Sentences with phrase «of essence of a thing»

The discussion is good, but it loses a lot of the essence of those things that are experienced in the daytoday.

Not exact matches

Time is, as they say, of the essence, so the best thing to do is take a first step, however small, and begin today.

«We changed the things we believed were important to the consumer, but we did not change any of the things that were the essence of the organization.

The essence of this particular dilemma lies in answering this initial question: Even if the upside appears to be a sure thing, can you afford to accept your fate in the event that the worse - case scenario of a life decision implodes on you?

The GGSC suggests a practice adopted from Buddhist meditation and now backed up by science: «treating thoughts, whether negative or positive, more like smells, sights, tastes and sounds: things that arrive in your awareness, rather than things that constitute the essence of who you are.

«That's the essence of the whole Barclays thing, isn't it?

Aristotle originally describes knowledge as a grasp of cause and essence: to know a thing, we must know the four causes of its existence and the essential genus and difference of its species.

The fact that First Things published a long article on my book Mercy: The Essence of the Gospel and the Key to Christian Existence is an honor even when the article is a critique, which — as usual in academic disputes — needs critique from my side as well («What Mercy Is,» March).

If a person thinks that nature is wholly corrupt, that there is no natural morality knowable by human reason, that grace completely supplants nature, that the basis of morality is the divine command and not the essences of things as created by God — and some Protestant theologians can plausibly be read as having said such things — then all bets are off.

To that assessment this essay will contribute modestly by arguing (1) that an account of experience must be compatible with the fact that there is no one thing which is what experience is or is the essence of experience, (2) that no philosophically adequate account of what experience is can be established merely by appeal to direct, personal, intuitive experience of one's own experience, (3) that generalization from features found in human experience is not sufficient to justify the claim that temporality is essential to experience, but (4) that dialectical argument rather than intuition or generalization is necessary to support the claim that experience is essentially temporal.

The prospect of discerning an essence of experience in the bewildering mass of disparate things termed experience seems dismayingly remote by contrast with the direct access to the essence of experience which an intuitive and immediate grasp of one's experience would seem to offer.

Because totality is constituted by its completely adequate relativity, i.e., its inclusiveness of all things, it is in essence a unity - in - diversity, an aesthetic composition.

Instead, it is transcendent in that it is beyond finite things and the essence of finite things.

«They allege, finally, that our perennial philosophy is only a philosophy of immutable essences, while the contemporary mind must look to the existence of things and to life, which is ever in flux.»

The sophisticated response to this string of questions is to assert that there is no such thing as a human totality or essence, and leave it at that.

It is to be found in the love of that unique, boundless Essence which penetrates the inmost depths of all things and there, from within those depths, deeper than the mortal zone where individuals and multitudes struggle, works upon them and moulds them.

(2) The formal cause of a thing is for Aristotle its essence as expressed by its formula or definition.

Essence is based on the fullness of being or, which comes to the same thing, fullness of development or maturation.

The man who is wholly taken up with the demands of everyday living or whose sole interest is in the outward appearances of things seldom gains more than a glimpse, at best, of this second phase in our sense - perceptions, that in which the world, having entered into us, then withdraws from us and bears us away with it: he can have only a very dim awareness of that aureole, thrilling and inundating our being, through which is disclosed to us at every point of contact the unique essence of the universe.

The second thing that should be said regarding this meaning of the supernatural is that the surprising and frightening phenomena are really no different in essence from what is generally called «natural».

There, and from there, in him and through him we shall hold all things and have command of all things, we shall find again the essence and the splendour of all the flowers, the lights, we have had to surrender here and now in order to be faithful to life.

To achieve the essence of real externality, whether of time or space or dimension, one must forget that such things as organic life, good and evil, love and hate, and all such local attributes of a negligible and temporary race called mankind, have any existence at all.

That is, it is not of the essence of finite things to exist.

In very personal language, I believe that all things are progressing from the same divine source; that that source is the ground of all being and its essence is love and interdependence; that all human beings (all of life, really) are equal and beloved in its sight; that in response to that overarching, boundless love which ensures that no one is ever truly alone, I have a responsibility to assist in the creation of just and loving community here on Earth.

As Whitehead points out, this concept of substance mirrors the ordinary concept of a thing, according to which reality consists in «things» that are «simply located,» are isolated from one another, and manifest an unchanged, enduring essence, their very «substance,» that underlies their fixed or changeable determining conditions or «accidents.

