In other words, if
aims communicated real possibilities and not simply eternal
objects, we ought to be conscious
of most
of our the
aims we receive from God.
By means
of this creativity, the occasion achieves further determination
of aim resulting in a final definite eternal
object.
It would make more sense to reconceive initial subjective
aims in terms
of propositional feelings.9 The indicated logical subjects
of the proposition can specify the standpoint (PR 283) whereas a pure eternal
object can not.
The problem is that while at times Whitehead conceives
of God's ordering
of the eternal
objects to be eternally unchanging, at other times «the ordering is such as to specify the initial
aim for each new occasion... (it) is extremely difficult to see how one unchanging order can provide a specific and novel
aim to every new occasion.
Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 250) Whitehead's more fundamental account then is that God, the primordial actual entity which prehends the eternal
objects, is the source
of the initial subjective
aim which produces novelty in actual occasions.
Specifically it is to see how the valuing
of the eternal
objects develops into a source
of the initial
aim.
It
aims at foreign
objects; when the subject realizes itself it changes that which is different from itself; when the free subject returns to itself it enters the sphere
of the other in order to find itself.
He continues: «Such an
aim is the feeling
of a proposition
of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal
object is the predicate.
His particular relevance to each creative act as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes him the initial «
object of desire» establishing the initial phase
of each subjective
aim.»
As a factor in the becoming
of an event it takes on primarily the role
of a determination.32 By prehending a given, predetermined eternal
object, the event in its becoming acquires an internal subjective
aim proper to it alone which provides direction to its becoming.
Furthermore, he defends Whitehead's understanding
of the free or self - creative character
of the individual actual entity against Edward Pols's objection that it is determined from the outside either through the initial
aim of God or through the intrinsic interrelatedness
of the eternal
objects which it prehends (TVF 36 - 40).
We will assume that God's
aim for it, a propositional feeling for which the new occasion is the logical subject and some complex eternal
object the predicate, will in every case be prehended and play a decisive role in the determination
of the subjective
aim of the occasion.
Whitehead conceived the primordial nature
of God as this timeless envisagement
of possibilities, and God's ordering
of the eternal
objects is such as to specify the initial
aim for each new occasion.
In accordance with the initial
aim, the initial data are severally objectified by the new occasion in terms
of eternal
objects realized by them.
The
object of the subjective
aim is the specific actuality, not the abstract, «perfected system.»
Despite Hall's appeal to the Whiteheadian separation
of «practical» and «speculative» reason, 11 I think that on a more fundamental level Whitehead too regards knowing (or more broadly the relation
of any actual occasion to its «environment») as an active process in which the
aim of the subject at its own attainment
of value partially determines how it will respond to the
objects of which it is aware.
We can now return to the function
of creativity The past actual entities, God's gift
of an initial subjective
aim, and God's primordial nature as the storehouse
of all eternal
objects provide the new entity» with the resources for its own journey (concrescence) towards a final self - identity.
In summary, extending Whitehead's doctrine
of eternal
objects to include the idea that they form a dense continuum seems to raise at least two problems: (1) it requires that God consciously prehend a nondenumerable multitude
of propositions regarding every past actual occasion and (2) it requires either that a new concrescence choose its subjective
aim from a nondenumerable multitude
of alternatives or that this multitude somehow be restricted before all these alternatives are prehended by the occasion.
The answer is no because the functioning
of the new actual entity presupposes the past actual entities as already organized into an actual world, it presupposes a subjective
aim, it presupposes the availability and relevance
of eternal
objects that are new for that situation, etc..
Rather, this additional structuring, this additional source
of eternal
objects comes from God's gift to the new actual entity»
of its initial subjective
aim.