Already, the English courts have signalled a limited retreat from the advances widely thought to have been accomplished by Anisminic — in Cart the UK Supreme Court did not employ the concept
of jurisdictional error to determine how to control alleged illegalities committed by the Upper Tribunal and preferred to rely on pragmatic considerations to limit the scope of review.
[x] Some current considerations should probably not be used such as the notion
of jurisdictional error.
It strikes down the right of the Workers» Compensation Appeal Tribunal (WCAT) to reconsider its own decisions on the basis
of jurisdictional error, and it potentially broadens the scope of judicial review, to permit reviewing judges to re-weigh the evidence that was before the tribunal.
The concept
of jurisdictional error, with its teaching that on some matters an administrative decision - maker must be correct or face judicial intervention, has usually been at the eye of the storm.
Anisminic is generally held as establishing the centrality
of jurisdictional error in English administrative law.
Not exact matches
«On the grounds
of lack
of jurisdiction», he continued, «I think the Applicant has not satisfied this court that the high court judge committed any
jurisdictional error to warrant the intervention
of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court
of Canada has been feverishly productive in the field
of administrative law since the Fall
of 2011, rendering decisions on standard
of review (questions
of law,
jurisdictional error and labour arbitrators), the right to reasons, issue estoppel, attempts to pre-empt the administrative decision - making process, and review
of municipal by - laws.
The Court
of Appeal found that it was an
error for the joint trial to have occurred, but dismissed the appeal on the basis that the
jurisdictional error could be cured by s. 686 (1)(b)(iv)
of the Criminal Code.
One can attach the label «
jurisdictional error» to this list, but the contents
of the list are
of greater practical importance: hence the emergence shortly afterwards
of Lord Diplock's GCHQ typology
of legality, rationality and procedural propriety; * and the notion that public law is concerned with controlling «abuse
of power».
First, the demise
of the distinction between
jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional error of law, along with the eradication in Ridge v Baldwin
of the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions, paved the way for the development
of a unified set
of principles —
of legality, rationality and procedural propriety —
of judicial review
of administrative action.
A decision can be challenged through the process
of appeal or judicial review if there is a
jurisdictional error.
An
error in an evidentiary ruling on an element
of the offence is not a
jurisdictional error that is reviewable.
Various «standards»
of review apply in Australia to the
errors which may constitute
jurisdictional errors — though they are generally not referred to as «standards» and are not open to judicial selection.
Despite Bastarache and LeBel JJ's description
of the distinction between
jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional errors (and the courts approach to determining which category a given
error fell into) as «formalistic» and «artificial» (at [43]-RRB-, the way this distinction has developed in Australian law in recent decades in fact shares much in common with the standard
of review analysis described in Dunsmuir.
It dismissed the appeal, however, on the basis that the
jurisdictional error could be cured by s. 686 (1)(b)(iv)
of the Code.
Doubtless influenced by that consideration, the House
of Lords in Anisminic did anything but give effect to the «plain words»
of the ouster clause, deciding that it did not protected determinations disclosing a
jurisdictional error on the part
of the decision - maker.
Citing Groberman JA's reasons for the Court in CSWU, Local 1611 v. SELI Canada Inc. 2011 BCCA 353, the dissent noted that Canadian courts have accepted that some
errors in the course
of a hearing will be
jurisdictional in nature, and that unreasonable
errors of law or fact can be
errors of jurisdiction.
In 2003, the Court
of Appeal in Powell Estate v. British Columbia (Workers» Compensation Board) held that the Appeal Division
of the Board, which predated WCAT, had the jurisdiction following Chandler to reconsider a case to correct its own
jurisdictional error.
She also considered whether «
jurisdictional defect» includes not only true questions
of jurisdiction but also excesses
of jurisdiction such as
errors of fact, law, or discretion offending the applicable standard
of review.
In the dissenting judges» view, patent unreasonableness as preserved in the ATA constitutes an
error of jurisdiction, and is thus a
jurisdictional defect for the purposes
of s. 53
of the ATA.
This post follows on from my post on «
Jurisdictional Error and Administrative Law Values ``... There have been many formulations
of Wednesbury unreasonableness over the years.
So we've suffered through categorizations into
jurisdictional error and non-
jurisdictional error, legislative, administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial decisions, categories
of correctness, reasonableness and patent unreasonableness and, now, categories
of correctness and reasonableness.
And the author
of the noteworthy comments in Jones was, as Sir Robert Carnwath, the first Senior President
of Tribunals appointed under the 2007 Act; in other words, due to historical happenstance, a jurist well placed to appreciate the effects
of the 2007 Act found himself involved in a case raising important questions about
jurisdictional error and was able to deliver an important reasoned judgment.