President - elect Donald Trump's victory in the Nov. 8, 2016 election caused a reflation theme to emerge; the incoming administration's proposed infrastructure spending and tax reductions resulted in expectations of increased inflation and an upward shift in the anticipated path
of nominal interest rates.
As Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda put it: «With the level
of nominal interest rates being high, Japan's economy will have more policy room to mitigate the impact of future economic downturns, or will be equipped with a sort of insurance for sustained economic growth.»
The housing recovery is being supported by an historically high level of affordability of houses which, in turn, reflects the low level
of nominal interest rates.
2 Average
of nominal interest rates on outstanding loans (fixed and variable).
(a) Average
of nominal interest rates on outstanding loans (fixed and variable); pre terms of trade boom average is 1993/94 — 2002/03; year - ended observation is the June quarter 2016 average (b) Consumer price data exclude interest charges prior to September quarter 1998 and deposit & loan facilities to June quarter 2011, and are adjusted for the tax changes of 1999 — 2000 (c) Pre terms of trade boom average is 1997/98 — 2002/03
As economists, we naturally think
of nominal interest rates as a combination of expected inflation and the real interest rate.
Not exact matches
(The Bank
of Canada estimates that the
nominal neutral
interest rate, or the rate at which the level
of interest is neither stimulative or contractionary, is between 2.75 % and 3.75 %, compared with 4.5 % and 5.5 % before the crisis.)
Real
interest rates, which subtract inflation from the
nominal rate to show the true cost
of borrowing, soared as high as 8 % in the aftermath, as demand for goods and services evaporated and prices tumbled.
Table 3 shows the changes in the average private sector economic forecasts for
nominal GDP (the most applicable tax base for budgetary revenues), and for short - and long - term
interest rates, from the first estimate
of the deficit to the final outcome.
This occurs when the
nominal interest rate is equal to the growth rate
of nominal wages.
Unfortunately, budget forecasts do not provide a breakdown
of the various components
of nominal GDP, such as wages and salaries, corporate profits,
interest income, etc., so it is difficult to properly assess the impact
of changes in the economic forecast to changes in the major components
of budgetary revenues.
It will be
interesting to see by how much a «risk adjustment factor» the Minister
of Finance builds into his fall update
nominal GDP forecast.
They include upwards revisions in economic forecasts, expectation
of monetary tightening, rising real and
nominal long - term
interest rates, fiscal stimulus on a huge scale in a full employment economy, rising protectionism that should choke off import flows, and tax reform directed at reducing capital outflows and increasing capital inflows.
Low inflation and the impossibility
of pushing
nominal interest rates significantly below zero meant that there was little scope for lowering real
interest rates and easing credit conditions by conventional means.
The only important thing a Neo-Wicksellian would add is that it's important to distinguish between
nominal and real rates
of interest (real =
nominal minus inflation), so if we have a 2 % inflation target we add 2 % to the natural rate to get the «neutral»
nominal rate.
Neither group
of countries, in other words, could help us determine what a «normal»
interest rate is compared to
nominal GDP.
While stocks have a terminal value beyond a 10 - year period, the effects
of interest rates and
nominal growth on those projections largely cancel out because higher
nominal GDP growth over a given 10 - year horizon is correlated with both higher
interest rates and generally lower market valuations at the end
of that period.
Most importantly, with
nominal GDP growth rates having dropped from 20 % to 8 - 9 % the greatest
of all the distortions, the
interest rate distortion, has been the one most dramatically to adjust in the past three years.
In a low - inflation environment,
nominal interest rates are also low, and households are able to service much higher levels
of debt than they could in the past.
Most people would accept that the relevant
interest rate here should be a real
interest rate — some
nominal interest rate adjusted for the ex-ante expected inflation rate
of the person making the decision.
There is a natural tendency for asset values to decline in line with deflation, whereas the
nominal value
of debt is constant (and, when
interest costs are added, the
nominal value
of monetary obligations actually increases).
While there are some signs
of recognition such as the Fed's reduction in its estimated neutral rate from 4.5 percent to 3.0 percent during the last 2 years, the IMF's explicit use
of the term secular stagnation in its World Economic Outlook, ECB president Mario Draghi's call for global coordination and greater use
of fiscal policy, and Japan's indicated
interest in fiscal - monetary cooperation, policymakers still have not made sufficiently radical adjustments in their world view to reflect this new reality
of a world where generating adequate
nominal GDP growth is likely to be the primary macroeconomic policy challenge for the next decade.
If the situation deteriorates for a given issue, history has shown there is often a window
of time when it is not particularly painful to switch out to a practically identical bond, with much better
interest coverage, for
nominal costs.
Currently, the Department
of Finance only using the major aggregates
of economic activity — real and
nominal gross domestic product (GDP), short and long - term
interest rates, etc..
