Sentences with phrase «object of their aim»

Now this totality is not given but demanded; it can not be given, not only because the critique of the transcendental illusion accompanies it without fail, but because practical reason, in its dialectic, institutes a new antinomy; what it demands, in fact, is that happiness be added to morality; it thus requires to be added to the object of its aim, that this object may be whole, what it excluded from its principles, that they might be pure.

Not exact matches

It was aimed at critics of the deal known as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, including left - leaning politicians in Europe as well as the clamouring anti-trade civil society movement, as an «unambiguous statement» to assuage concerns over «provisions that have been the object of public debate and concerns.»
It's a cool trick: Aim your smartphone camera at a building or an object, and — onscreen, anyway — other things seem to suddenly materialize out of thin air.
A photo lightbox is a tent - like container with several light bulbs aimed at its interior that photography professionals often use to create well - illuminated images of objects.
God moves things as their final cause: the aim of their growth and motion, the object of their desire.
(3) At first Whitehead tries to derive the subjective aim from the activities of the occasion itself, as it seeks to unify its multiple past in the light of the multiple interrelatedness of the realm of eternal objects (i.e., the nontemporal actuality of God objectified).
What is clearly stated by Whitehead is that the initial aim is derived from God's ordering of the eternal objects and that this aim limits the range within which the occasion can find its satisfaction.
Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.
If so, the initial phase of the subjective aim is also the feeling of a proposition of which the occasion itself is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object the predicate.
Again, no serious confusion need result, for the eternal object can constitute the aim only when an occasion is actively aiming at its realization; the satisfaction aimed at is always the actualization of some determinate possibility (eternal object); and the act of aiming is always directed toward such an actualization.
It prehends both the eternal objects and the temporal entities in its past in terms of this aim, and in successive phases of its own becoming it fashions a new creative Synthesis which is itself.
This aim is primordial and unchanging, and it determines the primordial ordering of eternal objects.
(4) A key difficulty with Whitehead's theory of initial aim lies in its exclusive reliance upon eternal objects.
Selection among eternal objects would imply the so - called unity of the subject, its aim, would be a multiplicity, not a unity.
But insofar as Whitehead conceives of eternal objects as a multiplicity of discrete specifications among which actualities select, coherently conceiving the aim as one is problematic at best.
For Whitehead the real object is thereby adumbrated: the intentional object is the real object under the aspect of prehension N in accordance with the subjective aim of the becoming occasion.
As primordial, God is «the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality» guided by a subjective aim toward the maximal actualization of the entire realm of eternal objects (PR 521, 47).
The restriction of the primordial nature to pure conceptual feelings would leave out the various propositional feelings that are required for relating the eternal objects to specific actual occasions and giving the initial aim.
In what immediately follows, Whitehead writes of God's urge toward the actualization of the eternal objects, an actualization which is effected by the giving of the initial aim.
I do not know why Whiteheadians should object (PS 6:219) to this monistic theme, since they are committed to think in terms of a God who supplies the initial subjective aim of each actual entity, and of the completion of the development of the actual entity by «the final reaction of the self - creative unity of the universe» (PR 75 — italics supplied).
One sentence links God's provision of aim with Whitehead's reconception of God as the nontemporal concrescence of eternal objects: the creativity for the nascent occasion «is conditioned by the relevance of God's all - embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilities of transmission from the actual world» (PR 244G).
There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of identity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of contrast.
That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes.
Hence in social terms the disorderly turmoil of individuals pursuing conflicting and egotistical aims; and, on the national scale, the chaos of armed conflict in which, for want of a better object, the excess of accumulated energy is destructively released... «Idleness, mother of all vices.»
In this final section I will suggest in a tentative manner how the two remaining roles of God (as ontological ground for eternal objects and as source of subjective aims in temporal occasions) could be rendered superfluous in a naturalistic, neo-Whiteheadian, system.
