The subject - predicate dogma, the scholastic dualism Descartes seemed unable to reject, only obscures some of the truly important aspects
of the cogito which inspired Whitehead's ontological principle.
Descartes (1596 - 1650) contributed to mathematics and especially to philosophy — to the latter with his basic questioning and his principle
of cogito, ergo sum («I think, therefore I am»).
We can briefly reconstruct as follows one prominent argument which brings Merleau - Ponty to this new notion
of the cogito and which will thus bring us to the question of personal identity.
First, the concept
of the cogito as mediated by a universe of signs.
Brightman's three stages in Personality and Religion are reminiscent of Descartes» attempt in the Meditations to restore our knowledge of the world on the basis
of the cogito, but there the order is self, God, other minds, and finally nature.
In the present moment of experience, there is no knowledge
of the cogito, because awareness
of the cogito is strictly prereflective and nonthetic.
Ever heard
of the cogito?
Not exact matches
But, even in the fundamental thinkers
of high modernity, hints can be found that knowledge requires God: Descartes uses God in the Meditations in order to escape from the interiority where the
cogito has stranded him; Kant uses God as a postulate
of pure practical reason in order to hold on to the possibility
of morality.
Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective
cogito which is the condition
of the Cartesian
cogito.
The prereflective
cogito (nonthetic self - awareness) is involved as a necessary structure in both consciousness as mere revealing intuition (prereflective positional consciousness
of the world) and consciousness as knowledge (reflective positional consciousness
of the past self).
My description
of the prereflective
cogito as the sole form
of consciousness in satisfaction is, consequently, at odds with the Sartrean scheme.
Here,
cogito and credo are antithetical acts: modern or «objective» knowledge is not religiously neutral, as so many theologians have imagined; rather, it is grounded in a dialectical negation
of faith.
«I am lonely because... I am a man
of faith for whom to be means to believe, and who substituted «credo» for «
cogito» in the time - honored Cartesian maxim.»
Descartes himself acknowledged that his
cogito ergo sum is already fundamental in Augustine's philosophy (letter to Colvius, 14 November, 1640), and he believed that his philosophy was the first to demonstrate the philosophical truth
of the doctrine
of transubstantiation, and could go so far as to claim that scholastic philosophy would have been rejected as clashing with faith if his philosophy had been known first (letter to Mersenne, 31 March, 1641) Indeed, nothing is more revolutionary in modern philosophy than its dissolution
of the scholastic distinction between natural theology and revealed theology.
From The Symbolism
of Evil8 on I have perceived this constitutional infirmity
of Descartes's
cogito.
This has two unfortunate results: it makes the regnant society, or as we would perhaps more loosely say, «the mind,» into an «ego» — in which case the self becomes less a «lived - body» than a Cartesian
cogito — and it gives the presiding occasion
of the regnant society the impossible, or at least, improbable, job
of coordinating all bodily data all the time, pre-reflectively and reflectively, into an organizational unity.
This power to exist, the «project towards the world that we are» (PP 405), constitutes my most immediate awareness
of myself as a «tacit
cogito» which is brought to expression and explicit awareness through language.
And this is what Merleau - Ponty expresses in terms
of behavioral patterns which form a continuity
of past and present in an identical
cogito, and pace Professor Weiss, this notion
of identity is independent
of a commitment to a philosophy
of substance.
It is a system
of motor powers for exploring and making sense
of the world, and as such, the
cogito becomes more an «I can» than an «I think.»
Above all try to forget it, to be an individual man is not to be anything — think, and then thou art the whole
of humanity,
cogito ergo sum.»
Whitehead sees the
cogito as the paragon
of clear and distinct ideas, involving a fusion if not identity
of knower and known.
The people struggle to be subjects
of their cultural universe, with their spiritual self, thinking self (
cogito), vital self (psyche), feeing self, and perceiving self all forming integral parts
of their subjecthood, enabling them to experience and create their own religio - cultural realities.
The
cogito ergo sum
of the Christian view
of repentance is: Since I can repent, I am responsible.
Among Descartes» many contributions (he was a brilliant mathematician and scientist as well), the «
cogito» (as philosophers call it) remains his most significant contribution to the history
of ideas.