Sentences with phrase «of analogical»

& Rhetoric 351, 359 (2012)(describing IRAC in terms of analogical arguments) with Miller & Charles, supra note 16, at 208 (describing IRAC as a deductive problem of applying rules to facts).

To review all the categories with a full discussion of their analogical application and transmutation is a very large task.

A full defence of the analogical mode of thinking about God would require an elaborate discussion.

Hence, the possibility of the analogical method rests on the principle that in the concepts of rapport and adverbial response, ontology and epistemology meet.

Rather, actual entities should be regarded as just one instance of the verification of this analogical structure; other instances would be societies of varying degrees of complexity, up to and including the divine community.

From the self Hartshorne moves by way of analogical thinking and category stretching to describe other entities in the great chain of being (e.g., CSPM 53 - 56).

But even if we allowed the possibility of analogical discourse, could we attribute even the vaguest meaning to these terms when they are applied to infinite, necessary, simple Being?

In his presentation, the argument that God exists as self - existent cause of all finite being is established first, and the problem of analogical predication follows.

This is the gist of The Analogical Imagination, a 1982 book by University of Chicago theologian David Tracy.

In difficult cases one asks not (for instance) whether the rule against murder has exceptions but whether this kind of case counts as murder - a question of analogical judgment.

Not exact matches

All accept the Qur» an and the sunnah (Muhammad's example) as foundational but differ on the importance of consensus in collective scholarly reasoning (ijma) and individual analogical reasoning (qiyas).

All our thought and language about God is analogical, and we must ever keep in mind the caution of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) that «No similarity can be found so great but that the dissimilarity is even greater.»

In this case, analogical thinking is forcing far too many among us to imagine that the only choices in Egypt today are the specter of the Iranian Revolution or the friendly ghost of the American Revolution.

If this confuses us, we should recall that the strict rules of creaturely logic will at times tend to break down somewhat in the analogical realms of theological discourse.

1) It is maintained by some that the relationship was essentially analogical - sequential: that is, imperial ideology did not directly shape ideas about Christ but, by virtue of the obvious analogies between some key elements of both, it made the ideas about Christ preached by the early Christians easily comprehensible and attractive to pagans.

3) However, I believe that the relationship is neither analogical - sequential nor genealogical but can be best described as one of polemical parallelism.

That meant that there is no direct conceptual approach to God, nor from God to human reality, by analogical reasoning, but God's presence is hidden in the particulars of history.

An outstanding example of theology as hermeneutics is the work of David Tracy, especially The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism.

Przywara (1889 - 1972) finds the formula for the analogical foundation of the Catholic Church in the Fourth Lateran Council 1215 decree that, «One can not note any similarity between Creator and creature, however great, without being compelled to note an even greater dissimilarity between them.»

The univocal and equivocal imaginations deny metaphor, deny that any new insight can come through the ordinary — the one flattens it to sameness, the other escapes from it — but what Lynch calls the analogical imagination delves into the mundane, for it is precisely in and through the complexities of historical, limited existence that insight comes, if it comes at all.

What Lynch is driving at with his insistence on the analogical imagination, which finds in the images of limitation «the path to whatever the self is seeking: to insight, or beauty, or, for that matter, to God,» is directly related to what I have called metaphor as method.

The fact is that although Mascall quite explicitly affirms the purely analogical character of even causality and existence as applied to God, (Existence and Analogy, p. 87.)

One need not be surprised if in the conflict between the apparent implications of Biblical concepts, understood to be analogical, with metaphysical concepts, understood to be univocal, it is the implications of the Biblical concepts that give way.

Clearly, all of this language about God must be understood as analogical discourse.

A recently completed book on systematic theology (The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism [Crossroad, 1981]-RRB- defends a second, less obvious but no less genuine notion of the kind of publicness that systematic theologies actually achieve.

In order to continue a genuine affirmation of pluralism despite the profound negative realities in the buzzing, blooming confusion of this pluralistic moment, I have turned to a strategy I name «the analogical imagination.»

The now beleaguered non-neo-conservatives in every tradition may find that something like an analogical imagination is at work among us all, The need — my need and theirs — is to find better ways in the future of articulating that imagination and that strategy in both theory and in practice.

