Sentences with phrase «obscene valuations»

But as John Hussman said in his October 17th Weekly Market Comment, «passive returns look glorious in the rear - view mirror precisely because Fed - induced yield - seeking speculation has driven nearly every asset class to rich or obscene valuations in recent years.»

From an investment standpoint, market conditions remain characterized both by obscene valuations and still - negative market internals.

At present, we continue to identify one of the most hostile market environments we've observed in a century of historical data, not only because obscene valuations and extreme «overvalued, overbought, overbullish» syndromes are in place, but also because our measures of market internals remain in a deteriorating condition.

It's not that obscene valuations or syndromes of extremely overextended conditions are irrelevant for long - term and full - cycle market outcomes; it's that the uniformity or divergence of market internals is critical in evaluating shorter segments of the market cycle.

An improvement in market internals and credit spreads would indicate a resumption of that speculative «meme» and would, despite obscene valuations, reduce the immediacy of our downside concerns.

That window of vulnerability has been open for several months now, and the immediacy of our downside concerns would ease (despite obscene valuations) only if market internals and credit spreads were to shift back toward evidence of investor risk - seeking.

Not exact matches

At the time they were used, they were effectively the result of ambitious management teams trying to cash in on the obscene (and stupid) once - in - several - generations valuation levels that seemed to be hitting new highs on an almost daily basis back during the dot - com bubble.

The problem is that with valuations now at obscene heights, future returns are likely to be dismal, and future downside risks are likely to be extreme.

At this point, obscene equity valuations are already baked in the cake on valuation measures that are reliably correlated with actual subsequent stock market returns.

With the S&P 500 within about 8 % of its highest level in history, with historically reliable valuation measures at obscene levels, implying near - zero 10 - 12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns; with an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of history.

That wouldn't make valuations any less obscene, but it would defer our immediate concerns about severe market losses.

The recent market cycle has extended much further, but it has also brought the most historically reliable measures of valuation to obscene levels.

Respect that distinction without abandoning valuations altogether, and recognize that at least for now, the combination of obscene overvaluation, extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions, and divergent market internals creates a terribly hostile return / risk profile for investors.

That wouldn't make valuations any less obscene, but it would defer our immediate concerns about severe market losses.