Sentences with phrase «objectified entities»

Whitehead needs to establish the fact that at least one type of objectified entities are actual entities in order to escape the solipsism of the present moment, as he himself notes (PR 81/125, 152/230 -231).

Yet Whitehead still opts for realism, because he thinks we have direct awareness of how these objectified entities have been changed by the time we perceive them.

Pure physical feelings objectify the entities felt by their physical feelings, whereas hybrid physical feelings objectify by conceptual or impure feelings.

Raising questions on body politics and the systematic oppression of the body as an objectified entity, the artists in the exhibition dismantle and redefine patterns for self - expression.

Not exact matches

Whitehead denies to what is «objectified» any «formal» existence, by which he means, that which formally constitutes entity.

As the analogue of «proximate matter» we have to take the objectified other entities, or more exactly the «physical» prehensions of them that are objectified in the newly arising entity.

In a concrete actual entity conceived dipolarly, the one (creative subjectivity) includes the many (objectified subjects) as parts.

So, if a satisfied actual entity is objectified (as it must be), it is a part in another process / whole.

In any case «creativity,» which takes the place of «primary matter» and which is supposed to be in itself just as indeterminate as the latter, constitutes the actuality of an actual entity» — its reality for itself and finally, as an «objectified» entity, its reality for others.

Though some of these examples of things that become do refer to what happens within the internal life of one actual entity, still others refer to relationships between objectified actual entities at transition.

In this way, all of the many that have been actualized, the complete multiplicity, of the cosmos (except immediately prior and noncontiguous contemporaries) is objectified for each actual entity with some degree of importance however minuscule (Religion 108 and Process 22, Principle of Relativity).

But the subject / superjects of many as simultaneously objectified in one actual entity is a spatial nexus, and abstracted from their necessary inclusion in a one, they are a multiplicity.

Of course a perspective on the epistemic situation of a given actual entity A is available from the perspective of another actual entity B in which A is objectified.

One point of this story is that the monk thought his true self was a thing or substance external to his own experience, an entity that could be objectified and then analyzed.

Perception in the mode of presentational immediacy objectifies the actual entities «within one particular duration»: «the «presented duration»» (Process 321).

The objective datum is a further perspective under which that entity is objectified through one of its feelings (PR 353 - 56; 361 - 63).

Looked at from the point of view of its prehension of past occasions, an actual entity (say, in the personally ordered society of actual entities which constitute the «self» of a human being) can be viewed as conditioned by, caused by, the other entities which it objectifies.

Even in the case of the objectification of a single actual entity, that subject is objectified as object, and not as subject.

«A [simple physical] feeling belonging to this special case has as its datum only one actual entity, and this actual entity is objectified by one of its feelings» (PR 245).

Hut the case is quite similar for Whitehead: the actual entity is never prehended (objectified) as a whole but according to one of its component prehensions.

An actual entity in a personal society prehends itself in its immediate past along with prehensions of other objectified past actual entities.

It prehends the world from a certain perspective, one that can be determined from the relative fullness with which it objectifies the other actual entities it takes as its data.

While the objectified facts are invested with a certain levity, no longer fully sedimented, the logical subjects as an indicative system, on the other hand, restrict the freedom of the proposition to apply to any actual entity in absolute generality.

The soul that was thought about was not the soul that was thinking in its dynamic immediacy, but an objectified, and thereby distanced, entity.

On the one hand, the objectified sheer matter - of - factness of actual entities is lifted, leaving a sufficient quality of concrete givenness to allow the latter to function now as «indicators.»

To understand Yahweh was, of course, not to objectify and localize him as an entity to be observed.

A hybrid physical feeling is a feeling which objectifies the actual entity which forms its initial datum by means of one of this datum actual entity's conceptual feelings.

This is because eternal objects can not convey a sense of the individuality of the past actual entities which are being objectified by a new actual entity (see PR 229f.

A new actual entity does not select the feeling by which it will objectify God.

Likewise, the objective datum Y of a new feeling X objectifies its initial datum (the actual entity B) for a new process of concrescence (the actual entity A).

Thus, a new actual entity «selects» the feelings by which it will objectify past actual entities only in a very restricted sense of the term «selects.»

In the case of a simple physical feeling X belonging to a new actual entity A, the feeling Y by which X objectifies the past actual entity B is called the «objective datum» of X. Whitehead describes this second subphase in the following passage:

This feeling provides the new actual entity with its subjective aim, and in turn the subjective aim determines how the new actual entity will objectify the actual entities in its past.

Instead, God determines the feeling by which God will be objectified by the new actual entity (see PR 244 / 373f.).

By contrast, the feelings involved in objectification can express the way in which past actual entities are objectified as individuals.

Like any Whiteheadian actuality, the divine actuality prehensively objectifies the concrete entities of the world and gathers them into its own concrete, immediate experience.

(ii) Science restricts itself to abstractions that depend not on the full structure of an actual entity, but on those elements of structure that an entity inherits through its objectified past.

Thus when we ascribe mass to an entity, we are asserting a kind of limit on its dynamics.12 Bringing this back to the preprojective, we are saying that insofar as a high - grade society objectifies a given nexus by virtue of the Category of Transmutation in the flattened form that is mass, the dynamics of that nexus are bounded, at least with regard to its extensive relations with the world.

An entity not a part of the objectified society, but of some other, may perceive the form of the society as an objectified property of the society.

Hence, the objectified gods stood in an ambiguous relation to that other primal religious reality that represented the apportionment to each entity of its lot or place.

In a strand of really distinct actual entities, these would necessarily stand in a subject - object relationship to one another, so that the entity that perishes and is objectified is a different entity than that which is coming into being.

The same proposition can constitute the content of diverse judgments by diverse judging entities respectively..., this requires that the same complex of logical subjects objectified via the same eternal objects, can enter as a partial constituent into the «real» essences of diverse actual entities.

As a result, Whitehead concludes that objectification is an abstraction that does not objectify the actual entity in its entirety (S 25).

The question, however, is that of whether from the standpoint of a given actual entity, any other portion of the extensive continuum but its own, can be objectified as atomized.

In «causal objectification» what is felt subjectively by the objectified actual entity is transmitted objectively to the concrescent actualities which supersede it.

In a sense, the «sign» bears a similarity to the eternally objectified superject that allows the closure and repeatability of objectified actual entities in other actual entities which are no longer their temporal contemporaries.

In regard to his doctrine of ingression, Whitehead distinguished three different ways in which an eternal object can function in the concrescence of an actual entity:» (i) it can be an element in the definiteness of some objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity, which is the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the definiteness of the subjective form of some feeling; or (iii) it can be an element in the datum of a conceptual, or propositional, feeling» (PR 290 / 445).

Unfortunately, the second principle (namely, that the «power» of one actual entity upon another is simply how the former is objectified in the constitution of the other) tells us little about the sense in which the former entity can be said to be «objectified» in its effect.

In Whiteheadian terminology this means that only past actual entities which are devoid of subjective immediacy can be objectified.

In Locke's phraseology the objectified actual entity is then exerting «power In this type of objectification the eternal objects, relational between object and subject, express the formal constitution of the objectified actual entity.