A full defense of this intuition as true (i.e., as «public») demands the kind of argument and modes of reflections which I have attempted in my recently completed work on systematic theology (The Analogical Imagination).

Because all language involves a process of abstracting certain elements in experience out of the total complex in which they occur, it is necessarily analogical and therefore imprecise: a word never refers to an absolutely discrete entity.

But there are two fundamentally different ways of approaching such an explication, and they are correlative with the two primary ways of understanding the language in which the confessional statement is made: the univocal, which takes the language as rigidly discursive, and the imagistic, which sees it as highly analogical or symbolic.

Elements that appear problematic in light of the metaphysical reference will not of course be excised from the text but rather interpreted — i.e., recognized as highly analogical or symbolic elements.

This approach (which is, I think, more impressionistic than analogical) would have the advantage of not forcing all religions into a single, narrow mold — a point to which I shall return.

And the term «Lord» has been interpreted like the word «king» as an analogical description of God's rule over creation, rather than a stand - in for the unpronounceable name.

These similarities are sufficient to allow the analogical extension of features of language to signs interpreted by subhuman forms of life, certainly those «higher grade of organisms, as Whitehead terms them, capable of learning.

In The Analogical Imagination I tried to rethink the traditional Christian theological dialectic of sacrament and word as the more primordial religious dialectic of «manifestation» and «proclamation.»

Throughout the history of the church, risky anthropomorphisms in Christian discourse were excused by appeal to the accommodated, analogical, symbolic or poetic form of the scriptural revelation.

In this context, the appeal to the Kerygma becomes an appeal to the act of faith as being a knowledge of the universal love of God, concerning which a process metaphysics may provide analogical knowledge obout.

The corrective I would like to urge upon Schubert Ogden, then, is not that he abandon his method of process theology based upon analogical thinking, but that he consider some means by which he might avoid the inevitable drift of such thinking toward a closed rationalism, in which only man and his formulations speak forth.

For critical presentations of approaches to this correlation, see David M. Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1981); see also his Blessed Rage for Order (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); James A. Sanders, «Hermeneutics,» Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: Supplement, ed.

If Aquinas at least tacitly acknowledges this by making all analogical predications depend upon the clearly literal distinction between Creator and Creature, he can also seem not to acknowledge it by flatly declaring that we can not know of God quid sit, but only an sit or quod sit.

These diverse traits are susceptible to an analogical generalization which contributes to establishing the meaning of the words «witness» and «testimony» in ordinary language.

McFague argues that images (whether symbolic / analogical or parabolic / metaphorical) need interpretation through concepts and theories, but interpretation never exhausts the meaning of images.

I submit that arguments of this kind can have the force that Hartshorne takes them to have only if the whole of our knowledge of God, beyond our unavoidable experience of «the inclusive something,» can be derived from such knowledge as we have of ourselves, and hence is merely symbolic rather than truly analogical.

But if any knowledge of God mediated by psychical concepts would leave open the possibility of its being merely symbolic instead of truly analogical, what could rule out this possibility?

Hartshorne explicitly recognizes this when he speaks of the terms that he distinguishes as analogical in the strict sense as «problematic,» in that they are «neither unambiguously literal nor unambiguously non-literal» (1970a, 156).

In an essay entitled «The Idea of God — Literal or Analogical?»

It would appear that Hartshorne is here depending, in effect, if not in so many words, upon something like the distinction made in the Thomistic theory of analogy between what is meant by an analogical term (the res significata) and how the term means (its modus significandi)(Thomas Aquinas 1964, 56 - 59, 66 - 71).

Moreover, as we learned from our earlier discussion, he can occasionally speak even of a purely formal concept like «relativity» as being in a broad sense analogical, because it has systematically different senses as explicative of the meaning of different logical types.

What is at least analogical in the scheme is the idea of prehension as dependence of an actuality on other actualities, or of participation, feeling of feeling, experience of experience, together with sense of futurity.

If, on the contrary, they are taken strictly, in any one of the senses they have when applied solely to entities within a single logical type, he is equally justified in holding that they are then used in the same sense, and, therefore, are literal, not analogical, even when applicable to God.