Sentences with phrase «occasions of actuality»

The category of perceptivity that we apply to all occasions of actuality allows us to envision them as actively synthesizing the past into themselves.

Whitehead asserts that «every occasion of actuality is in its own nature finite.

Not exact matches

Granted, therefore, that God's infinite conceptual valuation of pure possibility may justly be termed «free» since it is «limited by no actuality which it presupposes (PR 524), yet the temporal integrative activity of his consequent nature, whereby he loves particular occasions of the actual world, may also be called «free,» though in a somewhat different sense.

For the attained actualities of the external world are objectified within C [the regional standpoint of C], and these «objectifications express the causality by which the external world fashions the actual occasion in question» (PR 489)» (327).

But his insistence that» [t] he envisaging creativity, the continuum of extension, B's anticipatory feeling of C, the disjunctive plurality of attained actualities, the multiplicity of eternal objects, and the primordial nature of God are all alike involved in the creation of C's dative [i.e., purely receptive] phase» (326) would lead one to believe that some sort of objective medium must he present to facilitate the transmission to the new occasion of so many non-objective factors in its self - constitution (e g creativity, the anticipatory feelings of B and other past occasions, the multiplicity of eternal objects, the divine primordial nature, etc.).

In more technical terms, this «inclusion as an immediate fact of relevant experience» by each temporal actuality is the feeling by each concrescing occasion of its own initial aim.

(3) At first Whitehead tries to derive the subjective aim from the activities of the occasion itself, as it seeks to unify its multiple past in the light of the multiple interrelatedness of the realm of eternal objects (i.e., the nontemporal actuality of God objectified).

He adds himself to the world as the vision of ideal possibility, from which every new occasion takes its rise, thereby ensuring a measure of order and value in a situation that could otherwise be only chaotic and indeed could achieve no actuality at all.

It is a process of concrescence, that is, a process in which a new concrete actuality emerges from the diverse actual occasions that make up its world.

The Whiteheadian actuality, the occasion, represents a complete and thoroughgoing rejection of the substance - attribute conception, and is entirely relational in its essence.

51 In his discussion of how both God and world operate upon a becoming occasion, God always is working with the «given,» that is, the actuality of past decisions for good or for ill and all qualities inbetween.

Every new settlement of that community, every new disjunctive multiplicity of attained actualities, gives rise, through the transcendent process of transition, to a new occasion in which that particular settlement is reproduced and in which the settlement as reproduced is then synthesized into a final unity of experience by the immanent process of concrescence.

Clearly, then, Whitehead intended «actuality» to be predicable of the occasion qua superject, as well as of the occasion qua subject; and this is what we would expect only if «actuality» is to be predicated of whatever either is, or has been, self - realizing.

But if we hold, as for example in Process and Reality, that all final individual actualities have the metaphysical character of occasions of experience, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's immediately present occasion of experience with one's immediately past occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the connectedness of all occasions in nature.

Reference to the actuality of completed occasions, in PR and in other major works, is surely the rule rather than the exception.

Hence, in the general sense in which the notion of actuality is tied to the notion of self - realization, the superjective existence of an occasion is as actual as its subjective existence.

In the second sense, the causal objectification within an occasion of its antecedent world may be construed as the cumulative character of time, or, in more systematic terms, of the creative advance of actuality.

It was with a view toward the elucidation of the world's connectedness, Whitehead himself informs us, that he chose the basic working hypothesis of his philosophy — namely, that the final actualities of the world have the necessary features of acts, or occasions, of experience (AI 283f; see also PR 65, 114, 217).

For Husserl every actuality (Whitehead's actual Occasion) is an expression of an essence (Whitehead's eternal object); experience is composed of «individual instances of... essences» (Ideas 113).

I need to emphasize the actuality of the superject (or, what is the same, the superjective existence of the actuality) because the misinterpretation of the principle of process has often gone hand in hand with the mistaken belief that «actuality» can be properly predicated of an occasion only while it is in the process of becoming.3 This widespread and deeply rooted mistake deserves more attention than I can give it here without digressing extensively from my main thesis.

Now, in what sense is an occasion's universe — understood as a community of settled, or completed, actualities — immanent in the occasion itself?

We hold that the test for actuality is the ability to act, to exert power and influence on the coming to be of individual quantum events and larger societies of occasions.

None of this would be possible unless actuality is granted to societies of occasions, and not just to occasions.

It looks back to the constitution of an actual occasion by other actualities in terms of internal relations (prehensions) in Science and the Modern World and forward to «transition» (PR 210C).

