Sentences with phrase «of liberal democracy in»

Not exact matches

«Today's Summit will underline that we remain committed to defending our people and upholding our values as liberal democracies in the face of any threat, whether at home or abroad,» May said in a statement Wednesday night.

Trump does not believe in liberal democracy and his voters do not believe in liberal democracy, and that makes the liberal press part of the opposition.

The Liberals, NDP and Bloc argued somewhat persuasively that the Conservatives were in contempt of Parliament over their disdain for democracy, openness and accountability.

So what Gerecht seems to be talking himself towards is the idea that now that the coup has occurred the slender opportunity for liberal democracy to take root and grow in Egypt, and perhaps even in the entire Islamic world, given the now - evident failure of the Ataturk project in Turkey, has passed.

In refusing to impose the details of justice from afar the liberal political cultures would not be abandoning principles, for «self - determination» in the political sense is not just a principle of modern democracIn refusing to impose the details of justice from afar the liberal political cultures would not be abandoning principles, for «self - determination» in the political sense is not just a principle of modern democracin the political sense is not just a principle of modern democracy.

To the extent that full - blooded socialism is returning to compete with liberal democracy for the allegiance of modern persons, it does so in populist garb — and in the future, its....

In this stimulating collection of essays written while he served on the President's Council on Bioethics, Peter Augustine Lawler proves himself again one of liberal democracy's most perceptive friendly critics.

In our time, or so the argument runs, liberal democracy has attained such extraordinary power and widespread acceptance that it has come to be thought of as the only legitimate form of government.

They will of course be judged by courts typically secularist in mindset and now at the cutting edge of introducing a new, inappropriatelylabelled, «liberal democracy».

The judge could find no support for the position of Ms Ladele in a «modern liberal democracy».

He seems to assume that Christian culture and politics in other parts of the world can be understood through categories derived from the past 200 years of Western liberal democracy and misses the fact that these communities have histories of their own.

The inability of the Gallicanist state to co-opt Catholicism's social energy exposed a tension inherent in liberal democracy: between the people empowered as a sovereign whole, on one hand, and those partial societies of individuals which diversify the nation, on the other.

Liberal democracy has not always been in this situation; the collapse of sexual morals is relatively recent.

The result was that in the West, especially in Europe, Communists were able to pose, at least temporarily, as champions of liberal democracy.

Ordinary citizens are complicit in all of the appetites and short - sightedness of liberal consumer democracy.

In my view, no thinker better highlights the necessity or dignity of intermediary associations (a conservative theme par excellence) nor provides a deeper account of the dependence of modern liberal democracy upon the «moral capital» of premodern times.

In each case, the pattern of democracy they have chosen reflects some variation of a now - existent Western liberal democratic form.

One of the things about Japan that matters, I'd say, is how we see liberal democracy working itself out in a decidedly non-Western, yet otherwise very modern, nation.

Orwin says what ends up happening for traditional religious believers in a liberal democracy is they have to settle for a watered down version of their practice e.g. Catholic Lite, Jewish Lite etc..

It is represented in our day by liberal arts colleges, the Masons, Rotary, life insurance, Religion in American Life, the Anti-Defamation League, the League of Women Voters, Reader's Digest, the Jaycees, the Pro-Choice Movement, Robert Schuller, the WCTU, Common Cause, savings banks, the Moral Majority, William Buckley, the Institute for Religion and Democracy - and many preachers of the mainline denominations.

This breadth of scope is the basis for a program of liberal studies in a pluralistic democracy in which all the citizens are expected to participate.

Consider, for example, the implications of our belief in the political and moral superiority of liberal democracy.

Orwin goes on to say that Liberal Democracy doesn't work like that in practice because it actually assumes a particular conception of the good: «For so long as you observe prevailing liberal democratic norms on all fundamental social questions, you're free in merely secondary matters to continue in the ways of your ancestors.Liberal Democracy doesn't work like that in practice because it actually assumes a particular conception of the good: «For so long as you observe prevailing liberal democratic norms on all fundamental social questions, you're free in merely secondary matters to continue in the ways of your ancestors.liberal democratic norms on all fundamental social questions, you're free in merely secondary matters to continue in the ways of your ancestors.»

The assumptions undergirding our democracy are a somewhat paradoxical amalgamation, characterized by a free - flowing sense of moral relativism, a laissez - faire individualism and a fairly profound liberal sense of social responsibility: It is difficult enough to make sense out of these dogmas without considering our Christian faith in the saving power of Christ's cross.

They are sojourners, aliens in a strange land; their task is that of demythologizing and debunking all ideological idolatry (whether Marxism or capitalism, liberal democracy or conservatism).46.

Soviet spies were of the left generally, they supported liberal causes, they defended the Soviet Union in all circumstances, they were often secret members of the Communist Party, they were uniformly suspicious of American initiatives throughout the world, they could be contemptuous of American democracy, society, and culture, and, above all, their offenses were often minimized or explained away by apologists who felt that no man should be called traitor who did what he did for the cause of humanity.

But Ober is more interested in confronting modern liberal and post-liberal «democracy» with the genuine ancient ideal, the Athenian «people power» of the fifth and fourth centuries b.c., on which he has had so many original and persuasive things to say since publishing Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens in 1989.

The government of a liberal democracy is like every other government in that it coerces its citizens in all kinds of ways for the common good — the dominant form of this coercion being taxation.

