God is in no way, directly or indirectly, the cause
of moral evil.176 He permits it, however, because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it: (396, 1849)
We have come to a realization of the depth and recalcitrance
of moral evil in ourselves and in all men, to a recognition of the limitations implicit in our finitude, to an understanding of the realities of man's political, economic and social life, which make any easy optimism impossible.
Since one of the most famous exponents of process thought has called the western notion of substance a chief cause
of moral evil and selfishness in the western world (WVR 6), it is astonishing that another famous process philosopher should have tried a reconciliation between process thought, with its emphasis on relations and actions, and Aristotelian substantialism, with its emphasis on things and states of being.3
Within the traditional free will framework, process theists contend, the primary responsibility is arguably God's, given the twofold fact that God's gift of freedom to human beings is arbitrary and that, with regard to any instance
of moral evil, God could have prevented it.
Few will deny, for example, that Paul's theology represents with something approaching adequacy the fact and meaning of sin in human life — the reality
of moral evil, the universal blight it brings, man's hopeless entanglement with it, the perverse and rebellious pride, deep in our nature, which degrades us, distorts our efforts, mars even our best moral achievements, and from which we know God must save us if we are to be saved at all.
1970) and Cosmic Love and Human Wrong (New York: Paulist Press, 1978): perhaps I may refer the reader to them for a fuller treatment
of moral evil and sin.
If, on the plane
of moral evil rather than physical or «natural» evil, one replies that with the real freedom of the free will goes the real power of personal sanctifying grace to sweeten and transform our personalities if we will allow Him, the rejoinder comes, «well, yes, but if He is almighty why does He not stop me from sinning and going to hell?»
Assuming that God is incapable
of moral evil, Lombardo uses philosophy to lend greater precision to discussions of God's will and intentions and of the human will of Jesus.
This question of the physical evil in the world leads us naturally on to the question
of moral evil, which poses at least as difficult a question, even though it is sometimes argued that they are but different manifestations of the same thing.
(6) God can not make a person (P) significantly free with respect to an action (A) and yet causally determine or bring it about that P go right with respect to A — i.e., to create creatures capable of moral good, God must create creatures capable
of moral evil.
What motivated these German anti-Nazis to resist the powerful Hitler regime is an important object lesson for more precisely locating the roots
of the moral evil of Nazism by understanding the source of its antitheses (malum privatio boni est).
Not exact matches
The youth appear uninterested in carrying any longer the burden
of national
moral responsibility for the
evils of the Third Reich, and the hard - working people
of Europe are disenchanted with the concept
of toiling to keep idle Greeks and Portuguese at the beach on their state benefits that began when they retired prematurely from unproductive state jobs.
Money may be an
evil, he said during a recent visit to Stanford Graduate School
of Business, but he urged students to «get the money, and don't lose your
moral compass when you do.»
As the 1986 Vatican «Letter to the Bishops
of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care
of Homosexual Persons» stated, the homosexual inclination is «ordered toward an intrinsic
moral evil» and is therefore an «objective disorder.»
Still, as Carl points out, the
moral drama
of GENESIS is an indispensable part
of MUD's fidelity to the realities
of good and
evil.
The character
of God is establishing order,
moral codes (they fail to keep) and restraining
evil according to their fictional writings.
It's only by convincing his followers that his immoral acts are
moral that you come to believe that we are somehow misunderstanding gods
evil acts and that if we only read the bible again we'd somehow see that when he killed all the first born
of egypt, or impregnated a married woman and left her with a kid or that he's fine with slavery under certain conditions as good things.
The «higher» happiness is
moral happiness and the causes
of suffering are
moral evils.
And I do think there is an element
of hope in the crusade's demonstration that
moral appeal and censure can affect a behavior so widespread, although goodness knows there are
evils much more in need
of our
moral attention.
We all are creatures
of mingled good and
evil; and, good institutions neglected and ancient
moral principles ignored, the
evil in us tends to predominate.
using your argument we would had civil rights in this country just because goverments make certain practices illegal does tat mean that what the goverrmet s doing is
moral and just, The fact s the goverment attempted to use Christaniaity to bolster it claim to power through this we have the start
of the Roman Catholic Church one
of the most insidious
evil organzations on this planet which as doe more to oppose ad kill true follewers
of Christ then ay group o this planet.
But, as John Paul, Havel, and others said at the beginning
of the revolution and say now, it was above all a matter
of people discerning the possibility and
moral imperative
of «living in truth» and «calling good and
evil by name.»
If atheists are
evil,
of the devil, lacking
morals, etc..
He knew and saw the ultimate
moral weakness and unrestrained
evil of, not religion, but all humans and society.
Americans no longer quest for the truth and proper
moral education but seek for meaningless co-existence
of any and every
evil practices and comforts
of any types.
The central claim is made that
moral evil... occurs because God — even though he is all - good and all - powerful — out
of goodness decided to give freedom to human beings.
Also, as Christians we are required to speak out against
moral evils that leadership in our nation may legislate in favor
of.
It is one thing to grant that a
moral world must contain natural regularities and that some nonmoral
evil is an unavoidable by - product
of such regularities, but quite another thing to grant that we must have the exact types and amount
of natural
evil which we in fact experience in the actual world.
The classical response to nonmoral
evil we have been discussing begins by affirming «C» omnipotence in relation to humans and then argues that there do exist good reasons to believe that such a
moral world would include instances
of genuine nonmoral
evil and plausible reasons for assuming that such a world would have the types and amount
of genuine nonmoral
evil we presently experience.