Now, talking about what is specifically happening with the US dollar, it might be
interesting for people to look at the data provided by the World Bank, in which the World Bank provides the ratio between purchasing power parities and
nominal exchange rates
of countries, comparing it with the US dollar.
But I really was convinced
of my math, which connected iron ore prices inexorably with the extraordinarily large gap between China's
Nominal GDP growth and
interest rates set by the PBoC, and it was clearly impossible to maintain this gap.
At least part
of this, however, reflects the winding back
of inflation, with a corresponding reduction in the inflation premium built into
nominal interest rates, which in earlier years was being consumed — ie retirees were effectively running down their real capital, often without realising it.
Under that scenario, Social Security, health care, and
interest will be responsible for 77 percent
of nominal spending growth.
That set
of features suggests downward pressure on real U.S.
interest rates (i.e.
nominal interest rates declining without a corresponding decline in inflation rates).
Even if we agree that «doing nothing» means «doing nothing with the
nominal rate
of interest», that leaves open the question
of how long the Bank holds the
nominal rate
of interest constant.
Having higher
nominal interest rates because
of higher inflation would not help savers, because higher inflation would just erode the future purchasing power
of those savings.
They also warn that because
of extended zero -
interest policy by the Fed, security valuations have advanced to the point where prospective
nominal total returns on a conventional portfolio mix are likely to average well below 2 % annually, with negative real returns, over the coming 12 - year period.
The policy framework
of the MAS is focused on managing the Singapore dollar's
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), or the trade - weighted exchange rate, against an undisclosed basket
of currencies, rather than
interest rates.
Nominal interest rates (bills) averaged 4.1 % for a real average
interest rate
of 0.9 %.
Then again, a sustained period
of suppressed
interest rates is only likely in a continued environment
of restrained
nominal economic growth.
Historically, those
interest rate and
nominal growth effects have largely offset, which is why Market Cap / GVA has been reliably correlated with actual 10 - year S&P 500
nominal total returns regardless
of the prevailing level
of interest rates.
Interest rates
of intermediaries in Australia remain historically low, both in real and
nominal terms, and by international standards (Table 7).
The U.S. economy has never been willing to hold more than 10 cents
of base money per dollar
of nominal GDP except when
interest rates were substantially below 2 %.
Indeed, because the level
of interest rates at any point in time is highly correlated with the level
of nominal economic growth over the preceding decade, the relationship between starting valuations and actual subsequent S&P 500
nominal total returns is nearly independent
of interest rates.
While a money market fund or deposit account will protect the
nominal value
of your cash, you are missing out on a chance to grow it with
interest from bonds or capital appreciation from stocks.
The current valuation
of the S&P 500 is lofty by almost any measure, both for the aggregate market as well as the median stock: (1) The P / E ratio; (2) the current P / E expansion cycle; (3) EV / Sales; (4) EV / EBITDA; (5) Free Cash Flow yield; (6) Price / Book as well as the ROE and P / B relationship; and compared with the levels
of (6) inflation; (7)
nominal 10 - year Treasury yields; and (8) real
interest rates.
What exactly do you see playing out in terms
of negative
nominal interest rates or just negative real
interest rates with rising inflation?
For another example, a 1 % decline in inflation expectations would not result in a more bearish backdrop for gold if it were accompanied by a decline
of more than 1 % in the
nominal interest rate.
For example, a 2 % rise in inflation expectations would only result in a more bullish backdrop for gold if it were accompanied by a rise
of less than 2 % in the
nominal interest rate.
Although it now seems that the «zero lower bound» for
nominal interest rates wasn't actually zero, it is not clear that the recent negative rates implemented by a handful
of central banks in Europe offer some new vista
of policy effectiveness.
If the «pe»
of bonds and stocks is both high, bond principals will at least not lose
nominal principals when
interest rates rise.
Even if the Bank
of Japan did keep real and
nominal interest rates low after the country returned to inflation, the old «deflationary equilibrium» would be broken.
If she had added: «Plus, even though we are currently above the Effective Lower Bound on
nominal interest rates (which is probably below 0 %) we are worried that the margin
of safety is getting a bit small, and are pleased that fiscal policy is making that margin
of safety a bit bigger than it otherwise would be» that would also be an internally consistent thing for the Bank
of Canada to say.
When we talk about the Bank
of Canada offsetting rather than accommodating changes in fiscal policy, it is important to understand that we are talking about changing the
nominal interest rate relative to what it would have been otherwise without the fiscal policy change, and not relative to what the
nominal rate was in the past.
Computations
of real
interest rates should really be made by deducting an expectation
of future, rather than past, inflation from the relevant
nominal interest rate.