It works and we all know it works, but people don't admire it... It is the soul
of modern liberal democracy and it remains unsung in praise».
It is a saying long since become trite but still true of the thought
of modern liberal students of the Bible, that the Bible is not in its entirety the word of God, but that the Bible does contain the word of God.
This trajectory suggests that the Balmesian tradition is largely correct to see the development
of modern liberal culture as an integral set of often anti-religious social structures, and to see this culture as closely linked to the dynamics of Christian division.
For the burning question for Hauerwas is now clearly this one: How can the Christian church live with integrity and in faithful witness to the God revealed to it in the history of Israel and the life, death and resurrection of Jesus in the midst
of modern liberal society where narcissism and nationalism threaten its very existence?
Frei gave most of his attention to the varieties of liberalism, but his verdict applied equally to most forms
of modern liberal and conservative theology.
This type of interpretation starts with Schleiermacher, the father
of modern liberal theology, in the early part of the nineteenth century.
«One of the effects
of modern liberal Protestantism has been gradually to turn religion into poetry and therapy, to make truth vaguer and vaguer and more and more relative, to banish intellectual distinctions, to depend on feeling instead of thought, and gradually to come to believe that God has no power, that he can not communicate with us, can not reveal himself to us, indeed has not done so and that religion is our own sweet invention» (p. 479).
It's certainly more in line with a lot
of modern liberal thought than modern conservative thought.
The world's ambiguity is a central theme
of modern liberal consciousness, and the openness and tolerance required to confront it are central liberal values.
Castro was not a «progressive» and Mao did not represent the Leftist turn
of the modern liberal movement.
In my view, no thinker better highlights the necessity or dignity of intermediary associations (a conservative theme par excellence) nor provides a deeper account of the dependence
of modern liberal democracy upon the «moral capital» of premodern times.
Brian C. Anderson has it right that capitalism is part of our moral problem but, like Francis Fukuyama, follows up a discouraging diagnosis
of modern liberal democracy with an optimistic remedy for its potentially fatal diseases.
Perhaps Mr. Anderson should consider drawing upon the moral and political wellsprings
of modern liberal democracy itself.
* It's telling
of the modern Liberals» more leftward tilt that Trudeau refers to the anti-pipeline side, rather than the pro- side, as his friends.
For one thing, what we call «libertarianism» in USA today was originally called «classical liberalism» - and AFAIK is still called that in Europe (don't tell
any of the modern liberals in America who get allergic reaction from a mention of Mises or Ayn Rand:) If you mean «modern...
Not exact matches
It's incorrect but the charge results from how
modern liberals tend to favour government intervention on poverty issues while conservatives focus more on opportunity; the latter just do a lousy job
of connecting the dots for the public.
Restorative punishment, much like other practices
of reconciliation, retrieves the distinctive logic
of a religious tradition and brings it to bear upon
modern liberal democracy.
I'm genuinely curious to know
of surveys saying that young people are leaving
liberal denominations because they aren't interested in social justice, the findings
of modern science, and creating a welcoming environment for LGBT people.
A theory
of constitutional law that may be out
of fashion in today's legal academy, but that fits comfortably within the
modern conservative and the traditional
liberal views
of the courts, begins with certain basic premises: the existence
of law and the possibility
of meaningful rules
of law.
Modern Family and the Simpsons are the child
of liberal ideology.
But there is perhaps a use we might make
of the postmodern in apologetics, for the collapse
of modernity may allow believers to speak once again about God without defensiveness or self - consciousness, may allow believers both to escape political categorization as
liberal or conservative and to escape the
modern view that sees political categories as fundamental.
In refusing to impose the details
of justice from afar the
liberal political cultures would not be abandoning principles, for «self - determination» in the political sense is not just a principle
of modern democracy.
Our preaching and theology has been one ceaseless effort to conform to the canons
of intelligibility produced by the economic and intellectual formations characteristic
of modern and
liberal societies.
I do find it puzzling, however, to watch theologians, both conservative and
liberal, come to the defense
of the human, the rational, objectivity, the «text,» «moral values,» science, and all the other conceits the
modern university cherishes in the name
of «humanism.»
For Gilkey, the «neo»
of his orthodoxy is precisely where he remained most
liberal» not just his penchant for talking about biblical symbols and myths but also his conviction that the problem
of historical consciousness is the context for all
modern theology.
To the extent that full - blooded socialism is returning to compete with
liberal democracy for the allegiance
of modern persons, it does so in populist garb — and in the future, its....