Every actual occasion has temporal thickness and every present actual entity is a response to actualities of the settled past.

The meaning of these distinctions for my present dispute with Professor Cobb is simply this: the concept of regions as potentialities that can not, qua potentialities, be said to originate with the becoming of occasions logically presupposes as its necessary condition the concept of regions as actualities, regions which, qua actualities, do originate with the becoming of occasions.

Whitehead's reconciliation involved combining the earlier point, that all actualities in the world are occasions of experience, with the idea that God is the chief exemplification, not the exception to, the metaphysical principles applicable to all finite actualities.

First, God prehends every component of the satisfaction of every actual occasion; nothing in the domain of finite actuality is excluded.

The intuition that I, with my conscious experience, am an actual individual with the power of self - determination, to make decisions and to cause my body to do my bidding, is reconciled with the equally strong sense that my body is real, and that it exerts powerful causation upon me, in terms of the speculative hypothesis that all actual occasions are occasions of experience, so that interaction of body and mind is not the unintelligible interaction of unlikes (the unintelligibility of which has led philosophers to deny the distinct actuality either of the mind or of the body).

The justification for any relevance extending beyond actuality would have to depend upon the internal relatedness of the eternal objects ordered as a realm, The occasion incorporates these new elements in forming its «ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation.»

To say that God in his consequent nature can prehend a contemporary actual entity, a then - concrescing occasion, is to provide a ground for the datum (viz, the actuality of the then - concrescing occasion) but is to make an exception of God in order to prevent the collapse of the system.

This has been widely recognized, but we wish to go further and claim that the actuality required is provided supremely by, the living immediacy of the finite occasions, the exclusive sharpness of the very act of decision whereby one value becomes actual.

For the occasion values just this togetherness of actuality, cutting off all alternative possibilities in the decisiveness which is its immediate experience.

The wholeness of an occasion in its subjective unity is the vital and exclusive actuality which is completely lacking in the inclusiveness of the primordial vision taken by itself.

In one sense, every occasion of experience enjoys some freedom in forming itself into whatever it becomes in its moment of actuality.

An occasion of experience must receive not only the actuality of the past but also alternative possibilities for its own self - constitution.

Although this little book (it can be called an occasional address, yet without having the occasion which produces the speaker and gives him authority, or the occasion which produces the reader and makes him eager to learn) is like a fantasy, like a dream by day as it confronts the relationships of actuality: yet it is not without assurance and not without hope of accomplishing its object.

The prehension of God's consequent nature (how God has prehended the past actuality of that occasion) reveals a specific response to the past occasion.

On the other hand his control and efficacy operate not by arbitrary (that is to say, independent and «omnipotent») overruling, nor by being the only active elements in the occasion; but by the persuasive molding of new possibilities, by redirecting the pressures of prior actualities, by providing new opportunity for advance, and by offering the «lure» which evokes from each occasion in the ongoing process the movement towards satisfaction of its «subjective aim».

In its actuality salvation is enjoyment; at its acme it is ecstasy — the unrestrained joy experienced on the occasion of an acute awareness of the harmonious union of life with its surrounding community and its ultimate ground.

Whitehead speaks of decision as the mark of actuality, because the occasion decides or cuts off the alternative possibilities of Integrating the past in order to become the one single actuality that it is.

As such he was one of the formative elements of the world, and not an actuality like the actual occasions enjoying his own subjective immediacy.

We have already seen that each actuality is an organismic unity, whether it be the unity of prehensions in an actual occasion, the unity of a nexus of actual occasions, or even the unity of many nexus.

In effect, then, actuality is good insofar as it occasions an intrinsic experience of harmonious intensity.

Here is a case, we are told «in which God does aim to be the main content of that which is re-enacted or incarnated from the past, so that an occasion of human experience would not so much re-enact its own human past as some important aspect of the divine actuality» (1:146).

Insofar as the several occasions are mutually supportive of one another, they also contribute, but should they clash, or be individually trivial, they detract from this final unity of all actuality within God.

And, insofar as we actualize a unity of outlook and purpose with our peers through our common appreciation of the Christ - image, and our appropriation of this image as the guiding principle of our lives, we realize ever more perfectly that mutual inherence in one another and in God that is at the same time present actuality and (in its perfection) goal for every actual occasion.

Is not God's inclusion of every worldly occasion in God's own everlasting actuality a sort of «judgement»?

To be an occasion of experience is to be an actuality, and to be an actuality is to have value in and for itself.

A finite actuality or occasion of experience exhausts its creativity (its only power of transcendence) in a momentary act of self - unification, to be superseded by others.