Sentences with phrase «of logical propositions»

This theory of propositions (PR 184 - 207) is remarkable for the co-author of Principia Mathematica since it abandons its claim that the subjects of logical propositions can be imaginary.

Not exact matches

In other words, mainstream political science has insisted upon the logical independence of fact and value, such that only propositions about facts can be properly called true or false, and the study of political facts is «value - neutral» or «value - free.»

Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.

If so, the initial phase of the subjective aim is also the feeling of a proposition of which the occasion itself is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object the predicate.

This means that whereas a proposition must properly conform to the nexus to which it refers independently of the experience of any particular occasion, and is a logical type, a judgment is concerned with the conformity of components within one particular occasion, and is an emotional type.

In a proposition, «The definite set of actual entities involved are called the «logical subjects of the proposition»; and the definite set of eternal objects involved are called the «predicates of the proposition.»

In that case, in interpreting a body of propositions hitherto believed to be about the supposed entities, we can substitute the logical structure without altering any of the details of the body of propositions in question.

The subject of a proposition (the «logical subject») is in a sense a really existing subject.

The fact that a contingent event is future introduces an intellectual complication — namely, how, in the absence of causal sequence, certainty can be present in the divine mind — but that does not affect the logical status of the proposition.

Again, the principle of sufficient reason is not congruent with the most elementary logical truths, for instance that propositions may be such that one proposition, p, implies the other, q, but not conversely; or they may be mutually independent.

Predicates of propositions (the «logical predicates») speak about possibility, though not about sheer possibility.

It is not situated on the logical level of empirically verifiable or tautological propositions, but on a different logical level.

A proposition proposes that certain select matters of fact, called «logical subjects,» be interpreted, or theorized about, in terms of a particular «predicate.»

We should also note that Hartshorne must be very careful as to just what set of propositions he alleges to have this tight logical interconnection.

This suggestion «that functions of propositions are always truth - functions» (PM xiv) was made in his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (TLP), a non-Platonic, tight - knit, precise logical system that had a tangential but critical influence on the logical positivist movement.

The logical subjects, however, are not capable of doing more than indicating how the proposition could be realized: if the logical subjects to which the predicative pattern refers could, in themselves, make the proposition «tell tales» as to its ingression, it would be to cast the world's lot in advance, it would be to prescribe exhaustively creative unfolding and thus vitiate creativity.

The proposition is the potentiality of an assigned predicative pattern finding realization in indicated logical subjects (PR 24/35, 186/283, 257f / 393f, 261/398).

«Thus no actual entity can feel a proposition, if its actual world does not include the logical subjects of that proposition» (PR 259/396; cf. 203/309, 260/397).

The subjective aim, which as Ford clarifies it, is a proposition whose logical subjects indicate the past actual world the novel occasion is to unify, guides the feeling of the nascent subject, the source of which, for Whitehead, is God (DP 292n9).

The restrictive abstractness of the predicative pattern, and the abstract definiteness of the indicative logical subjects provide the necessary indeterminacy and determinacy for a proposition to be true or false.

If the proposition does not already contain the locus of the prehending subject and logical subject, the proposition can not be entertained.

While the objectified facts are invested with a certain levity, no longer fully sedimented, the logical subjects as an indicative system, on the other hand, restrict the freedom of the proposition to apply to any actual entity in absolute generality.

Rather, in the unity of the proposition, actual entities assume the form of «logical subjects» and eternal objects are transformed into the «predicative pattern.»

To understand this statement it is imperative that we tease propositions out of their purely logical domain.

The intrinsic togetherness of the indicated state of affairs as logical subject and the assigned predicative pattern in their potentiality for realization is phenomenologically distinct from the eventual truth or falsity of the proposition.

Yet a proposition regarded simply in terms of its logical subjects admits too much vagueness to have a de facto truth value.

It is to realize that the proposition regarded simply in terms of its logical subjects is vague in the sense of poly - valence and that to become what it is, the proposition requires valuation, i.e., an interpretive matrix.

Quite simply, a proposition is true when the logical subjects do in fact exemplify the predicative pattern, or differently stated, when a member of the proposition's locus admits the proposition into feeling in such a way that the predicative pattern actually conforms to the indicative logical subjects.

To recapitulate: the two subjects embraced by the proposition, the logical subject in a potential predicative pattern and the prehending, e.g., entertaining subject; the two correlative conditions for the truth and falsity of propositions, the fact that they both «can» and «must» be true or false; the fact that a proposition is a «real possibility» for an «entertaining subject,» gives to the proposition its fundamental trait: according to Whitehead, a proposition is a lure for feeling.3

Rather, in the provocative words of «The Metaphysical Scheme of March 1927,» a proposition «contains» two subjects, the logical subject and the «percipient subject» for whom the proposition is or is not a valid element in experience; a proposition is not only about its logical subject, but is for any one of its percipient subjects, and thus relevant for the future (MS 321, 322).

The indicative character of logical subjects disciplines the scope of the predicative pattern; they enjoy the function as «food for possibility» and enable the proposition to refer to the actuality of the world, to existential particularity.

A proposition is not simply that fusion or «contrast» of predicative patterns and logical subjects, for it does not «contain» only one subject, i.e., the logical subject.

But this, he says, only establishes the logical, asymmetrical dependence of propositions, not the ontological or causal interdependence of individuals.

The interesting question in the present context is what the logical necessity of mathematical propositions reveals about the nature of man.

@Chad, Begging the question is a type of logical fallacy in which a proposition relies on an implicit premise within itself to establish the truth of that same proposition.

The freedom of definition and postulation, and the logical necessity of mathematical propositions, are in no way incompatible.

There is not only a kind of logical scandal in asserting both p and not - p, where p is any proposition, but also a conviction that such a contradiction is an impossibility in the domain of existent things.

The logical subjects of the proposition are all those actual occasions constituting its past world.

The basic elements of an imaginative proposition are named: the origin of the logical subjects from one portion of the original (objectified) nexus and the eternal object (for the predicate) from another part of the nexus.

This much is obvious to any geometer, and it simply seems to me that Russell had the genius to recognize that, in like manner, propositions about other propositions had to be understood as of a logical order at least one «step» beyond that of the propositions they described.

It is at least one logical order «beyond» the class of entities it describes, and is thus not itself necessarily described by the set of properties it ascribes to the class of propositions it is characterizing.

It would make more sense to reconceive initial subjective aims in terms of propositional feelings.9 The indicated logical subjects of the proposition can specify the standpoint (PR 283) whereas a pure eternal object can not.

This provides the matrix, as a body of first principles, judged as coherent and logical depending on the manner in which each proposition requires the others in systematic interconnection.2 However, as a whole, the theses of the system must be confronted with the facts of experience.

3 The logical calculus is formulated first in terms of propositions and propositional functions and is soon expanded into a formal theory of classes and relations until the topics gradually become more specific to the point of a purely logical theory of cardinal and ordinal numbers.

Logical proofs are closed, self - contained systems of propositions, whereas science is empirical and deals with nature as it exists.

He continues: «Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.

But is «logical force» the right category for the function of propositions in Whitehead's theory of perception?

In asking about the «logical force» of propositions, however, Kelsey is not interested in the customary importance logicians place on the cognitive value of propositions, as his term «injunction» indicates.

Although the attachment of a feeling of promise, for good or ill, to a proposition in the context of an entity's self - creation might suggest that the «logical force» of propositions is an ethical one, it could just as easily be thought of as an aesthetic one.

In interpretation, the reader entertains propositions whose logical subjects include entities in the reader's (and author's) past world; only as such do they become components of the interpreter's «forms of subjectivity»; so there is always an element of objective reference.