So my twofold task is first to show what it is about the treatment of eternal objects in Science and the Modern World which makes the Aristotelian move possible, and then secondly to suggest a way of handling the source of subjective aims without there being any need to implicate God in the procedure.
To bring about that awakening of conscience was a major object of his work, certainly the major aim of most of the parables.
It may be objected that it is not the aim of the book to alleviate any of these problems in the Church — quite.
The good intentions of the climber don't matter if they aim at the wrong object.
Furthermore, the exigencies of his system required him to conceive of the initial aim in terms of single definite form: the «aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase...» (PR 244).
In other words, if aims communicated real possibilities and not simply eternal objects, we ought to be conscious of most of our the aims we receive from God.
By means of this creativity, the occasion achieves further determination of aim resulting in a final definite eternal object.
It would make more sense to reconceive initial subjective aims in terms of propositional feelings.9 The indicated logical subjects of the proposition can specify the standpoint (PR 283) whereas a pure eternal object can not.
The problem is that while at times Whitehead conceives of God's ordering of the eternal objects to be eternally unchanging, at other times «the ordering is such as to specify the initial aim for each new occasion... (it) is extremely difficult to see how one unchanging order can provide a specific and novel aim to every new occasion.
Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 250) Whitehead's more fundamental account then is that God, the primordial actual entity which prehends the eternal objects, is the source of the initial subjective aim which produces novelty in actual occasions.
Specifically it is to see how the valuing of the eternal objects develops into a source of the initial aim.
It aims at foreign objects; when the subject realizes itself it changes that which is different from itself; when the free subject returns to itself it enters the sphere of the other in order to find itself.
He continues: «Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.
His particular relevance to each creative act as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes him the initial «object of desire» establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim
As a factor in the becoming of an event it takes on primarily the role of a determination.32 By prehending a given, predetermined eternal object, the event in its becoming acquires an internal subjective aim proper to it alone which provides direction to its becoming.
Furthermore, he defends Whitehead's understanding of the free or self - creative character of the individual actual entity against Edward Pols's objection that it is determined from the outside either through the initial aim of God or through the intrinsic interrelatedness of the eternal objects which it prehends (TVF 36 - 40).
We will assume that God's aim for it, a propositional feeling for which the new occasion is the logical subject and some complex eternal object the predicate, will in every case be prehended and play a decisive role in the determination of the subjective aim of the occasion.
Whitehead conceived the primordial nature of God as this timeless envisagement of possibilities, and God's ordering of the eternal objects is such as to specify the initial aim for each new occasion.
In accordance with the initial aim, the initial data are severally objectified by the new occasion in terms of eternal objects realized by them.
The object of the subjective aim is the specific actuality, not the abstract, «perfected system.»
Despite Hall's appeal to the Whiteheadian separation of «practical» and «speculative» reason, 11 I think that on a more fundamental level Whitehead too regards knowing (or more broadly the relation of any actual occasion to its «environment») as an active process in which the aim of the subject at its own attainment of value partially determines how it will respond to the objects of which it is aware.
We can now return to the function of creativity The past actual entities, God's gift of an initial subjective aim, and God's primordial nature as the storehouse of all eternal objects provide the new entity» with the resources for its own journey (concrescence) towards a final self - identity.
In summary, extending Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects to include the idea that they form a dense continuum seems to raise at least two problems: (1) it requires that God consciously prehend a nondenumerable multitude of propositions regarding every past actual occasion and (2) it requires either that a new concrescence choose its subjective aim from a nondenumerable multitude of alternatives or that this multitude somehow be restricted before all these alternatives are prehended by the occasion.
The answer is no because the functioning of the new actual entity presupposes the past actual entities as already organized into an actual world, it presupposes a subjective aim, it presupposes the availability and relevance of eternal objects that are new for that situation, etc..
Rather, this additional structuring, this additional source of eternal objects comes from God's gift to the new actual entity» of its initial subjective aim.
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