Sentences with phrase «of animals experiencing»

By using the highest quality ingredients, Natural Solutions for Life brings effective help to owners of animals experiencing joint pain.
One of the biggest problems with the animal data, Woith says, is the lack of continuous, long - term observations of animals experiencing earthquakes.
Value is located finally in the individual occasion, in this case, most significantly, in the individual occasion of animal experience.
I especially resonated with this part: «lll just give an example of animal experience.
«It's the same exact type of spatial calculation,» she said «This study gives us one more window into the complexity of animal experience.
Kimberly Hall is a licensed, bonded, and insured professional pet sitter with 19 years of animal experience.
licensed, bonded, and insured professional pet sitter with 19 years of animal experience.
Amy is a Registered Veterinary Technician with more than 20 years of animal experience.
Azmira's CS Drops is a homeopathic remedy helping calm the effects of an animal experiencing grief,..
Raised in Southern California and always pursuing the dream of becoming a veterinarian, Lori has a broad base of animal experiences.

Not exact matches

Yalong Bay Tropical Paradise Forest is a rainforest park that contains over 1,500 varieties of tropical plants and over 190 kinds of wild animals, and it's the perfect way to experience Hainan's unique nature and ecology.
Your list of credentials should probably include personal pet ownership — if not currently, at least in the past — as well as other pet - related experience, including working at a pet food store, an animal hospital or other animal - related business.
«A customer tried to bring a baby kangaroo on the plane as a service animal,» a retired airline customer service agent with 18 years of experience told Business Insider.
For animals, intermittent stress is the bulk of what they experience, in the form of physical threats in their immediate environment.
(The Department of Transportation told me that it's looking into Robledo's experience, working in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture, the agency that enforces the Animal Welfare Act.)
Workers complained they were not always paid overtime and even experienced instances of verbal abuse, alleging they have been called things like «animals, moron and monkey.»
In fact, you can give these donations as gifts (many of them come with an «experience» such as a safari when you donate to a local exotic animal zoo) and get good karma points, a tax write - off, and a genuine thank you to boot.
Jeff Corwin is a conservationist and the television host and producer of The Jeff Corwin Experience on the Animal Planet network.
Through my experiences and discussions with countless other animal advocates representing a broad swath of our movement, I've come to realize organizations with the best cultures espouse these two philosophies:
He observes, however, that «the modernist desire in Frost and Eliot — to preserve an independent selfhood against the coercions of the market, a self made secure by the creation of a unique style — is subverted by the market, not because they wrote according to popular formulas, but because they give us their poems as delicious experiences of voyeurism, illusions of direct access to the life and thought of the famous writer, with the poet inside the poem like a rare animal in a zoo.
To be specific, a human being or higher - order animal organism is an ongoing subject of experience in and through its dominant subsociety of occasions; but the coordination therewith required to sustain the flow of consciousness can only be achieved through the collaboration and coordination of millions of sub-fields of activity, subordinate layers of social order, within the organism.
If we view the soul as an effective social system for the procurement of intense experience, we can legitimately apply to it Whitehead's statement in «Immortality» that «the more effective social systems involve a large infusion of various soils of personalities as subordinate elements in their make - up — for example, an animal body, or a society of animals, such as human beings» (IMM 690).
He vetoed the consumption of prawns, those bizarre other - worldly creatures which no member of the faithful had ever seen, and required animals to be killed slowly, by bleeding, so that by experiencing their deaths to the full they might arrive at an understanding of the meaning of their lives, for it is only at the moment of death that living creatures understand that life has been real, and not a sort of dream.
It needs to be stated first that human beings are highly complex psycho - physical organisms with literally thousands of energy events interacting with each other and with and under the dominance of an «organizing center of experience» (the brain), also present in animals with central nervous systems.
Even up till modern times class and caste divisions have obscured the unity of the human species, while animal lovers have frequently projected their own human consciousness into animal experience.