The lack of self - sufficiency in finite things consists in the separability of essence and existence.

The above example is an example of indeterminacy at the level of knowing the essence of things: knowing what something is.

In addition to knowing essences (the «whatness» or quiddity of things) the intellect also reasons, deriving new truths from ones already known.

This statement can be understood in two ways: first, that concepts are entities that capture the essence of a given thing but remain aloof from its individuating material particulars (such as shape, size, colour); second, the concepts themselves do not have material characteristics: my concept of «tree» has no flavour, location, smell and so on.

It might be argued that the failure of thinkers to accept the data as they really are has been due to special factors such as their preoccupation with forms or essences and that common people have always viewed things as finite existents.

But with that is stated not at all everything and not the crucial thing about the essence of disease.

Cf. further Whitehead's note that the essence of a thing is to be prehensive, receptive, and relational (PR 41).

The essence of this, he wrote, «lies in the conviction which a Christian man possesses that every goad thing in him, every good thing he does, is somehow not wrought by himself but by God».23 Paul, for example, said, «By the grace of God I am what I am» (1 Cor.

It is true of Aristotle too: the dialectic of act and potency that, for sublunary beings, is inseparable from decay and death, or the scale of essences by which all things — especially various classes of persons — are assigned their places in the natural and social order.

Our Churches, with common consent, do teach that the decree of the Council of Nicaea concerning the Unity of the Divine Essence and concerning the Three Persons, is true and to be believed without any doubting; that is to say, there is one Divine Essence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the HolyEssence and concerning the Three Persons, is true and to be believed without any doubting; that is to say, there is one Divine Essence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the HolyEssence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the Holyessence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

The figures stay there, reclining in their recurring sequence, forever showing the essences in the nature of things.

The thing known is in an external relation to the known — the knowing does not constitute the essence of the object.

The above verse not only has the revelation of how the creation started but also has another scientific evidence (all in one verse) that water is at the essence of every living thing!

Each thing appears to the senses, and its essence shows to the mind; that is, they are both kinds of appearances.4

Luke 6:27 (Love you enemy) is not the only unique thing but is indeed the essence of Christianity.

The essence of that cosmology is that through it science has achieved for the first time in its history a contradiction - free discourse about the totality of consistently interacting things, or the universe.

Because the name is one with the essence of the thing named great care and ceremony were exercised in the giving of names; and we find reflected in the legends of Genesis an inordinate interest in the origin of ancient names of both places and people.

The essence of life is not to find the one thing that satisfies us but to realize that nothing can ever completely satisfy us.

«To support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they are going badly,» the latter wrote in 1925, «this, in spite of all that has been said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popular government.»

Can we reconceive theological education in such a way that (1) it clearly pertains to the totality of human life, in the public sphere as well as the private, because it bears on all of our powers; (2) it is adequate to genuine pluralism, both of the «Christian thing» and of the worlds in which the «Christian thing» is lived, by avoiding naiveté about historical and cultural conditioning without lapsing into relativism; (3) it can be the unifying overarching goal of theological education without requiring the tacit assumption that there is a universal structure or essence to education in general, or theological inquiry in particular, which inescapably denies genuine pluralism by claiming to be the universal common denominator to which everything may be reduced as variations on a theme; and (4) it can retrieve the strengths of both the «Athens» and the «Berlin» types of excellent schooling, without unintentionally subordinating one to the other?

Santayana thus identifies two aspects of mind or spirit, intuition of essences and intent directed upon things and processes in the natural world, and conceives knowledge as arising from their combination (see ED 350, 663 - 665 and 726).

And it is precisely the holding of such external relations between them which constitutes them as existing things — without such relations they would simply be their essences (RB 278).

On the face of it Santayana rejects all three of these departures from the tradition, since (1) he makes no very explicit move from a continuant to an event ontology, (2) regards the inherent nature of an object as a matter of the individual eternal essence which it actualizes and (3) regards the distinction between matter and form as at least a virtually inevitable way of expressing the obscure manner in which one state of things takes over from another (see RB 278 - 284).

It is because he fears that speaking of pure essences as existing will encourage assimilation of their status to that of efficacious particular things that he insists that so long as they stick within their own eternal realm they only have pure being.

The very essence of Christian conduct consists, not in refraining from bad things, but in actively doing good things, and not just for our friends, but for our enemies as well.