Sentences with phrase «occasions of human experience»

Each occasion is influenced by many factors, only one of which is the group of preceding occasions of human experience that conjointly with successor occasions constitutes the human soul from birth to death.

These entities are very different in kind from the corpuscular societies as a whole and, Whitehead is convinced, have much more kinship to the actual occasions of human experience.

(Whitehead suggests that there may be from four to ten such occasions of human experience in a second.

The previous discussion indicates how Whitehead believes one can, by generalizing from occasions of human experience, talk meaningfully about the nature of nonhuman actual entities in themselves.

Finally, the doctrine that the regions that constitute the standpoint of actual occasions of human experience include those of subhuman occasions in the brain has several specific advantages.

If we follow the argument of the previous section, there would be some difference, for whereas the occasions of human experience have considerable temporal breadth in relation to the electronic occurrences in the brain, we have seen that the occasions of God's experience must be extremely thin in their temporal extension.

To put it in another way, there is a flow of causal efficacy from the events external to the body to bodily events and from them to the occasions of human experience.

Also, what I call «conscious occasions are what Whitehead calls «final percipient occasions of human experience.

Occasions of human experience everywhere exhibit the structures described by Whitehead's categories and, in addition to that, the special forms described as intellectual feelings.

It added an immense richness to the unconscious, which, by the continuity of its life, constituted the successive occasions of human experience as a unified soul.

The process as a whole is the succession of these atomic units which are the individual occasions of human experience.

In that picture, the clothes - line is the real self, the genuine identity of the I», and the various articles hung on the line for drying are the particular moments or occasions of human experience.

Hartshorne also rejected Whitehead's account of the magnitude of the occasions of human experience for much the same reasons as Cobb.

To cite but one example, in Modes of Thought Whitehead says, in respect to occasions of human experience, that «there is a dual aspect to the relationship of an occasion of experience as one relatum and the experienced world as another relatum.

The theory generalizes the repetition of the past that is evident in conscious, mnemonic occasions of human experience into a feature of all actual occasions, human or nonhuman.

Some we think of as bursts of energy; others, as occasions of human experience.

Whitehead's project to find, in occasions of human experience, patterns or structures that can be generalized, presupposes and implies the view that human beings are wholly, and without remainder, part of the natural world.

Whitehead provided us with a model of occasions of human experience that makes clear that their content is provided by the societies out of which they come into being.

Each occasion of human experience makes a decision about itself in view of the past that it includes and the future that it anticipates.

Consider, above all, the activity of what Whitehead calls «the final percipient occasion», i.e., the present occasion of human experience, in integrating its present visual experience, with all the complex interpretation involved therein, with previous experiences.

An occasion of human experience is a burst of energy, and all bursts of energy, like all occasions of human experience, are acts of self - constitution out of the world.

Each momentary occasion of human experience is such a concrescence, and there is no subject or substance underlying these concrescences.

One mode is that primarily employed in this book in which attention has been focused on the intrapsychic structure, and especially on the center from which the occasion of human experience is organized and unified.

To understand what is peculiar to the Buddhist structure of existence, it was necessary to concentrate attention on the relation of each dominant occasion of human experience to the predecessor and successor occasion together with which it constituted a soul.

Here is a case, we are told «in which God does aim to be the main content of that which is re-enacted or incarnated from the past, so that an occasion of human experience would not so much re-enact its own human past as some important aspect of the divine actuality» (1:146).

It is, of course, such subtle, nonconscious decisions, usually quite minor, that Whitehead discerns in every occasion of human experience.

That an occasion of human experience is a synthesis of prehensions is fairly clear to anyone who attempts to describe what is happening.

An occasion of human experience is an event.

(From my Whiteheadian viewpoint, Buddhism seems subtly to have exaggerated the capacity of an actual occasion of human experience to determine its own relation to its predecessors.

If we ask how this difference arises, and if we press our question fully, we find that the answer is that in each occasion of human experience there is a decision determining the subjective aim of the occasion which may deviate from the full ideal offered the occasion in its initial phase.

However, Buddhism does not finally acknowledge the inescapable causal efficacy of the past, an efficacy only partly subject to the control of the present occasion of human experience.

Each occasion of human experience is constituted not only by its incorporation of the cellular occasions of its body but also by its incorporation of aspects of other people.

Not exact matches

And yet, with the emergence of consciousness at the level of regnant human occasions, the struggle for justice becomes ingredient in the achievement of the richest harmony of experience attainable.

Such concrete knowledge of God is for any such occasion, even a human occasion of experience, largely unconscious, because it is the organizing center of the concrescing activity.

In the case of microbes which feed on humans, a society with limited potential for intensity of experience may achieve a measure of endurance by destroying societies of occasions which form the necessary environment for dominant human occasions of greater potential intensity of experience.

To be specific, a human being or higher - order animal organism is an ongoing subject of experience in and through its dominant subsociety of occasions; but the coordination therewith required to sustain the flow of consciousness can only be achieved through the collaboration and coordination of millions of sub-fields of activity, subordinate layers of social order, within the organism.

I also believe that, in spite of Whitehead's reluctance to concede privileged status to human occasions of experience, the introduction of the wide range of conscious anticipation of the future which humanity represents in comparison to lesser types of existence also introduces justice as a characteristic of the specially human aim at harmonious beauty.

It may be argued that if human occasions of experience prehend God, and they do, they must prehend him as a contemporary, since God as actual entity is contemporary with all other occasions.

Both Cobb and Sherburne try to unify human experience within the dominant thread of occasions, but our supposition is that the unity of many bodily experiences occurs within threads of nondominant occasions within the supposedly nonsocial nexus.

It is this presence of God within the human occasion of experience, that makes the occasion something more than a deterministic outcome of the past.

Whitehead's method, in part, is to analyze these occasions of subjective experience in order to find factors capable of being generalized into principles applicable to all actual entities: «In describing the capacities, realized or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have... tacitly taken human experience as an example upon which to found the generalized description required for metaphysics» (PR 172).

The stream of conscious experience and synthetic activity is the dominant society of actual occasions in human (and animal) bodies, being influenced by subordinate organic processes in those bodies, then influencing them in turn in an ongoing dialectic of causality and creativity.

If our human existence is not that of some supposedly substantial and indestructible soul to whom experiences happen, but is rather those experiences themselves held together in unity and given identity by the awareness and self - awareness which makes it possible for us to say «I» and «you», then the enduring reality, which God accepts and values, is precisely that series of events or occasions which go to make us what we are.

Every interpretation of the meaning of human experience, every understanding of the world in its totality, must by necessity start from some particular stance — or, better, must find some particular point that is taken to be of special importance among all the events or occasions; it provides a clue to the totality of experience.

The «specious present» of human experience and the quantum events of physics are perhaps the best samples of actual occasions now discernible.

In Whitehead's view (and mine), occasions of experience are not limited to the human ones.

The concept of occasion of experience enables us to see what is common to the human soul and all other entities whatsoever.

This remainder is far larger in human experience than in most other occasions of experience, but no event is wholly determined without remainder by its past.

Whitehead's insistence upon the organismic connectedness of things is certainly conducive to answering this question by means of analogy and metaphor, mapping in isomorphic fashion characteristics of the actual occasion onto the macrocosmic objects of human experience.

This is the sort of experience Whitehead is referring to when he writes: «In describing the capacities, realized or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have, with Locke, tacitly taken human experience as an example upon which to found the generalized description required for metaphysics» (PR 112).