Dalahäst So, like I said, you are actually a product
of our
modern, more
liberal, egalitarian society, but you are insisting on giving credit for this to «Christianity», as if Christianity has always lined up with your beliefs.
The
liberal churches need their own particular language
of faith to communicate with the cultured despisers
of the
modern world, in a manner that lays claim upon the self and the community.»
In any case, an equation
of private with preferential was historically effected by the alliance between
liberal thought and
modern economics.
The target is, rather, those forms
of broader
modern liberalism which have produced certain ways
of thinking about faith and the church which can be found in both conservative and in so - called «
liberal» churches.
In his previous, more historical studies, Walsh explored overlooked sources, often outside the
liberal canon, that made the value
of personal experience central to
modern political thought.
This is a sort
of religiosity that it is difficult for
modern, secular people to understand and appreciate; she goes against the grain not only
of the more obvious kind
of rationalistic secularism embodied in Rayber but against all
of the best in
liberal Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant.
From the beginning, we have believed that the Spirit given on the day
of Pentecost causes both «sons and daughters to prophesy»... We had no connections to
liberal social movements, but were demonstrating racial equality in pockets all around the world years before the
modern civil rights movement.
The judge could find no support for the position
of Ms Ladele in a «
modern liberal democracy».
As that quote suggests, Caldecott was profoundly critical
of much in the
modern world, but he was far more interested in the Christian cure than in describing the history and extent
of the
liberal - Enlightenment disease.
Would those thus indoctrinated by the hate speech
of liberal hypocrisy (which
modern societies seem to embrace so readily) treat the Christians with love and kindness or with fear and intimidation?
Conservatives (who are often early
modern liberals in outlook and temperament) sometimes look fondly at the purifying effects
of «severe struggle,» substituting economic for natural battle.
In agreement with most nonteleological expressions in the
liberal political tradition, this theory affirms that rights articulate a universal or natural moral law; but, against the persisting weight
of the
modern natural law tradition, the universal right to general emancipation is not bound to the assertion that human rights are independent
of any inclusive good.
Assuming these traits are fundamental to the American political mind, most political theorists see this as reflecting the classical
liberal mind — distinct from the «
modern liberal» view which accepts the legitimacy
of the welfare state — not a conservative mind.
OR, maybe some, even just a few, will start to recognize that Progressives /
Liberals are more in line w / the teachings
of Jesus Christ as found in the Four Gospels & that their Religous / Political leaders are
Modern Day Pharisees.
«Scattered throughout these essays are self - affixed labels such as «we anti-representationists,» «we Western
liberal intellectuals,» «we partisans
of solidarity,» «we pragmatists,» «we new fuzzies,» «us shepherds
of Being,» «we enlightened post-Kuhnians,» «we anti-essentialists,» «we
moderns,» «we humans,» «we bourgeois
liberals,» «we Deweyans,» «we pragmatic Wittgensteinean therapists.»
The bewildering proliferation
of theologies in the last quarter
of the 20th century contrasts sharply with the blends
of liberal, existential and neo-orthodox theologies outlined by H. R. Mackintosh in his Types
of Modern Theology in the second quarter
of this century.
This is a far cry from
liberal theology's effort to adapt Christianity to the
modern world and make sense
of culture on terms relevant to a rather confident secular and scientific age.
That the meager theological fare
of liberal Protestantism was still enough to prompt people like himself to gather regularly just to say thank you to God was perverse evidence for Updike that the
modern world still left room for miracles.
Well Rick, then I guess that, just as with
modern people
of African descent,
liberals are way more genetically diverse than everyone else.
But Altizer may well be right in his comment that process theologians are «clearly related to the social world
of modern American
liberal Protestantism» (TA 199).
Rorty calls us «the
liberal Rawlsian searchers for consensus» and «the community
of the
liberal intellectuals
of the secular
modern West» (CIS 12).
A similar fate has overtaken
modern liberal philosophical and theological schemas, (such as those
of Hegel, Schleiermacher, Troeltsch and Rahner) on the relationship
of Christianity to the other religions.
One
of the things about Japan that matters, I'd say, is how we see
liberal democracy working itself out in a decidedly non-Western, yet otherwise very
modern, nation.
Under
modern conditions, with changes occurring so rapidly that most specific occupational preparation becomes quickly out
of date, it even appears that a fundamental
liberal education is the best vocational education, for it develops the powers
of imagination needed to meet new situations and the understanding
of interrelationships required by life in an increasingly interdependent civilization.