Sentences with phrase «of nominalism»

(PiP I, p. 22) Moreover because the individual known is part of and in relation to a unified cosmos, the dangers of nominalism are obviated.

The absence of this insight gave the scholastic notion of substance a whiff of nominalism.

This makes sense of Hartshorne's contention in his chapter «Abstraction the Question of Nominalism,» that the novel forms emergent in a creative event are not determinate before the event but become determinate by decision in the event; to deny this is to deny any real meaning to creativity.

Might the influence of nominalism in the subsequent century be relevant?

Kathleen Sweeney historically roots the problem in the philosophy of nominalism and links it with the heart issue of the place of Christ in creation.

Among the many references, I suggest the following: SDE 137 - 82 (see, e.g., 141); Man's Vision of God (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941), p. 225, pp. 244 - 47, and p. 315; «Chance, Love, and Incompatibility,» in RSP 85 - 109 (see especially 94 and 98f; also see [in a later chapter] 118); TDG 193 «Abstraction: The Question of Nominalism,» chapter IV of CSPM 57 - 68 (see especially 61 - 64; also see [in an earlier chapter] 22f and [in a later] 122).

They both also acknowledge that this was in the context of the rising challenge against the idea of «the nature of something» from the school of Nominalism.

Hume's insight had roots in the fourteenth - century revolt of nominalism against those Scholastics whose descendants inhabit my «Traditional» category.

It is fashionable at present, among some theologians, to attempt precise genealogies of modernity, which in general I would rather avoid doing; but it does seem clear to me that the special preoccupations and perversities of modern philosophy were incubated in the age of late Scholasticism, with the rise of nominalism and voluntarism.

April 16, 2012 at 12:43 pm The «practicalities of nominalisms» are of a retreatists» renderings whereby and from they do the most clamourings either for or even against the liberties» bells!

Not exact matches

Because Dreher's account of the historical relationship between realism and nominalism is basic to his subsequent argument, it can not be dismissed as a side issue.

Chapter 2, on the «Roots of the Crisis,» surveys Western history and draws unwarranted conclusions concerning the relationship between metaphysical realism and the late medieval nominalism of William of Ockham.

Thus the dislocation of sign from reality by nominalism makes ready the manipulations of gnostic intellect.

What nominalism called in question is the universal, those principles and causes larger than the mechanism of nature or ideas generated out of nature seen as mechanistic by man.

That may mean rejecting the medieval world» the «Dark Ages»» or embracing the medieval world as if that were our most recent Eden, nominalism poisoned our intellectual life, whether one takes himself to be of the left or right, insofar as one justifies order merely in terms of history or these mechanisms collectively referred to as «nature.»

This has allowed science to be predominantly interpreted through the lens of anti-essentialist nominalism and reduction ism.

How, then, did Packer come to an Evangelical conversion and yet choose to remain part of the church whose supposed nominalism blocked his conversion for so many years?

Part of that will include connecting them to a church so they can grow from nominalism to deeper faith.

It must be stressed that the monadic view of reality that Whitehead and the phenomenologists share does not lead to nominalism, but what might be called a moderate realism.

It is precisely in the introduction of formative elements as conditions of the possibility of actual entities, according to Collingwood, that Whitehead differs from Alexander.25 Furthermore, the status of one of these formative elements, the «eternal objects,» is analogous to that of the «abstract entities»: 26 both are situated between the realism of ideas and pure nominalism.

Even such a brilliant and subtle study as The Theological Origins of Modernity, by Michael Gillespie, simply assumes that nominalism attained victory over the older tradition because of an intrinsic superiority.

This is explained as the philosophical change from realism to nominalism, from a belief in universals as real to a belief in the fundamental reality of unrelated particulars.

The very intellectual weakness of keeping science at arm's length invites the dominant dualistic mindset to interpret scientific as well as other observational data in a reductive manner, which leads to nominalism.

The present Humanism, whether we call it scientific or existentialist, is only the natural and nal culmination of those principles of autonomy and nominalism in philosophy, which oversowed the New Learning.

It's also different from what might be called Darwinian nominalism; words are weapons for the flourishing of the species because people, whether they know it or not, are basically species fodder.

In Ockham's nominalism the value of human abstractions is relativised and truth is found only in God's revelation, which can be understood, nonetheless, according to logical and grammatical laws.

A third heresy that often appears in the electronic - church message is nominalism («Speak the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and you will be saved») which fits nicely into the electronic church «s emphasis that the individual need merely «name the name» or «accept the Lord Jesus Christ» to be saved.

It arose largely from the individualism of Protestant then Enlightenment thinking with its roots in the Nominalism of the late Middle Ages which denied any intrinsic connection, any common «natures», between entities.

While the book gives an interesting summary of various authors who have argued that it was the Protestant Reformation that gave rise to atheism, the author fails to note any connection between the rejection (traceable from nominalism) of reason's capacity to know reality, the Protestant Reformation's appeal to faith against reason, intellectual scepticism and current postmodernism.

In philosophy this would be called Nominalism: the denial of mutual inter-definition both to be at all, and to be fulfilled rightly and beautifully, and in true order, in one's being.

Although I think the authors of the Appeal misread paragraph 137, I agree with their identification of what leads too many people to think that appeals to «conscience» can trump objective norms (nominalism and relativism).

This disturbed processing, embedded as it became in the dialectical method of inquiry (thesis, antithesis, synthesis), generated polarized and competing forces: rival powers (such as popes versus emperors), competing orders (such as the simple Franciscans versus the sophisticated Dominicans), competing pieties (such as natural realism versus Gothic symbolism), and competing inquiries (such as nominalism's empiricism versus realism's idealism) The dialectic between spirit and matter was pressed beyond its limits, resulting in both collapse and rigidification.

The end result — it's harder to be a nominal Pentecostal — the beliefs of the movement tend to weed out nominalism.

This is of course a far cry from nominalism, which Quine seems to have left behind years ago.

We do not want to do away with the notion of form altogether; we are not advocating nominalism.

The implications of Ockham's nominalism for the moral life and for politics are not hard to tease out of this brief sketch of his basic philosophical position.

And it has everything to do, I suggest, with four themes that arise from the modern expression of Ockhamite nominalism: the deterioration of the idea of freedom into willfulness, the detachment of freedom from moral truth, an obsession with «choice,» and the consequent inability to draw the most elementary moral conclusions about the imperative to resist evil.

Professional philosophers consider him the chief exponent of «nominalism,» a powerful late - medieval philosophical movement which denied that universal concepts and principles exist in reality» they exist only in our minds.

Often presented as a crucial moment in the history of epistemology, nominalism also had a tremendous influence on moral theology.

«Human nature» is simply a description, a name (hence «nominalism») we give to our experience of common features among human beings.

Further, the practice of appreciative perception is likely to show us that appreciation and discernment of worth need not be limited by a nominalism which gives moral consideration only to individuals, unusual as the idea may seem.

Again and again he sees the same underlying issue, which he poses in terms of a long - standing philosophers» controversy between «realism» and «nominalism.»

Though he is especially known for his seminal books on Marcel Duchamp such as Pictorial Nominalism and Kant after Duchamp, this time around he set out to revisit the history of Modernist painting which Hilma af Klint is belatedly entering.

More important to Collection was the «pictorial nominalism» signaled by Tu m's trompe l'œil succession of color samples.

Thierry de Duve, Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp's Passage from Painting to the Readymade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).