Sentences with phrase «occasions process of becoming»

Accordingly, what happens during the occasions process of becoming is, in part at least, «merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining what it is integrally to be, in its own character of the superject of its own process» (PR 369).

In the satisfaction of an actual occasion the process of becoming which can be described as the transition from indeterminateness to determinateness comes to an end, and with it the subjective immediacy of the occasion perishes.4 With this satisfaction the objective immortality begins, namely, the functioning in respect to other processes of becoming.

Not exact matches

First of all, upon completion of its process of concrescence, an occasion becomes a superject; that is, it objectifies itself so that it can be prehended by later occasions (PR 219f / 335f).

This differs from process metaphysics, which incorporates the object in the act of becoming, holding that an object is given or imminent in an occasion.

Primitively time has the character of process, which has «creativity» as its essence and reveals itself in the becoming of actual occasions (PR 31f).

We may trace these stages: (1) At first, Whitehead is content to express the unity of an occasion in process of becoming simply in terms of the first three categoreal conditions (f).

When he says creativity «is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively» (Process 21), is he saying the members of the multiplicity (that an actual entity prehends) are parts of one whole as it begins its concrescence, or is he saying they do not become parts of a whole until the actual entity reaches its satisfaction?

As it moves through the process of becoming a specific and complete something in the world, the actual occasion exhibits the character of a decision system.

And so, when an actual occasion comes into being through its process of concrescence, its concrescing prehensions also become.

For, without doing violence to a single organic doctrine, we could avoid the embarrassment of saying that an occasion qua subject is not an entity by the simple expedient of redefining «entity» to signify whatever functions, or is destined to function, as a potential for processes of becoming.

I need to emphasize the actuality of the superject (or, what is the same, the superjective existence of the actuality) because the misinterpretation of the principle of process has often gone hand in hand with the mistaken belief that «actuality» can be properly predicated of an occasion only while it is in the process of becoming.3 This widespread and deeply rooted mistake deserves more attention than I can give it here without digressing extensively from my main thesis.

This creation of an occasion's being by its becoming is precisely what the principle of process asserts.

For it can be shown that an actual occasion can be a potential for other processes of becoming only when it is a superject.

Just as the temporal order of actual occasions is the order of their acts of becoming, so the temporal order of prehensions in the process of concrescence is the order of their becoming.13

Accordingly, if every being or entity is a potentiality for process and if an occasion is a potentiality for process only when it is a superject, we can then conclude that when Whitehead says that an actual occasion has become a being and is, for that reason, a potentiality for processes of becoming, he means that the occasion has become a superject.

The initial datum, which is that actual entity prehended, is already an abstraction from the full, living, subjective immediacy of that occasion's process of becoming.

Process philosophers must either become Cartesians and reject the doctrine of the spaciness of mind, or find an effective way of reinterpreting the epochal theory to permit longer - lasting conscious occasions, or they must reject the doctrine of the external imperceptibility of mind.

But his answer diverges in two ways: (i) In speaking of «lateral tensions» as having some influence on what each natural moment passes on to later moments, Santayana is in conflict with Whitehead's view that in its process of becoming an actual occasion is causally quite detached from its contemporaries, and operates privately upon the past occasions which have entered into it in order to produce that over-all character which it will pass on to later occasions.

These statements give something of the flavor of this early theory: «the first stage of the process of feeling is the reception into the responsive conformity of feeling whereby the datum, which is mere potentiality, becomes the individualized basis for a complex unity of realization» (PR 113C).3 Or, later, «The objectified particular occasions together have the unity of a datum for the creative concrescence» (PR 210C).

In the present instance God is the concrescing entity, so God can not be the ground of the givenness of X when God is prehending X. God is in unison of becoming with every occasion (cf. Christian, 333 - 334), but it is the definition of contemporary occasions, occasions in unison of becoming, that neither of them prehend the other (cf. Process and Reality, An Essay in Cosmology 102).

By perishing in its subjective, present immediacy the actual occasion becomes objectively immortal, as the process of becoming unified terminates in a unified being capable of causally influencing those processes of becoming which supersede it.

As I reflect on the experience of my temporality I note that it is a process composed of occasions, each of them a «throb of experience4 that momentarily becomes and then perishes.

It would seem reasonable to hold that as one grows up, as one's brain develops and becomes more complex (a process which does not end with physical maturity but continues through life) and as one accumulates a wealth of memory against which one can compare and contrast present experience, the mental poles of the occasions of one's regnant nexus would become generally stronger.

33 The chief difficulty which the reading of Process and Reality occasions is that the initial data of an event are represented as themselves in constant movement and as always performing different functions in the process of beProcess and Reality occasions is that the initial data of an event are represented as themselves in constant movement and as always performing different functions in the process of beprocess of becoming.