Although Whitehead's Category of the Ultimate is meant to lessen the distance, so to speak, between actual occasions and societies of actual occasions, the application of Whitehead's metaphysics to persons seems troublesome; the ancient metaphysical problem of appearance and reality seems to lurk in the background, for the philosopher who wishes to identify res vera in the system soon finds herself perplexed, asking if the subjects of experience are actual occasions, societies of occasions, or sentient beings, such as persons and animals.1
Out on the farm, the storyteller keeps a journal («forty - eight animals seen today before lunch, of which all but six were birds, most small and brownish»), and begins to «experience
The lower animals are not demonstrably righteous or wicked, but they too can be bored or the opposite, they show signs of experiencing conflicts or harmonies of their feelings or impulses.
I mean to assert that my conscious experience, the experience constitutive of me as a conscious ego, is the experience of the actual entities constitutive of the personally ordered regnant society which dominates my brain and my whole animal organism.
The data of experience — rocks, trees, animals, people, etc. — are part of the world, and yet they are part of the self as well.
In the history of a living society, its more vivid manifestations wander to whatever quarter is receiving from the animal body an enormous variety of physical experience.
The stream of conscious experience and synthetic activity is the dominant society of actual occasions in human (and animal) bodies, being influenced by subordinate organic processes in those bodies, then influencing them in turn in an ongoing dialectic of causality and creativity.
He adds that the scientists unwilling to attribute intentionality to animals are generally those with little direct experience with the behavior of nonhuman primates (DNCC 221).
Two of the specific experiences which Buber mentions in the essay on Boehme — that of kinship with a tree and that of looking into the eyes of a dumb animal — are later used in I and Thou as an example not of unity but of the I - Thou relation.
The objects of our ordinary experience, things such as rocks, trees, animals and persons are composites or groupings of what we have been calling occasions of experience.
We have seen that research in nonhuman experience corroborates Whitehead's epistemological scheme in which perception takes the two forms of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy, propositions and concepts are primarily nonlinguistic, feeling is the dominant mode of world - and self - disclosure, and animals experience both morally and aesthetically.
Our developed consciousness fastens on the sensum as datum: our basic animal experience entertains it as a type of subjective feeling.
Its experience of the extent to which human brutality can go, of the fury that can be unleashed when the human animal is attacked, its acceptance in wry cynicism of the venality of great and small; its acceptance, too, of a psychological analysis that tends to show how slight the power of reason, how great the strength of obscure passions; how corrupting of children the possible love of mothers and the wrath of fathers; its portrayal of men and mankind in bitterly disillusioned novels and in shuddering chronicles of man's inhumanity to man — in all this the 20th century has perhaps gone beyond anything that Edwards said in dispraise of men, individually and in the collective.
Burton, an experienced ethologist, states that animals are capable of compassion, pity, sympathy, affection and grief, as well as true altruism (JLA 91).
Ontologically speaking, the dominant occasion of experience is not different from the other occasions of experience with which it jointly constitutes the psychophysical animal organism.
This capacity to learn from experience in man, as in other animals, is primarily bound up with the interpretation of signals and with the ability to bring past experience to bear on present interpretation.
Also in the case of animals, it is often best to speak of dominant occasions of experience to refer to that entity which in man is organized as soul.
In primitive man, however, this individuality was located in the unconscious, and although it must be emphasized when we compare human experience with that of animals, it was not what we think of as individuality today.
The evolutionary sequence from protons, molecules, cells, plants and animals to people would be interpreted as an increase in complexity of experience and degree of self - determination.
In general it seems that we can be sure there are souls only where there are central nervous systems providing sufficient stimulus in some locus in an animal body for a unified experience to emerge far more complex than that of individual molecules or cells.
He would not have believed that human experiencing could have an infinite number of successive experiences in a second, and that the same infinity would also occur in a non-human animal.
Animal life introduces the central nervous system and a much higher capacity for richness of experience.
Pet owners today are more sensitive to the life experiences of their animals.
A single human egg cell is alive, but it has no experiences like those of an adult, or a child, or even of an animal with a central nervous system.
In this second sense of the term, the «innocence» of the fetus is like that of the animals: an incapacity to distinguish right from wrong but a capacity to experience pain.
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z