I think it is appropriate in our liberal democracy for Christians, along with adherents of other religions, to make decisions about political issues on the basis of whatever considerations they find true and relevant.

Even Richard Rorty, who is not a great religious mind, thinks that the success of liberal democracies lies in the creative tensions between «the agents of love» and «the agents of justice,» explained more or less in this way.

If Marxism and secular ideologies of liberal democracy were turning points, the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been historic too.

In the Introduction to his Declaration, Kurtz shows an understanding of the relationships among secular humanism and the Enlightenment, (liberal) democracy, and the Catholic Church:

The class interest, within the political spectrum of Western democracies, is on the left; in America this means «liberal,» in current terminology.

They take pride in the contribution of Protestantism to liberal democracy.

Peter learned two things from the dissidents: the notion of «living in the truth»; and the disconcerting thought that Communism and Western liberal democracy had things in common, modern science to begin with, that challenged human freedom and dignity.

The few available attempts to link Whiteheadian metaphysics with political categories can be illustrated in the works of A. H. Johnson and Samuel Beer.1 Essentially, they become exercises in identifying which existing political alternative — liberal democracy, social - revolutionary democracy, fascism, etc. — is most synonymous with Whitehead's formulations.

Croce contrasted the «democracy of the eighteenth century as mechanical, intellectualist, and abstractly egalitarian, whereas the «liberalism» of the early nineteenth century was personal, idealistic, and historically organic: «The democrats in their political ideal postulated a religion of quantity, of mechanics, of calculating reason or of nature, like that of the eighteenth century; the liberals, a religion of quality, of activity, of spirituality, such as that which had risen in the beginning of the nineteenth century: so that even in this case, the conflict was one of religious faiths.

When Ignatieff quickly adds that in a liberal democracy all use of force is a lesser evil, something has, it seems to me, gone wildly astray.

But if endowments are conceived solely as instruments, rather than equal partners with the state in pursuit of the public good, then the classic principle of private association in liberal democracies has been lost, for instrumentality implies that government alone is the public good's ultimate arbiter.

The form of argument in this presentation has emphasized several specific points: first, that the Asian values argument, as a challenge to the implementation of constitutional democracy, is exaggerated and fails to account for the richness of values discourse in the East Asian region - local values do not provide a justification for harsh authoritarian practices; second, that the cultural prerequisites arguments fail because they ignore the discursive processes for value development and they are tautological, excessively deterministic and ignore the importance of human agency it, therefore, makes little sense to take an entry test for constitutional democracy; third, the difficulties of importing Western communitarian ideas into an East Asian authoritarian environment without adequate liberal constitutional safeguards; fourth, the positive role of constitutionalism in constructing empowering conversations in modern democratic development and as a venue for values discourse; fifth, the importance, especially in a cross-cultural context, of indigenization of constitutionalism through local institutional embodiment; and sixth, the value of extending research focused on the positive engendering or enabling function of constitutionalism to the developmental context in general and East Asia in particular.

When you're talking about Revelation you're talking about Jesus» Second Coming, and there are a lot of Christians who think that their religion wouldn't be worth the effort unless they personally got to see their Lord and Savior slaughter all the liberals and end democracy like it says in that book.

An early work in political thought influenced by Whitehead's philosophy that stresses reason, individual freedom, and liberal democracy is Samuel H. Beers The City of Reason (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949).

Trump's shocking victory, his ascension to the Presidency, is a sickening event in the history of the United States and liberal democracy.»

But it is imperative not to lose sight of the way that the leaders of the Leave campaign used popular discontent in order to manipulate democracy in pursuit of their own political goals, and in order to legitimise a political culture that challenges the survival of liberal and progressive ideals.

In brief, I extract the minimal secular core of liberal democracy.

-- which invites answers measuring how well non-western countries fare in relation to a presumed model of western secularism — I start from liberal democratic ideals and assume that they are not ethnocentric: human rights, freedom, equality and democracy are universal aspirations.

The Catalan case constitutes a clear empirical point of reference within the sphere of comparative politics on secessionist processes in liberal democracies, and constitutes a dynamic element in the European Union in an increasingly globalised world.

Most of these needs are found in liberal democracy paradigms to different degrees — although not all — which serve to explain the inequalities and disenfranchisement in some of these societies.

In addition, the existence of marginalized communities in Western democratic societies, which stand as the pinnacle of the liberal democracy model, as well as some contested international policies of some democracies in recent history, have questioned the mythology of the liberal order in its current form as an aspiration of all peoples and the natural course of historIn addition, the existence of marginalized communities in Western democratic societies, which stand as the pinnacle of the liberal democracy model, as well as some contested international policies of some democracies in recent history, have questioned the mythology of the liberal order in its current form as an aspiration of all peoples and the natural course of historin Western democratic societies, which stand as the pinnacle of the liberal democracy model, as well as some contested international policies of some democracies in recent history, have questioned the mythology of the liberal order in its current form as an aspiration of all peoples and the natural course of historin recent history, have questioned the mythology of the liberal order in its current form as an aspiration of all peoples and the natural course of historin its current form as an aspiration of all peoples and the natural course of history.

Guaranteeing dignity for all, at all times and under all circumstances, is inclusive of all democratic principles in the first place, while simultaneously addressing inequality, something most liberal democracies tackle insufficiently.