Becoming is associated with the subjective processes of concrescence (PR 25 / 38, 35 / 53, 283 / 434, and others), while the relationship which obtains between occasions in durations is an extensional concept of simultaneity.

Panexperientialism resists the completely deterministic interpretation of this idea, according to which the temporally prior condition fully determines every present event: When the event in question is an individual occasion of experience, it has a mental pole, which is partly self - determining (In Whitehead's words, the ontological principle «could also be termed the «principle of efficient, and final, causation,»» because it says that «every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence» [PR 24].)

Gingerly, I approach this problem of the subjective immortality of the «resurrected» into an everlasting God by envisioning God's continuous process of becoming as comprehending the regions defined by all of the processes of becoming that are God's creatures, even as the spacio - temporal regions coordinated by and responsive to the «presiding occasions» of our bodies include the regions defined by our various bodily occasions.

The process - relational model of God as the most extensive exemplification of primordial creativity, with every worldly occasion in its own process of becoming; the process - relational concept of God as the principle of order channeling the world's becoming toward ever richer and more harmonious experience (the primordial nature); and the process - relational concept of God's preservation of every worldly occasion in God's own everlasting becoming (the consequent nature), with each such occasion evaluated and positioned for its greatest possible contribution to the divine life — these perspectives on divine reality which process - relational thought claims to find exemplified in the very nature of things are separately and together congruent with and supportive of the biblical images and events which describe the «already» in inaugurated eschatology.»

One can not observe, from without, an «occasion in the process of becoming.

The occasion's final cause is called its «subjective aim»; it is the aim at a determinate «satisfaction» which is the conclusion of the occasion's process of becoming (PR 1 34).

This occasion is related to other occasions only at its initiation (as prehender) and at its consummation (as datum for prehension) Hence, in principle, its own inner process of becoming is irrelevant to its observable relations.

However, one can analyze the process of becoming of the actual occasion, and indeed, Whitehead develops an extremely elaborate analysis.

Confusion at this point tempts non-process thinkers to identify the coming into being and the occurring of an event on the grounds that both must mean its «becoming present, «2 and tempts process thinkers to suppose that the satisfaction of an occasion must have the static being of a substance.

Worship becomes an occasion in which «sacred» texts are both revered and scrutinized through the playful processes of oral performance and homiletical interpretation.

A genetic phase in process of becoming can not derive its being from the occasion of which it is a part, for that occasion has not yet come into being.

Of course the rhythm of the immediate process has no being or achievement other than the determinate occasions it brings to fact; but that is the poignancy of change and becoming, always losing its thrust when it succeedOf course the rhythm of the immediate process has no being or achievement other than the determinate occasions it brings to fact; but that is the poignancy of change and becoming, always losing its thrust when it succeedof the immediate process has no being or achievement other than the determinate occasions it brings to fact; but that is the poignancy of change and becoming, always losing its thrust when it succeedof change and becoming, always losing its thrust when it succeeds.

Since the aim of this process is to become something fully definite, there is no fully definite possibility at which the occasion aims.10 Indeed, a «fully definite possibility» is, in Hartshorne's view, a contradiction in terms.

It becomes an objective datum for future occasions to take account of, positively or negatively, in the continuance of process.

For example, what we usually call «an electron» really is a society of occasions, each of which is a distinct subjective process of becoming, flickeringly brief in duration; each inherits some characteristic forms (which we call «electronic») from a predecessor and mediates them to a successor.

Adventure is the universes search for continually more intense forms of ordered novelty.5 If the actual world is a process, composed of becoming and perishing occasions then its movement toward integrating these occasions into ever richer modes of order may be called adventure.

The analysis of the process of an actual occasion, which constitutes its own becoming, leads into a theory of subjectivity which is among the most important new achievements of Whitehead's cosmology.

Objectified occasions, before they become data in the process of concrescence under consideration, are themselves always functioning as subjectivity in their own process.

Whitehead's decisive thesis — that the actual occasion as subjectivity becomes what it is in the process of concrescence (cf. PR 40ff.

Because of the singularity of actual occasions in the process of concretion, this exhausting of the perspectives of the preceding occasions never becomes a complete reproduction in the sense of a renewed occurrence of the subjectivity of these objectified occasions.

The inclusion of the satisfaction in the occasion as a contributory component would amount to a return to a substance metaphysics; the process insights of a dynamic becoming would be replaced by reference to substances undergoing accidental changes.

It seems incredible that such a basic shepherding process works so well but, after seeing it on a number of occasions, and talking with both predator and prey, it became clear that much more than just physical herding is in practice.