Not exact matches
In other words,
national courts are
obliged to apply the statutes of limitations.
Under the Melloni doctrine, if EU law does not provide the full harmonisation of a matter,
national criminal
courts «are free» — i.e. they are permitted but not
obliged under EU law — to apply higher
national standards of fundamental rights.
The last question referred to the
Court was about whether a Member State can be
obliged to issue an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation conferring a right to stay to a third - country
national on the ground that there is no longer a reasonable prospect of removal.
Within the scope of application of EU law
national courts can already now apply higher standards of fundamental rights protection based on the ECHR and are
obliged in cases of doubt to submit a question to the CJEU in the framework of a preliminary reference procedure.
Even though framework decisions do not entail direct effect (former Article 34 (2)(b) TEU), it follows from the
Court's Pupino case law that the loyalty principle
obliges Member States to interpret
national law (including their
national constitution) as much as possible in conformity with the framework decision (Pupino, paras 42 - 43).
Furthermore, although it is true that the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the
Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the former provides the latter with the points of interpretation of EU law necessary in order for them to decide the disputes before them, the fact remains that when there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before
Court of Justice and the
national courts, by means of which the former provides the latter with the points of interpretation of EU law necessary in order for them to decide the disputes before them, the fact remains that when there is no judicial remedy under
national law against the decision of a
court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before
court or tribunal of a Member State, that
court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before
court or tribunal is, in principle,
obliged to bring the matter before the
Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before
Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before it...
Hence, Article 325 TFEU might be again used by the latter
Court to
oblige national judges of another Member State to disapply
national rules preventing the protection of EU financial interests.
As a result of all the foregoing, the Labour
Court concluded that, given the primacy of EU law over provisions of
national law, the
national judge is
obliged not to apply the new fees.
By giving guidance on the circumstances in which a
national court of last instance is
obliged to make a reference to the CJEU with the Ferreira de Silva case one may assert that there is a need to occasionally check the case - law and practice of other
courts of the Member States when a given term gives rise to uncertainty which ultimately bears the risk of different interpretation.
National courts or administrative authorities will be able to issue a redress order that
obliges the trader infringing Union law to provide, among other things, monetary compensation, repair, replacement, price reduction, contract termination or reimbursement of the price paid.
In that scenario, the
national court is not
obliged to disapply the provisions of the Criminal Code on limitation periods.
However, «If the
national court were thus to come to the view that the obligation to disapply the provisions of the Criminal Code at issue conflicts with the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law, it would not be
obliged to comply with that obligation, even if compliance with the obligation allowed a
national situation incompatible with EU law to be remedied»: in fact, it is for the
national legislature to take the necessary measures.