SB 440 Provides rebuttable presumption
of judicial recusal where party, attorney, or law firm in case gave 25 % of all contributions to judge's campaign.
Not exact matches
«If any district attorney believes he or she is unable to prosecute a particular case, there is a well - established
judicial process for
recusal and the appointment
of a special prosecutor.»
[4] The petitions sought to amend the
Judicial Code
of Conduct to provide that
recusal is not required in a proceeding based solely on any endorsement or receipt
of a lawful campaign contribution from a party or entity involved in the proceeding.
These decisions led to the formation
of the Joint Legislative Council Special Committee on
Judicial Discipline and
Recusal («Special Committee») to study the two issues and recommend legislation to the full Legislature.
The
judicial recusal issue gained national prominence last year when the Supreme Court
of the United States issued its 5 - 4 decision, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. [2] Caperton involved an extreme set
of facts.
According to Justice Roggensack, to impose
judicial recusal rules in such circumstances would «nullify the constitutional vote
of the contributor, or the lawful choice
of the appointer, or chill the lawful speech
of those who make independent communications during the course
of a campaign for
judicial office.»
I mentioned last month the raft
of legislation filed in the Wisconsin Assembly dealing with
judicial recusal, including proposals to require
recusal for certain campaign contributions as well as giving the supreme court the ability to force a justice off a case.
The bill would require
recusal by any judge or justice «when a party or party's attorney to the proceeding before the judge was a member
of the appellate
judicial commission or a circuit
judicial commission who nominated the judge.»
They include making a complaint to the Canadian
Judicial Council, seeking McLachlin's
recusal from the Nadon matter before the Supreme Court, and, in the most extreme and unlikely
of cases, trying to have a judge removed from office.
It has been argued that
judicial fundraising has the undesired potential
of contributing to an excessive number
of recusals.
The most recent American Bar Association Model Code
of Judicial Conduct instructs judges to disclose any potential conflicts
of interest and requires
recusal when campaign contributions exceed a certain amount.
In the wake
of the Caperton decision, a few states strengthened their
recusal rules, but most states have not responded to the ethical dilemmas that have emerged as campaign cash has flooded
judicial elections.
Unlike laws allowing legislatures to override court rules or giving politicians more control over
judicial selection,
recusal rules govern the ethics
of judges, and they are only necessary in states in which the high courts have failed to respond adequately to the swelling tide
of campaign cash.