Plantinga need only acknowledge that the possible world containing Hitler's actions — i.e., the actual world — contains the greatest net amount
of good over
evil of any possible world containing free
moral agents which God was free to actualize.
He also examines how the human being who denies these
moral truths steeps himself ever deeper in perverted forms
of remorse, confession, atonement, reconciliation, and justification, all in the vain attempt to convince himself and others that
evil is really good.
Hence, only the first interpretation is meaningful, and it can not be used to deduce from the existence
of (genuine)
moral evil the nonexistence
of benevolent omnipotence, since «whether the free men created by God would always do what is right would presumably be up to them» (GPE 271).
We can also see the root
of why Haught finds it difficult to account for
moral evil.
The Church speaks with Christ's own authority on faith and
morals and
evils such as abortion, casual sex, the culture (or «anti-culture»)
of recreational drugs, binge - drinking, and pornography.
The idols
of moral people are not usually what we would consider
evils; but a good for which we have an inordinate love, something intrinsically good that we love more that God.
Thus the traditional conception
of deity, which we have received from our past, puts its main stress on divine absoluteness or aseity; on divine causative agency as the explanation
of everything that occurs whether by direct divine willing or by indirect divine permission with respect to
evil done in the world; on divine self - containedness and hence lack
of necessary relationship with anything else; on divine impassability, which makes any suffering impossible for God; and on divine
moral perfection, with the giving
of laws in accordance with which everything should be ordered.
''... the right
of holding slaves is clearly established in the Holy Scriptures, both by precept and example... Had the holding
of slaves been a
moral evil, it can not be supposed that the inspired Apostles... would have tolerated it for a moment in the Christian Church.
We re-discover the meaning
of heroism and friendship as we see the two hobbits clawing their way up Mount Doom; we see again the endless
evil of greed and egotism in Gollum, stunted and ingrown out
of moral shape by years
of lust for the ring; we recognize again the essential anguish
of seeing beautiful and frail things - innocence, early love, children — passing away as we read
of the Lady Galadriel and the elves making the inevitable journey to the West.
His argument, part
of which appeared in these pages («Leading Children Beyond Good and
Evil,» May 2000), is that
moral education as presently conceived almost inevitably ends up by thinning out
moral content, removing the sharp edges
of judgment, avoiding normative traditions
of moral experience, and thus stifling the factors most crucial to the formation
of character.
What is chosen therefore is one
of those types
of act which «in the Church's
moral tradition have been termed «intrinsically
evil» (intrinsice malum): they are such always and per se, in other words on account
of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions
of the one acting and the circumstances.»
I find, on the contrary, that it is much more difficult today for the knowing person to approach God from history, from the spiritual side
of the world, and from
morals; for there we encounter the suffering and
evil in the world, which it is difficult to bring into harmony with an all «merciful and almighty God.
When people speak
of «permitting the lesser
evil» they may have one or other
of a number
of different comparisons in mind, either between greater or lesser
moral evils, or between what they think
of as greater or lesser «pre-
moral»
evils.
(Leviticus 19:2; cf. 20:26; 21:18) Along with
moral commands against such
evils as child sacrifice, adultery, and sexual perversion are detailed injunctions concerning ceremonial observances, reminiscent
of the old taboos.
So unstinting has been the effort to portray as virtuous the ending
of the lives
of the weak that it brings to mind Pope Benedict's words to the College
of Cardinals in 2012: «We see how
evil wants to dominate the world,» he said, and how it uses cruelty and violence, but also how it «masks itself with good and, precisely in this way, destroys the
moral foundations
of society.»
It is frustrating to see William Chip's well - documented argument
of the economic and political
evils of illegal immigration rebutted from Scaperlanda's supposedly
moral standpoint, when in fact the victims in this scenario are the laborers working without regulations for workplace safety, without employment benefits, and even without police protection (since contact with law enforcement is associated with deportation).
One can concede that the tendency
of two - kingdoms theology to subordinate political concerns to a lesser realm made it easier than it should have been for Lutherans under Hitler to ignore or rationalize the regime's
moral evils, but the Nazis» anti-Semitism and their exaltation
of the State to idolatrous heights could find no justification in legitimate Lutheran doctrines
of morality or church - state relations.
While they write
of their qualified
moral acceptance
of deterrence, they mean only, as Cardinal John Krol testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that they consider deterrence to be for now the lesser
of competing
evils.
The interpreter who wishes to suggest that the text is declaring God's creation
of moral / spiritual
EVIL, has to contend with the fact that 45:7 a constitutes a juxtaposition and so does 45:7 b. «Rah» is being juxtaposed with «Shalom».
The great issues
of our time are
moral: the uses
of power; wealth and poverty; human rights; the
moral quality and character
of society; loss
of the sense
of the common good in tandem with the pampering
of private interests; domestic violence; outrageous legal and medical costs in a system
of maldistributed services; unprecedented developments in biotechnologies which portend good but risk
evil; the violation
of public trust by high elected officials and their appointees; the growing militarization
of many societies; continued racism; the persistence
of hunger and malnutrition; a still exploding population in societies hard put to increase jobs and resources; abortion; euthanasia; care for the environment; the claims
of future generations.
This was followed by five subsequent phases
of development in a regular pattern
of succession: (1) the organization
of home and foreign mission societies to channel new leadership into church planting or into the field; (2) the production and distribution
of Christian literature; (3) the renewal and extension
of Christian educational institutions; (4) attempts at «the reformation
of manners» — i.e., the reassertion
of Christian
moral standards in a decadent society; and (5) the great humanitarian crusades against social
evils like slavery, war and intemperance.